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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Gender and the Homoerotic Logic of Torture at Abu Ghraib. 
 (August 2007) 
Ryan Ashley Caldwell, B.A., Austin College; 
M.A., Texas Tech University 
Chair of Advisory Committee:  Dr. Stjepan G. Mestrovic 
 
 
 The focus of this dissertation is a social and cultural theoretical analysis of the 
empirical data regarding the prison abuse that occurred at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq by 
American forces.   I provide the following: an examination of the photographs of abuse 
that were leaked to the press in the fall of 2003; an analysis of both Lynndie England’s 
and Sabrina Harman’s courts-martial (two of the “rotten apples”); a discussion of the 
body associated with punishment and torture, and also as marked in ways of 
identification; and an assessment of additional representations regarding prisoner abuse 
at Abu Ghraib.   Throughout this analysis, I use gender as a lens to understand Abu 
Ghraib and the subsequent courts-martial.  It is important to note that I gained access to 
and was intimately involved as a graduate researcher for Dr.  Stjepan G.  Mestrovic, an 
expert for the defense, and experienced the events of the trials themselves, first-hand and 
during closed counsel and open session.   
  The empirical data provided is drawn primarily from first-hand qualitative 
research that involved participant-observation of two trials, interaction with soldiers and 
 iv
officers, and analysis of both documents pertaining to the trial as well as the photographs 
of abuse themselves, among other things.  I incorporate cultural studies, feminist and 
sociological theory (modern and postmodern), and feminist philosophy so as to provide a 
theoretical analysis of the abuse at Abu Ghraib and the subsequent courts-martial 
focused on gender and sexuality.   
The result of this dissertation is a social and cultural theoretical analysis of the 
empirical data regarding the prison abuse that occurred at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq by 
American forces, where women, gender, and sexuality are shown to be important criteria 
for examination.  Specifically, the results of this project highlight areas that current 
analyses of the abuse at Abu Ghraib have left out:  how women fit into American 
military politics, how gender functions as power within the military, how gender is 
socially constructed in the military in terms of heterosexuality, and how both gender and 
sexuality are used as weapons by the American military.  This kind of examination is 
useful in future policy considerations for the military and for detainee treatment, where 
analyses of women, gender, sexuality, and power have been so far neglected in any 
serious way, and even by sociologists Phillip Zimbardo and the application of his 
Stanford Prison Study to the events of Abu Ghraib. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
The focus of this dissertation is a social and cultural theoretical analysis of the 
empirical data regarding the prison abuse that occurred at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq by 
American forces.   I provide the following: an examination of the photographs of abuse 
that were leaked to the press in the fall of 2003; an analysis of both Lynndie England’s 
and Sabrina Harman’s courts-martial (two of the “rotten apples”); a discussion of the 
body associated with punishment and torture, and also as marked in ways of 
identification; and an assessment of additional representations regarding prisoner abuse at 
Abu Ghraib.   Throughout this analysis, I use gender as a lens to understand Abu Ghraib 
and the subsequent courts-martial.  The empirical data provided is drawn primarily from 
first-hand qualitative research that involved participant-observation of two trials, 
interaction with soldiers and officers, and analysis of both documents pertaining to the 
trial as well as the photographs of abuse themselves, among other things.  I see this 
project located at the intersection of sociology, social and cultural theory, women’s 
studies, and critical theory.  Consequently, I incorporate cultural studies, feminist and 
sociological theory (modern and postmodern), and feminist philosophy so as to provide a 
theoretical analysis of the abuse at Abu Ghraib and the subsequent courts-martial focused 
on gender and sexuality.   
Over the last 20-30 years, gender has become an important focus for analysis in 
the social sciences.  Feminists, gender and social theorists, and those concerned with 
women’s issues, have analyzed society and culture using gender as a focus for 
understanding many different phenomena.  In these cases, gender is understood as 
something that is socially constructed, meaning it is a category that is defined in terms of 
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a cultural context, where “masculinity” and “femininity” are conceived of differently 
within different contexts.  In the social sciences and in feminist theory, for example, there 
is a strict conceptual separation of sex, gender, and sexuality categories when theorizing 
categories for gender.   
However, what is important to understand is that gender conceptualizations have a 
limiting effect in that there are strict rules for gender, and are real consequences within 
these specific cultural contexts for not performing gender correctly.  Moreover, within 
cultural contexts, gender is used to organize society and culture such that gender 
functions as a kind of ideology.   Likewise, gender is understood as one component of an 
intersected identity, where race, class, cultural identification, sexual orientation, religion, 
etc., function as additional characteristic schema, where power is coupled with gender to 
provide an understanding of identity.   The social construction of gender thus delineates 
the boundaries for both “masculinity” and “femininity,” and I argue that gender 
categories are understood with regard to power or a “code” in their constructions. 
Social construction is a theoretical concept used to understand and explain social 
reality, and I take it as a theoretical presupposition that individuals experience a shared 
sense of reality that is itself socially constructed in terms of power differentials.   By this, 
I mean that what individuals and society perceive and understand as “reality” is a product 
of the social interactions of individuals and groups with others, as well as with the 
previously established “reality” that has been beforehand socially objectified.  Through 
these interactions, people continually create a shared reality experience, thereby 
ultimately establishing a shared social epistemology.  Social constructionists work to 
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document and analyze the processes through which social reality is constructed, and how 
that constructed reality begins to work back upon society itself.   
However, within this socially constructed system of “reality,” there is a dilemma 
regarding what counts as “reality.”  It is argued that individuals or groups in positions of 
power influence what comes to be socially regarded as “real,” thereby dictating reality in 
terms of a specific viewpoint.  Social control is established in terms of this kind of 
inequitable socially constructed reality, thereby allowing the generated norms, taboos, 
expectations, social roles, etc., to be understood in terms of this privileged viewpoint.  
This is problematic for those individuals who are not socially powerful in that it has the 
consequence of “silencing” their minority experiences.  Thus, through the process of 
socially creating an objective “reality,” experiences of those with little or no social power 
are not fully represented in that the created “objective reality” is biased towards the 
socially powerful.   
Given the problem of the biased social construction of reality, feminists aim to 
understand and uncover the ways in which members of society come to know and 
simultaneously create “social reality,” so as to identify and expand on the ways in which 
women come to be represented within society.  Feminists argue against a phallocentric 
ordering of society, which privileges the socially powerful male subjectivity, and argue 
for the equality of the sexes.  Additionally, feminists make a case for the realization of 
representations of women’s diverse experiences given the idea of intersected identities, 
and show how these intersected identities actually shape the ways in which women 
experience different kinds of subjugation.  Feminists locate the origin of male dominance 
in patriarchal cultures within the social, economic, and political spheres of society, and 
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are interested in the ideological processes that legitimate and perpetuate female 
subordination.  As a result, it seems that the term ‘feminist’ implies a specific politicized 
understanding of “woman,” namely as members of a subjugated social group. 
Feminist social theorists question the gendered hierarchy of cultures that privilege 
males, as this endeavor applied questions the social theory cannon’s universal voice as 
representing masculine biases.  In section two entitled “It was not Lucifer Achieved: 
Zimbardo, Women, and Abu Ghraib,” I argue that one way American society has been 
“gendered” is through the study of men in social experiments to the exclusion of women 
in these situations.  Using gender as a tool for analysis, it is possible to provide a richer 
understanding of social and cultural situations. 
 For example, there have been many attempts to make sense of the now infamous 
photographs of abuse at Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq.  There are several approaches that can 
be used to understand these situations of abuse.  Phillip Zimbardo argues that the 
narratives from which to understand the abuse at Abu Ghraib can be found through an 
analysis of group conformity, and in terms of his 1971 Stanford County Prison Study.  
Still a further understanding of this abuse can be found in Stanley Milgram’s study 
regarding obedience to an authority figure.   
At first sight, it seems that experiments such as Zimbardo’s and Milgram’s can 
explain the abuse at Abu Ghraib, and to some extent they do provide an interpretation.  
However, these experiments do not fully account for the anomic absence of authority and 
the lacking of Riesman’s “moral compass” that was non-existent at Abu Ghraib as shown 
by the numerous testimonies at the courts-martial of both England and Harman regarding 
the lack of leadership with regards to detainee treatment, and the lack of responsibility of 
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those higher-up with regards to the abuse itself.  These issues need to be addressed in 
order to fully account for the chaos of Abu Ghraib.   
Additionally, I argue that abuse took place because of the gendered masculine and 
heterosexist nature of the American military, and highlight the fact that unlike the events 
at Abu Ghraib, the above studies by Zimbardo and Milgram included only white males.  
Furthermore, in The Lucifer Effect, Zimbardo (2007) fails to mention the existence of 
female prisoners at Abu Ghraib.  He writes with reference to “good boys” gone bad at 
Abu Ghraib as an extension of his famous experiment—but does not write about the 
female soldiers, prisoners, officers, girlfriends, and other female roles.  No account of any 
situation that excludes 50% of the human race can be considered a full explanation, and 
instead is an exclusively male-centered analysis.  An account of female soldiers, 
prisoners, officers, lawyers, commanders, girlfriends, and other female roles needs to be 
considered for a full explanation.  The section shows that by using a gender-sensitive 
analysis, which accounts for both gender and sexuality, one can come to a thicker 
understanding of the infamous events of this now iconic occurrence.  I provide a critique 
of Zimbardo’s mock-prison study using the realities of Abu Ghraib, and I “fill in” the 
women’s perspective on Abu Ghraib as a counter to Zimbardo’s exclusively male-
centered analyses, from the Stanford Prison Experiment to Abu Ghraib.  Thus, I argue 
that Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison Study neither fully elucidates nor makes significant 
sense of the abuse at Abu Ghraib prison, which was a real place with actual abuse that 
involved males and females as well as gender and power permutations. 
Consider how gender is socially constructed with regards to power, where 
masculinity is equated with heterosexuality, and value is given to this association.  In this 
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way, the connections between sex, gender, and sexuality function as a culturally practiced 
ideology.  One of the characterizations of the American military that I continually refer 
back to is that it has been socially constructed as masculinist and heterosexist.  The “code 
of cultural masculinity,” where both masculinity and heterosexuality function together as 
the power symbolic of the military, was evidenced in many ways at the Stanford Prison 
and also at Abu Ghraib prison.  At Abu Ghraib and during the Stanford experiment, both 
situations evidenced homosexual torture techniques to exploit culturally constructed 
attitudes about masculinity and fears of homosexuality.  Zimbardo’s paradigm for 
analysis does not show the importance of sex, gender, and sexuality as themselves torture 
techniques, which were used against both Iraqi detainees and Zimbardo’s American 
prisoners.   
Both situations, Abu Ghraib and Zimbardo’s Study, evidenced similar sexualized 
and homoerotic torture techniques—a mock (homosexual) wedding at Stanford, and 
forced masturbation and naked pyramids at Abu Ghraib.   For example, masculinity was 
taken away through the characterization of prisoners as women, through the use of raw 
sex, by putting female panties on male prisoner’s heads as humiliation, stacking naked 
bodies, forced masturbation and fellatio, and male prisoners’ naked bodies in pyramids.  
The American military’s heterosexism and masculinist power symbolic can be seen in 
given testimony at the England and Harman courts-martial through the characterization 
of soldiers who did not participate in the abuse, where homoeroticism was used as torture 
device (sodomy, simulated fellatio, etc.).  These examples of abuse at Abu Ghraib prison 
show that the mostly male soldiers at Abu Ghraib were reified and heralded when they 
acted in typically masculine ways with regard to abuse, while the confessions of 
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weakness made by other soldiers served as an embarrassment to the US Army and its 
image of the macho-instrumental soldier, and contrary to the masculinist and heterosexist 
ideal of the military itself.   
Consequently, what is missing in Zimbardo’s paradigm for explaining the abuse 
at Abu Ghraib is an analysis of the connections with regard to power or maleness, 
masculinity, and heterosexuality.  Through an analysis of the connections between sex, 
gender and sexuality with regard to power, and an analysis of the gendered masculine and 
heterosexist nature of American culture and military, additional narratives about prisoner 
abuse are formed.  Because the above are not considered by Zimbardo’s paradigm, I 
argue that Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison Study does neither fully elucidate nor make 
significance sense of the abuse at Abu Ghraib prison. 
Gender categories also provide descriptions of gender characteristics, where both 
masculine and feminine symbolic narratives and “codes” have been culturally employed 
to describe social phenomena.  For example, in patriarchal societies some narratives 
describe gender in terms of binaries, associating masculinity with all that is essential, 
rational, reasonable, strong, orderly, and logical.  Conversely, femininity is associated 
with emotionality, chaos, weakness, inconsistency, inessentiality, and irrationality.   
Given these descriptions of gender characterizations, it is possible to understand how 
power has been historically exerted to control women’s bodies in areas such as marriage, 
sexuality, and in legislation over abortion.  However, masculine power and control over 
the body can also affect sexed male bodies, where feminization serves to humiliate and 
mock cultural constructions of masculinity itself.  In this way, masculinist power is used 
to torture both the body and mind. 
  
8
 
In section three entitled “Gender, Power and the ‘Rationalization’ of Rationality: 
Uses of the Masculine and Feminine Symbolic Narratives,” rationality and chaos as 
descriptors are analyzed and probed via a gendered lens to demonstrate that both have 
become collective symbols that works to obscure and repress the cultural and emotional 
harms of inadequacy, shame, reprisal and barbarism that Abu Ghraib reflects back to the 
world's collective consiousnesses.  In this vein, the section demonstrates that rationality 
and chaos have becomes narratives and means to repress additional gendered 
explanations of what occurred in Saddam Hussein's former torture chambers—now 
owned and operated by the American military.  By demonstrating the rationality 
associated with modernity and its link to masculine and patriarchal systems, the section 
uses a gender analysis to demonstrate the rational and logically constructed symbols of 
both “rationality” and “chaos” that most now use to garner a non-understanding of Abu 
Ghraib's horrors.   
I provide a discussion of the chaos associated with Abu Ghraib prison and how 
this chaos does not fit into modernist narratives of rationality and order, where I equate 
order and rationality with the masculine symbolic code.  In this way, I describe the 
illusory order and actual chaos at Abu Ghraib as gendered.  Nonetheless, both the rhetoric 
of order and chaos obscures an additional explanation for the abuses, namely the 
masculinist and barbaric environment that was indicative of pejorative conditions and 
was responsible for the maltreatment of detainees.  
 I provide an analysis of the built and created environment at Abu Ghraib and 
describe characterizations of Abu Ghraib that came out in testimony at the courts-martial.  
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I also provide some testimony about the conditions of Abu Ghraib to evidence the lack of 
“masculine” order, control and rationality associated with the prison itself.   
Additionally, I discuss Foucault’s narrative of modernist power structures, and 
here I am especially interested in how power was used to punish both the body and soul 
at Abu Ghraib.  Foucault's identification of the body as the principal target of power has 
been used by feminists to analyze contemporary forms of social control over women's 
bodies and minds.  This becomes an important discussion of power coupled with gender 
in that women’s bodies and souls (both American and Iraqi) were punished at Abu 
Ghraib—Iraqi women and children were held as bargaining chips at Abu Ghraib, dogs 
were used to intimidate Iraqi prisoners, and panties were put on male prisoner’s heads 
thereby “feminizing” them.  
I also discuss how Foucault’s identification of the body as the principal target of 
power actually provides a kind of social control over the prisoners’ bodies and 
souls/minds at Abu Ghraib, and especially given the gendered and associated sexualized 
nature of this torture, and the associated violation of Iraqi cultural constructions of 
masculinity.  Some examples of gender manipulation associated with torture of the body 
are the following:  the use of women’s panties on male Iraqi prisoners’ heads, nakedness 
in front of women as a means for control, a female’s marking of rapist on the male body, 
male prisoners “friendships” with female guards, male prisoners being treated as 
“females,” female guards being forced into photographs of abuse, and the torture of Iraqi 
males in front of American female guards.  I argue that the dehumanization and abuse of 
prisoners has set the stage for the physical and sexual abuse that followed, where the 
punishment of the soul occurred in the form of gender manipulation and humiliation.   
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  Feminist social theory is also aimed at the analysis of the subordination and 
marginalization of women from social and cultural arenas, and is focused on 
understanding the fundamental inequalities between the sexes, specifically with the 
analysis of male power as dominant over women.1  However, an analysis of power 
associated with gender shows how our society and culture is effectively organized in 
terms of attitudes and beliefs concerning gender categories.   
 Again, one aspect of society that that is frequently analyzed using gender is the 
division of social power between men and women.  These realized power differentials 
manifest themselves in the ways that society is organized, as they directly inform a 
schema of social order and value.  In patriarchal societies, what I call gender ideology, or 
the set of cultural beliefs, values, and attitudes that favor the interests of the powerful 
masculine gender, come to function as dogma in that they foundationally constitute, 
justify, and legitimate positions of power.  Additionally, in patriarchal societies, males 
are given social power, opportunities, value, and rewards unequal to women, where 
women receive less of these benefits given their subordinate statuses. 
Power coupled with gender informs the organization of society and thus are 
evidence of the effects of applied and specific gender constructions within society.   
Since it is the case that society is stratified in terms of power arrangements, an analysis of 
gender constructions shows how gender roles have been conceived of as a means for 
establishing and sustaining social control.  From these understandings of power coupled 
with gender, social roles emerge and social theorists have come up with many different 
ways to discuss these gendered roles.  In section four “Abu Ghraib, Parsonian Gender 
                                                 
1 It is important to note that gender experiences differ between individuals, even of the same gender, and I 
argue that gender categories are stratified with regards to race, ethnicity, class, sexuality, and cultural value, 
among many other hierarchical ways.   
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Roles, and Courts-Martial Experiences,” I analyze the courts-martial of Lynndie England 
and Sabrina Harman and show that the Parsonian distinction between instrumental 
(masculine) and expressive (feminine) roles served a multitude of functions 
simultaneously and especially given the masculinist code of the military.  I analyze sworn 
statements and testimony, and I apply Parsons’ notion of gender roles to an analysis of 
responsibility for some of the abuse at Abu Ghraib, to an analysis of my experiences in 
defense council meetings and in the courtroom, to the treatment of prisoners at Abu 
Ghraib prison, to an analysis of Sabrina Harman as a “maternal caregiver,” and an 
analysis of Instrumental and Expressive torture.  However, I move beyond Parsons, and 
argue that given the complex social situations at Abu Ghraib, Parsons’ notions of 
“instrumental” and “expressive” are limited with regard to their explanatory power. 
For Parsons, the feminine role was the “expressive” role associated with the 
mothering duties of taking care of children and providing emotional support, which was 
functional in nature for both the family and for social solidarity.  The feminine role was 
expressive action oriented towards internal integration, or the amalgamation of the group, 
as well as assimilation and incorporation.  The masculine role was, according to Parsons, 
the “instrumental” role, or those tasks associated with being a wage earner or other goal-
oriented and presumably “rational” tasks.  Additionally, Parsons characterized the 
masculine role as oriented towards instrumental action, aimed at the external environment 
such as the work place or public and political sphere of society.  The masculine role 
identifies the male as an agent who thinks in terms of rationally-linked goals and means, 
and whose behavior is esteemed in terms of competence and independence. 
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Nonetheless, I expand Parsons’ theorizing, and argue that given the complex 
social situations at Abu Ghraib, Parsons’ notions of “instrumental” and “expressive” are 
limited with regard to their explanatory power in the following situations:  when 
expressive means were linked to instrumental ends; expressiveness towards superiors as a 
means to an ends; and expressive fear in male soldiers.  In general, Parsons accounts for 
the rigid stereotypes of the military with regard to male and female roles.  But Parsons 
does not account for the fact that males can be expressive, females can be instrumental, 
and above all, that expressive functions can themselves be “instrumental” in terms of 
power relationships.  Moreover, the “instrumental” goals-means relationships established 
at Abu Ghraib was non-functional, and ironically, resulted in chaos, not the desired, 
instrumental goals.  A complex and sophisticated application of Parsons’s initial typology 
leads to new concepts such as expressive torture, expressive power, instrumental torture, 
and instrumental chaos. 
Social conceptual schemes are formed with regard to gender, where power is 
associated with masculinity, which serves as the standard or benchmark for 
understanding and interpreting society.  Accordingly, the social construction of gender 
can be understood as a conceptual tool that shapes social realities in that it acts as a 
comprehensive set of ideas that explain and prescribe social, political, and economic 
conditions in terms of specific power differentials as within specific contexts.  These 
conceptual schemes are blueprints from which it is argued that social power should be 
allocated.  In this way, gender constructions inform social distributions of power, which 
are thus products of certain gender ideologies.   
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As stated, recent understandings of gender in sociology describe gender as 
something that is socially constructed, meaning that gender performances are “real” in 
terms of some “code” of social reality, and as well in their consequence.  In this way, 
socially constructed gender conceptualizations function as a theoretical “reality” with 
applied outcomes for identity and value.  Using postmodern theory as a perspective for 
understanding “realness,” both gender identity and identity in general, can be understood 
as something that is produced in relation to a socially constructed normative category of 
“realness.” 
 In section five “The Significance of Identity Simulacra and Gender Hyperreality: 
American Military and The Case of Abu Ghraib,” I am interested in analyzing what was 
“real” and what was “simulacra” about gender at Abu Ghraib prison and at the 
subsequent trials.  I provide a discussion of how what is considered theoretically "real" 
instructs the formation of conceptual and organizational paradigms, and especially 
categories for thinking about sex and gender.   
Both Jean Baudrillard and Judith Butler have theories of gender “realness,” and I 
consider both theories when describing the categories of gender as simulacrum in their 
construction, but real in their consequences.  For Baudrillard, these gender categories are 
simulacra in that they do not refer to any reality outside of their conception.  However, 
for Judith Butler, there is a legitimating system based on power that served to render 
gender performances as valuable.  This means that, for Butler, “realness” regarding 
gender identity is something that we conform to with regards to cultural norms of identity 
realness.  Nonetheless, and although Baudrillard does not posit any kind of power 
doctrine of gender, both Butler and Baudrillard see gender as ultimately a social 
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construction.  Because of their social construction, gender categories themselves can be 
thusly understood as simulations and simulacra, which are located in Baudrillard’s world 
of hyperreality, as the reality of the “self” has been replaced by simulacra, or the 
representations of things (the self in this case) that come to replace the thing being 
represented.   
I analyze notions of gender “realness” and postmodern identity with an analysis of 
the “metrosexual soldier.”  Also, I examine the notion of drag and Baudrillard’s 
seduction, and show that Sabrina Harman actually “seduces” the masculinist and 
heterosexist military’s “code” because she is simultaneously a female, a lesbian, and also 
a member of the masculinist military.  This means that Harman evidenced signs of 
masculinity, heterosexuality, and homosexuality in her identity performance, thereby 
displaying more signs than reality.   
Moreover, I show that roles within the military have been gendered in their 
constructions in terms of the code of normative gender realness, and show how 
individuals and actions both reify and subvert these gendered constructions, thereby 
questioning the “realness” of these constructions.  I analyze the gendered construction of 
the military as a simulacra of masculinity, how military uniforms give bodies legitimate 
expression while also policing gender according to the code of gender enforced, 
evidences of “femininity” within the masculinist military through the ritualized style of 
the body in terms of military gender politics, the association of the doctrine of separate 
spheres within the military itself vis-à-vis gender roles and gender expressions, 
performances of gender in the courtroom, the idea of “drag” as applying to military 
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uniforms, and the perceived consequences of offending the masculinist and heterosexist 
symbolic military code.   
One way that gender has been constructed within the U.S. military is through the 
masculinist system of the military itself, where masculinity functions as the dominant 
power-simulacra with regards to gender hierarchy.  The masculinist economy of the 
military is one normalizing structure that constructs and reifies notions of gender within 
the military itself in terms of value.  In this way, the masculinist economy functions as 
the “real” with regards to judging and policing gender expressions, as this “realness” 
allows for understandings of gender within the military context.  
Lastly in this section, I analyze non-normative gender practices that call into 
question the validity of this entire system of gender and show its “real” nature to be 
simulacra, or a “code” based on the “rule by simulacra of reality.”  In this analysis I 
consider defense attorney Captain Takemaura.  It was a telling site that the only female 
attorney in the Harman trial was the one who elicited confessions of being afraid out of 
the male soldiers.  In this way, Takemura wore the persona of the motherly caregiver who 
could empathize with fear, and who could make it a safe place to address this fear, even 
in the courtroom which was representative of the military’s symbolic code of 
masculinity.  I argue that she could elicit these confessions because she understood the 
military code, and inserted herself as a role acceptable with regards to this power 
symbolic.  Takemura elicited these confessions while wearing the masculine uniform of 
the military, and thus through the use of “drag.”   
Dominant gender ideologies become social organizing tools in that the power 
associated with these ideologies act upon society in such a way that it effects, and to a 
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greater extent instructs, social stratification.  Hence, gender ideologies perform the 
function of “conceptual lens” through which social power, and specifically social 
stratification, is understood.  Furthermore, it is in terms of gender ideologies that society 
constructs itself in an attempt to mirror established power differentials, thereby reifying 
the dominant ideology.   
One way that gender ideologies manifest themselves is in terms of cultural 
representations.  Within these representations, gender messages can be interpreted as 
showing the subjugation of women in larger societies, thereby furthering messages of 
inequality and gender hierarchy.   Sometimes these messages are interpreted in terms of 
what they leave out.  In section six “Representations of Abu Ghraib and Images of Power 
in Relation to Gender,” I analyze different representations of Abu Ghraib and discuss 
images of gender as power.  These representations range from leaked photographs of 
abuse at Abu Ghraib, to Botero’s art, to images used by the advertising industry to 
promote a sort of Abu Ghraib, sado-masochistic fashion.   
I discuss Colombian artist Fernando Botero’s recent exhibition entitled “Abu 
Ghraib,” and show the gendered representations that Botero provides of prisoners.  
Within this analysis, I discuss the importance of these images with regard to 
constructions of Iraqi cultural masculinity and the associated gendered humiliation and 
“homoerotic” abuse.  I critique his representations of abuse at Abu Ghraib because they 
leave out a “testimony” of two specific kinds of suffering associated with the atrocities at 
Abu Ghraib prison.  First, Botero does not fully address the suffering of the women and 
children who were detained at Abu Ghraib, and specifically the women who were raped 
at the prison.  Second, Botero’s work does not depict the women charged and found 
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guilty of detainee abuse, namely Lynndie England and Sabrina Harman, two of the 
“rotten apples.”  To not make these women central to his work seems to violate his stated 
aims of remembering what happened at Abu Ghraib.  Additionally, I analyze the 
representations of Botero’s Abu Ghraib versus the actual images of abuse at Abu Ghraib 
in terms of the poses of prisoners as martyrs, and especially since Botero’s “martyr” pose 
is gendered in that the male prisoner is wearing a red female undergarments.   
Aditionally, I analyze images taken by photographer Antonin Kratochvil, a Czech 
refugee who fled to the United States and whose father was tortured and humiliated in a 
Stalinist labor camp.  Following in the footsteps of Botero, Kratochvil has recreated the 
humiliation suffered by naked, bound and hooded Iraqis in his project called “Homage to 
Abu Ghraib.”  Like Botero, Kratochvil says his intent is to emblazon the images upon the 
consciousness of the world.  Kratochvil’s images are blurry, and I argue that a possible 
explanation for the blurry images is that prisoners are not identified by name or face at 
Abu Ghraib, and exist only in terms of the gendered and homoerotic abuse they 
experiences as objects, among other conjectures. 
Additionally, I analyze current images of Abu Ghraib that have been morphed and 
used as a means to sell consumer products, and argue that these images have a gendered 
message with regards to women’s secondary status to men within a patriarchal culture.  
Within this discussion, I show that the advertising media exploits the sadomasochism of 
the sexual and homoerotic abuse at Abu Ghraib to sell products.  In this case, women’s 
use-value as objects to be tortured, objects for torture, and as witnesses to torture.  This 
discussion of the value of women becomes additionally important when considering the 
  
18
 
“use-value” of woman as functioning as objects for torture, or as actual “interrogation 
techniques” at Abu Ghraib, in both thing and strategy.   
Finally, I analyze the actual images of women depicted in the leaked photographs 
of abuse at Abu Ghraib and argue that these photographs show England and Harman as 
out of context, in that they were not actually torturing (this came out in the trials), but 
were following commands to smile in pictures. 
The significance of this research for sociology is that there has not been extensive 
analysis of the abuse at Abu Ghraib and the surrounding courts-martial in terms of 
sociological theory (postmodern, modern, and cultural), gender, or sexuality, so this 
would add to the current and growing analysis of these events.  Additionally, a discussion 
of the visual interpretations of the abuses at Abu Ghraib has not been connected to social 
theory in general, including recent expressions of this abuse. This project can thus fill a 
missing gap in the discussion.   Additionally, because of the nature of my involvement in 
the trials of Lynndie England and Sabrina Harman, I have an insider perspective that only 
few others have, including researching for the defense, and being a part of private 
meetings and strategy sessions.  I think it is important to initiate the discussion of gender 
and women’s roles in the military today—as soldiers, officers, commanders, lawyers, and 
other roles—in addition to an analysis of current issues for policy making, and 
specifically with regard to the use of torture.  
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2. IT WAS NOT LUCIFER ACHIEVED: ZIMBARDO, WOMEN,  
 
AND ABU GHRAIB 
 
There have been many attempts to make sense of the now infamous photographs 
of abuse at Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq.   Academics, lawyers, and journalists alike have 
provided varied interpretations of how the situation could have taken place at the hands 
of American military soldiers, if the environment itself could have produced the 
malicious behavior, who was to blame for the abuses of prisoners, among many other 
conjectures.   There are several approaches that can be used to understand these situations 
of abuse.   Some make sense of the abuse at Abu Ghraib through interpretations of the 
leaked photographs only, and without consideration of the context within which these 
photos were taken, while others provide an account of the ill treatment in terms of 
interviews with former detainees at Abu Ghraib prison itself.    In other sections, I have 
provided a postmodern text for understanding the events at Abu Ghraib.   However, 
Phillip Zimbardo argues that the narratives from which to understand the abuse at Abu 
Ghraib can be found through an analysis of group conformity, and in terms of his 1971 
Stanford County Prison Study (Zimbardo 2007a, Zimbardo 2007b).   Still a further 
understanding of this abuse can be found in Stanley Milgram’s study regarding obedience 
to an authority figure (Milgram 1963).    
At first sight, it seems that experiments such as Zimbardo’s and Milgram’s can 
explain the abuse at Abu Ghraib, and to some extent they do provide an interpretation.   
However, these experiments do not fully account for the anomic absence of authority and 
the lacking of Riesman’s “moral compass” that was non-existent at Abu Ghraib as shown 
by the numerous testimonies at the courts-martial of both England and Harman regarding 
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the lack of leadership with regards to detainee treatment, and the lack of responsibility of 
those higher-up with regards to the abuse itself.   These issues need to be addressed in 
order to fully account for the chaos of Abu Ghraib.   Hence, I argue that because of 
testimony supplied at the England and Harman courts-martial, analysis of the 
government’s reports, as well as other evidence, that the abuse at Abu Ghraib was not 
simply the result of a few “rotten apples” in a volatile environment conducive to group-
influenced behavior defined as torture.     
Still another narrative is that abuse took place because of the gendered masculine 
and heterosexist nature of the American military.  Zimbardo takes none of these alternate 
explanations into account.  Furthermore, in The Lucifer Effect, Zimbardo (2007) fails to 
mention the existence of female prisoners at Abu Ghraib.   He writes with reference to 
“good boys” gone bad at Abu Ghraib as an extension of his famous experiment—but 
does not write about the female soldiers, prisoners, officers, lawyers, commanders, 
girlfriends, and other female roles.  No account of any situation that excludes 50% of the 
human race can be considered a full explanation.  Much like Carol Gilligan had to “fill 
in” the “other voice,” namely women’s points of view, in relation to the exclusively 
male-oriented work of Lawrence Kohlberg, I intend to “fill in” the women’s perspective 
on Abu Ghraib as a counter to Zimbardo’s exclusively male-centered analyses, from the 
Stanford Prison Experiment to Abu Ghraib.   The section shows that by using a gender-
sensitive analysis, which accounts for both gender and sexuality, one can come to a 
thicker understanding of the infamous events of this now iconic occurrence.   Thus, I 
argue that Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison Study neither fully elucidates nor makes 
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significant sense of the abuse at Abu Ghraib prison, which was a real place with actual 
abuse that involved males and females as well as gender and power permutations. 
2.1 Zimbardo’s Prison Study 
 
Consider Zimbardo’s experiment aimed at providing an explanation of group 
conformity to roles (Zimbardo 1971; Zimbardo 1972; Zimbardo 2007a, Zimbardo 2007b; 
Musen and Zimbardo 1991).   Zimbardo’s 1971 Stanford County Prison Study simulated 
a mock jail situation where exclusively male students were randomly assigned the role of 
guard and prisoner.   This experiment was aimed at understanding the behavior and 
psychological consequences of becoming a prison guard or prisoner.   A realistic looking 
prison block was constructed in the basement of California’s Stanford University, and 
seventy young men were screened physically and psychologically for the experiment.   
The healthiest 24 men—or as Zimbardo calls them, “boys”—were selected to participate 
in the study, and they were given their roles as either guard or prisoner.   The Palo Alto 
city police actually participated in the experiment and arrested publicly those previously 
designated to be prisoners in the study.   These prisoners were taken to the police station, 
fingerprinted, and then transported to the Stanford University basement’s mock jail.    
The guards and prisoners were to spend the next two weeks in the prison with 
each other.   Zimbardo, the superintendent of the prison, had instructed the guards not to 
physically harm the prisoners, but to create situations of boredom, frustration, fear, and 
arbitrariness so that the prisoners understood that the guards now controlled their life.   
Basically, Zimbardo ordered that the guards should show the prisoners that they had total 
arbitrary control of them as prisoners.   It was the guards’ responsibility to maintain 
constant surveillance of the prisoners, who in turn had no degree of privacy whatsoever.   
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Additionally, the guards were instructed to create an atmosphere of powerlessness for the 
prisoners, where their identities were stripped from them in exchange for a faceless 
identification through numbers.   Once the prisoners arrived at the mock jail, they were 
stripped naked, given rubber shower shoes, and chained around one leg as a constant 
reminder of their role status.   Symbols were used at the prison to show status, with the 
guards receiving a whistle, billy club, uniform, and mirror sunglasses (to allow the guards 
to mask their “own” identity for that of “guard”)—all symbolic of their powerful role 
over the prisoners.   The prisoners received identical plain potato-sack outfits with 
armholes, which were actually women’s plain dresses, prisoner identification numbers, 
and headscarves—all symbolic of their subordinate status to the guards.   In this way, the 
mask of the mirror sunglasses and the numbers used for detainee identification provided 
alternate identities for both prisoners and guards. 
  However, soon after arriving at the “Stanford Prison,” both guards and prisoners 
became resentful and hostile towards one another.   When tactics of force were shown not 
to work effectively, as sometimes prisoners laughed at guards’ commands, thereby not 
taking the situation seriously, the guards began to additionally use psychological tactics 
to control the prisoners.   Guards humiliated the prisoners sadistically by assigning them 
duties such as cleaning out toilets with their bare hands, forcing them to do pushups and 
repeat commands, sing songs that ultimately led to the guards’ power position over the 
prisoners (such as repeating “prisoner 819 did a bad thing” so as to redirect prisoner 
hostility away from the guards).   Additionally, guards interrupted sleep to do role calls 
(argued to provide regular interaction with prisoners as a means to show control), called 
the prisoners names thereby making them feel ridiculous, took away their blankets, 
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clothing (nakedness), and beds, used sexual humiliation, and forced them at night to 
urinate and defecate in buckets in their cells.   In some cases, the guards attempted to give 
some prisoners privileges such as beds, clothing, and better meals as a means to gain 
prisoner compliance through reward.   Additionally, the guards used a storage closet as a 
place to put prisoners in solitary confinement for punishment.   These were all actions 
aimed at outlining and maintaining the guard’s control.   As a means for preserving the 
environment of the prison, compliance of prisoners, and the authority of the guards, 
Zimbardo instructed guards to put paper bags over the prisoner’s heads when they went 
to the restrooms or when they went to the counseling office, which was not uncommon 
(Gibney 2006).   Not surprisingly, the prisoners resisted and insulted the guards in return.    
Within a day there were signs of stress and anxiety, as prisoners were beginning 
to feel panic and extreme control.   On the second day, prisoner 8612 started to complain 
of stomach pains and headaches, and when he went to meet with Zimbardo (as a prisoner, 
and not a student), Zimbardo (in the prison supervisor role) told him that he could not 
leave the experiment and instead offered prisoner 8612 a deal for easy treatment if he 
would become a “snitch” (Musen and Zimbardo 1991).   Prisoner 8612 returned to the 
population and told everyone that he had met with Zimbardo and that there was no way 
that anybody could get out of the experiment (Musen and Zimbardo 1991).   Because of 
the reported outcome of this meeting with Zimbardo, the prison superintendent, the 
prisoners really began to feel like prisoners.   Additionally, the guards began to think of 
the prisoners as themselves dangerous.   There were minimal signs of physical rebellion 
in the mock jail, and instead there were evidences of psychological stress.   After only 
four days, Zimbardo had removed five of the male student-prisoners who displayed 
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“extreme emotional depression, crying, rage, and acute anxiety” (Zimbardo 1972).   For 
example, prisoner 8612 began to show signs of confusion and helplessness, and began to 
exhibit signs of a “crazy person,” which turned into uncontrollable rage (Musen and 
Zimbardo 1991).   Before the first week ended, the situation of abuse had become so bad 
that Zimbardo cancelled the experiment totally.   Zimbardo (1972) says that guards began 
to treat prisoners as “despicable animals” and that they were taking pleasure in cruelty.   
Zimbardo also characterized some of the prisoners as becoming so servile, yielding, and 
submissive that they were said to have only been concerned with their escape, their own 
individual survival, and their escalating hatred of the guards (Zimbardo 1972).    
It is important to note that Zimbardo “decided” to end the experiment as the result 
of his girlfriend, and wife-to-be, Christina Maslach’s strong protestations.  Zimbardo has 
acknowledged her whistle blowing role throughout his writings, and in fact, he dedicates 
his most recent book, The Lucifer Effect, to her with the words: “Dedicated to the Serene 
Heroine of My Life: Christina Maslach Zimbardo.” The significance of this fact for the 
present analysis is that Maslach was the only female voice, the only “different voice,” in 
the more than 30-year-old patriarchal and exclusively male-centered narrative of the 
Stanford Prison Experiment and its significance. 
 The abuse that flowed from the experiment was explained by Zimbardo as 
resulting from the situation and environment that the students were put into, coupled with 
their role identification of either guard or prisoner.   In this way, behavior was explained 
in terms of situational forces and adherence to roles within these situations.   Zimbardo 
thus concluded that prison violence is a behavior that is rooted in the social character of 
jails and prisons themselves, and not in the personalities of those either working or kept 
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there (guards or prisoners).    Zimbardo is not always consistent on this point, admitting 
in The Lucifer Effect that he was the superintendent at the mock prison, and thereby may 
have influenced the results. 
Zimbardo applied this narrative to the abuse at Abu Ghraib as a way of 
understanding the events.   However, Zimbardo’s account leaves out some important 
factors that are imperative to consider when providing a narrative for the detainee abuse 
at Abu Ghraib.   Specifically, Zimbardo does not account for the following:  how 
significant authority figures can have some impact on behavior; that American troops 
were located in a war zone and faced daily catastrophes of war; that cultural differences 
were exploited and used against prisoners at Abu Ghraib as torture techniques; the 
anomic absence of authority at Abu Ghraib; and the lack of any moral guidelines for 
action; and above all, how men and women coped and acted differently at Abu Ghraib 
vis-à-vis the abuse and reactions to it . 
2.2 Milgram and the Absence of Authority Figures 
Another approach for understanding the abuse at Abu Ghraib is in terms of 
Stanley Milgram’s 1962 social psychology experiments at Yale University, where 
Milgram aimed to understand the effects of group behavior and blind obedience to an 
authority figure (Milgram 1963).   Using this study, it is possible to account for some of 
the influence that those higher-up in the military had regarding prisoner abuse, which the 
application of Zimbardo’s experiment failed to account for. 
Milgram conducted conformity experiments in a controversial study that was 
aimed at understanding how inhumane actions can be understood with no concern for 
consequences, such as with the Nazi’s in WWII.   His research question was the 
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following—Under what conditions would a person obey authority when it goes against 
one’s conscience? (Milgram 1963).  In this experiment, Milgram explained to male 
recruits that they would be taking part in a study of how punishment affects learning.   
One by one he assigned them to the role of either ‘teacher” or “learner,” and placed the 
learner (who was also the accomplice in the study) in a connecting room.   Note again 
that the idea of testing how women would behave under similar research conditions did 
not seem to occur to Milgram or any of the noted researchers in the obedience to (male) 
authority paradigm.   
The teacher watched the learner sit down in a contraption representing an electric 
chair, and as the teacher looked on the researcher applied electrode paste to the learner’s 
wrist, explaining that the paste would prevent blisters and burns.   The researcher then 
attached an electrode to the learner’s wrist, and fastened a leather strap to prevent 
movement when given electrical shock.   Although the shocks were to be painful, 
Milgram assured the teacher that there would be no permanent damage.   The researcher 
then led the teacher into an adjoining room and showed him that the electric chair was 
hooked up to a generator that gives shocks.   However, the “teacher” role did not know 
that these would be phony shocks.   There was a dial that could be turned to adjust the 
intensity of the shocks, and seated in front of the shock generator the teacher is supposed 
to read a pair of words aloud and then repeat the first word, waiting for the learner to 
repeat the second word.   If the learner got it incorrect, he would be shocked, with 
increasing intensity.   The listener was supposed to moan when “shocked,” and as the 
shocks became more intense, the learner was instructed to begin to yell and pound on the 
wall.   After a certain level, there was silence from the learner after shocks were given.   
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Now, even with this silence, Milgram was trying to research how many teachers would 
go all of the way to the highest shock level under the command of Milgram, the authority 
figure in the experiment.   When the “teachers” expressed concern and asked Milgram 
how far on the shock meter they had to go, Milgram would reply “As far as necessary” 
(Gibney 2006).    
At the urging of Milgram, the “teachers” kept participating with the experiment 
even though they believed that they were causing harm.   The responsibility for this 
“harm” was put onto the researcher’s shoulders and Milgram, the authority figure, could 
be understood as taking the blame for the “teacher’s” actions with his prodding of action.   
In this way, responsibility was removed from the “teachers” with regard to the harm they 
were possibly causing, as Milgram as the authority figure insisted in their compliance of 
action, thereby forcing responsibility onto Milgram.    Almost two thirds of the subjects 
(“teachers”) went all of the way to 450 volts, even with all of the negative responses from 
the learners, and even after their final silence.   Milgram thus reached the conclusion that 
pressures keep us in the roles that we accept and that behavior itself is dominated by 
social roles we are to play.   Milgram’s research into obedience suggests that people are 
likely to follow directions from legitimate authority figures even when it means inflicting 
harm on another person. 
Applied to Abu Ghraib, Milgram’s study about compliance with authority figures 
provides an interpretation concerning the influence that those higher-ups in the military 
had regarding prisoner abuse.   For example, there was some confusion about the status 
of the prisoners at Abu Ghraib—were they prisoners of war or enemy combatants?  The 
President of the United States was not clear in the characterization of the status of these 
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detainees in Iraq and there was much discussion about their relative standing.   This 
unclear characterization of prisoner status by the Commander in Chief of the United 
States, and within the military itself, led to uncertainty with regards to prisoner rights.   
Thus, it was not initially clear if the Geneva Conventions applied to prisoners at Abu 
Ghraib, and hence there was some confusion about proper handling of detainees.   This 
confusion was specifically a result of the confusion between prisoner rights in 
Afghanistan, where the Geneva Conventions did not apply, versus prisoner rights in Iraq, 
where they were applicable. 
Moreover, the new situation at Abu Ghraib that is different from Milgram’s male-
centered studies is that Brigadier General Janis Karpinski was a female commander of all 
the prisons in Abu Ghraib.   But as she explains in her book, One Woman’s Army, her 
male superiors dealt with this unwelcome fact by simply bypassing her completely when 
it came to all decisions regarding Abu Ghraib.  As she points out, she was kept “out of 
the loop,” and she makes it clear that she believes that this is because she is a woman.  
On the other hand, she was the only commander, male or female, who was demoted as 
punishment for what occurred at Abu Ghraib.  This complex reality of Abu Ghraib in 
terms of command structure, obedience to authority, and gender does not flow out of 
Milgram’s, Zimbardo’s, or any other work in the obedience to authority paradigm. 
Additionally, as was shown in the courts-martial of Lynndie England and Sabrina 
Harman, abuse of prisoners was again and again reported to those higher up in the chain 
of command.   However, initially nothing was done about these reports of abuse, and only 
after the photographs of the abuse were leaked to the press did this maltreatment become 
an outright issue.   Once abuse was reported and nothing was done about it, logically it 
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follows that those who took the reports of abuse become implicated as “authority figures” 
acquiescing to torture tactics.   Nonetheless, as of this writing, no officers or those higher-
ups in the chain of command, including Donald Rumsfeld, the former Defense Secretary 
(who the ACLU and Human Rights Watch have filed a lawsuit against for bearing direct 
responsibility for the torture and abuse of detainees in U.S.  Military custody in Iraq), 
have been charged with maltreatment of detainees.    Rumsfeld has been quoted in the 
media as stating that he “felt bad about what happened to the detainees [at Abu Ghraib],” 
but he has personally approved interrogation techniques such as stress positions, nudity, 
and the use of dogs, which violate long standing military rules (Gibney 2006).   In fact, 
with regards to using questionable tactics for detainee interrogation, Vice President Dick 
Cheney was also quoted as saying that it might be time to “take the gloves off and go to 
the dark side” (Gibney 2006). 
Additionally, training in interrogation techniques migrated from Guantanamo 
Bay, Afghanistan, and to Iraq, where Major General Geoffrey Miller provided training.   
Miller is the officer in charge of interrogation at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and his 
instruction in Iraq evidences an authority figure as associated with the questionable 
treatment of prisoners.   Case and point, interrogation tactics were taught to the MI’s in 
Iraq by an authority figure, namely Miller.    
Moreover, at the England and Harman courts-martial, testimony was provided 
regarding orders given to the prison guards at Abu Ghraib specifying tactics for dealing 
with prisoners, and specifically the breakdown of the roles of MI and MP.   The MPs 
were told to “soften up” detainees for interrogation, which was outside of the duties of 
the MPs, who were to function as guards.    As a matter of fact, at the England courts-
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martial, Specialist Matthew Wisdom stated under testimony that he reported abuse to 
Sergeant Jones, and was told to go back to work.   Additionally, Sergeant Ken Davis 
stated at the England courts-martial that he reported this questionable treatment of MPs 
abusing detainees to his platoon leader, and that he was told that the MIs were in charge 
and to let them do their job.   Said Davis to his platoon leader after seeing naked 
prisoners handcuffed in sexual positions, “The MI’s are doing weird things with naked 
detainees.”   
Additionally, in a 2006 Documentary shown on Sundance about Abu Ghraib 
(Gibney 2006), Davis describes a conversation that he and Charles Graner had one 
evening after Graner’s shift, where Davis asked Graner if he was getting sick since he 
was losing his voice.   Graner said “no, he wasn’t getting sick,” but explained that MIs 
were pushing MPs to “soften up” detainees, and that he, as an MP, had been yelling all 
night.   As bombs were going off outside of the prison, MIs were yelling at MPs and 
telling them that “there goes another American losing their life and unless you help 
[soften up detainees] then their blood is on your hands too” (Gibney 2006).   MIs were 
using the psychological tactics of guilt coupled with obligation as a means to get the MPs 
to “soften up” the prisoners, where the prisoners were now getting the full brunt of the 
MP’s force, as they were being emotionally equated with the “terrorists” bombing the 
prison outside of the walls of Abu Ghraib.   What is important to remember here is that 
most of the prisoners at Abu Ghraib were common criminals, if criminal at all, and that 
these prisoners were suffering violence at the hands of American troops because of the 
psychological techniques that MI was using on MP.   Specifically, MIs were using the 
psychological technique of making the MPs paranoid and delusional, where events 
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outside of the prison were being equated with regards to responsibility to the detainees 
inside of the prison.   In this way, MI was applying psychological techniques to the MPs 
as a way of getting them to do specific actions, and thus functioned as a kind of 
influential superior in that behavior was brought about because of MI urgings.   These 
urgings, coupled with, according to the book The Torture Papers (Danner 2004), the high 
priority placed on “actionable intelligence” from suspects being interrogated, led to the 
valuing of intelligence as more important than the lawful respecting of the Geneva 
Conventions or the various prohibitions on torture signed onto by congress.   Explicitly, 
in some cases, military personnel were told “do what you have to do to get confessions” 
(Gibney 2006).   Hence, there is some evidence that authority figures instructed prisoner 
care, although this is different than exemplified in Milgram’s study in that Abu Ghraib 
was not a controlled for environment, there was not an authority figure continuously 
providing the delineations for correct behavior, and this authority figure could not be 
referenced continuously and over time with regard to responsibility for the actions being 
urged forward. 
Again, missing even in these discussion of the role of MI at Abu Ghraib are the 
glaring facts that the general in charge of all military intelligence in Iraq was female, 
Major General Barbara Fast.  Interestingly, the point person for implementing General 
Miller’s Guantanamo techniques in both Afghanistan and Iraq was female, Captain 
Carolyn Wood.  Fast and Wood are, for all practical purposes, invisible in discussions of 
this sort.  Next to nothing is known about the following:  their roles, whether they 
protested against the techniques, how they got along with their male counter-parts in the 
chain of command, and in general—their “voice.” 
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Nonetheless, Milgram’s study does apply to the situation between England and 
Graner to some extent.   One of the expert witnesses for the defense stated under oath that 
Graner could have been running a “class on obedience,” where Graner was the scientist 
authority and England was the individual showing blind obedience to this authority, or 
“teacher” using Milgram’s study as a parallel.   In Xavier Amador’s and Thomas Denne’s 
expert opinion at England’s courts-martial, England was compliant to Graner’s wished 
and orders, and showed loyalty and duty to Graner since they were in a relationship as 
lovers at Abu Ghraib prison.   Additionally, Amador characterized Graner as acting as 
England’s father when describing the level of England’s compliance.   For the sake of 
completeness, it should be noted that Mestrovic did not agree with the tack taken by the 
two expert witnesses in psychology, because, as a sociologist, he said that such an 
exclusively psychological explanation unfairly shifted all the blame onto Graner, and not 
the social climate that transformed Graner’s behavior.    
Consider Graner’s testimony about the now infamous picture of England holding 
a leashed detainee.   Graner stated under oath that he pulled the detainee he had 
nicknamed “Gus” out of the cell through the use of the tether of a rifle sling.   Earlier that 
day, Gus had been violent towards the guards and so Graner thought he was using 
precautionary measures by not entering the cell and using an extraction technique.   
Joyner’s testimony later that day also revealed that Gus was highly disruptive and would 
fight everyone when he was taken out of his cell, and he said that he remembered Gus 
specifically and as his personality made a lasting impression on him, as he refused to 
wear clothing.   Graner stated that both England and Ambuhl were present during this 
extraction in case the prisoner got violent, as cell extractions were repeatedly described in 
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the courts-martial as dangerous situations where you enter the prisoner’s environment, 
although Graner did not request that either England or Ambuhl wear protective 
equipment.   Graner intended to yank the prisoner out of the cell by his shoulders, but the 
leash slipped and went around his neck instead.   Graner stated that the prisoner then got 
up on all fours and crawled out of the cell, at which time Graner handed the tether to 
England.   Graner took three photographs of this detainee with England holding the 
tether, and stated that England was compliant with all of his orders.   Stated Graner 
“England trusts me, yes.   She did not think I was going to maltreat the detainee.”  
Implied in this statement is the idea that England held Graner in high esteem such that his 
behavior could not be aimed at anything unethical or wrong.   Actually, I doubt that 
England even questioned these distinctions when it came to her views of Graner, and 
specifically because of consideration of Xavier Amador’s expert witness analysis of her 
psychological profile.   Additionally, in another infamous photograph of England, where 
she is smiling and pointing to an Iraqi’s genitals, Graner stated under oath that he had 
ordered England to get into the photograph.   No doubt, England was compliant with this 
order, again demonstrating the kind of blind faith that she put in Grainer.   Applying 
Milgram, in this example his notion of obedience to authority figures applies exactly in 
that England was described again and again through testimony as being compliant 
towards Graner’s requests.       
However, considering the previous examples—the questionable status of the 
prisoners, the fact that abuse was reported and ignored, and also that tactics for 
interrogation were trained for, evidence of authority figures as responsible for instructing 
some of the abuse at Abu Ghraib, and as separate from Zimbardo’s claims of 
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environmental conditions as the reason for action—there is indeed another narrative that 
should be considered as a reason for the abuse itself.   Specifically, the Zimbardo 
paradigm leaves out the role of influential superiors by only focusing on the power of 
situations and roles, and thus Zimbardo’s account leaves out the power individuals have 
to influence these situations.   What is also interesting is that in his own study, the 
Stanford Prison Study, Zimbardo himself acts as the primary “authority figure” in the 
experiment, as he both controlled the experiment and was also an active participant in the 
experiment as prison supervisor.   Again, not only did Zimbardo serve as the social 
scientist and creator of this experiment, he was also a participant in this experiment with 
his role of prison supervisor.    
Nonetheless, I do not argue that in these examples that total responsibility can be 
passed off to the authority figure, as was the case with Milgram’s study.   At Abu Ghraib, 
there was no written or agreed upon method or tactic for detainee care or interrogation 
that was consistently taught or put forth as procedure.   Instead, prisoner care and 
detainee interrogation was described in testimony as “ad hoc” in nature.   Jones even 
stated in his testimony that Graner, who was described by Jones as having a “strong 
personality,” had a following of sorts, where it gave Jones the “impression” that Graner 
controlled and influenced the actions of others with his “ad hoc” approach to detainee 
care and handling.   Additionally, there was no authority figure urging appropriate and 
prescribed action to continue, and there was no controlled for environment such as with 
Milgram’s laboratory.   Nonetheless, Milgram’s study thus gives some insight into the 
roles that authority figures played at Abu Ghraib, and where Zimbardo’s experiment does 
not.  Yet the role of England highlights the fact that gender played a significant role: no 
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male soldier was nearly as submissive to Graner as the female England was.  Other male 
soldiers testified that they were afraid of Graner, even feared that he would shoot and kill 
them, but England testified and experts testified about her, that she complied with his 
“authority” out of “love.” Moreover, as the defense attorneys tried to argue, she was 
involved in this ‘abusive love relationship” because she was stressed, scared, and 
disoriented, so that Graner became her “moral compass.”  Graner made it very clear in 
his testimony that he did not love or even care for England or her baby.  A 
straightforward application of Milgram and Zimbardo is not complete without taking into 
account these aspects of cross-gender relationships in authority and obedience. 
The “obedience to authority” paradigm that Zimbardo and Milgram use does not 
fully capture the reality of the abuse at Abu Ghraib, which I and Mestrovic (2007) argue 
was caused by an anomic absence of authority and the lacking of Riesman’s “moral 
compass” (Riesman [1961] 2000) along with several other explanations outlined above.   
Did the Geneva Conventions apply?  Why were they not posted in the prison on a 
consistent basis?  Were these enemy combatants or prisoners of war?  Throughout the 
trials there was testimony regarding the ad-hoc nature of detainee handling and 
questioning of practices precisely because there was no ready-made guide for this kind of 
situation for soldiers to follow.   What is more, once training was given to soldiers 
regarding detainee treatment, responsibility was denied at even the highest levels, for 
example as in the Cardona dog-handler case, where Major General Miller was exempted 
from testifying even though there was testimony stating that he had indeed trained for, 
and thereby approved the use of, these interrogation tactics. 
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Stjepan G.  Mestrovic, an expert witness for the defense in sociology and 
psychology for both the Harman and England courts-martial, stated under oath that there 
was a normalization of deviance at Abu Ghraib with regard to the social disorganization 
of the prison.   For example, Mestrovic pointed to the uncertainty of authority, the 
inadequate filling system, the confusion of roles concerning MI and MP, the social chaos, 
and the unhealthy mystique of the environment itself.   He spoke directly of the chaos at 
Abu Ghraib as being disoriented and with no validation of right or wrong behavior—
meaning that there was no moral compass from which to organize behavior.   Mestrovic 
linked his testimony to the government’s actual reports on Abu Ghraib and stated that the 
breaking of norms basically started a slippery slope, leading to more serious abuse.   
Mestrovic argued that deviant practices “migrated” into Iraq from Afghanistan and 
Guantanamo, and that these deviances morphed into regular-seeming and thus 
normalized tactics, making further deviance easier.   In this way, Mestrovic argued that 
there existed a “cognitive dissonance” regarding the chaos at Abu Ghraib, where the 
mind had to join together two seemingly contradictory things and actions—in this 
situation, moral versus immoral behavior.   In his testimony, Mestrovic also distinguished 
sharply between the “passive” abuse committed by England and Harman, who did not hit 
anyone and were guilty primarily of posing in photos and taking photos, versus the active 
kicking, punching, and physical violence exerted by male soldiers on prisoners. 
 
2.3 Back to Zimbardo and Abu Ghraib 
 
No doubt, there are some similarities of behavior evidenced between Zimbardo’s 
study and the events at Abu Ghraib, and I will address these in the following section.   
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However, there were much dissimilarity between Zimbardo’s study and the realities of 
Abu Ghraib. 
First, Abu Ghraib was located in a war zone where American troops were killed 
daily, and mortar and rocket-propelled grenade attacks on the prison itself were made 
nightly.   Additionally, at Abu Ghraib there was a lack of food, water, medical provisions, 
and even electricity, such that there were sometimes no electricity from the generators, 
and at night outside lighting from vehicles was used, according to the testimony of the 
supply officer at Abu Ghraib, Major David DiNenna.   Master Sergeant Joyner testified 
under oath at the England trial that Abu Ghraib prison stunk, was nasty, and was possibly 
“the nastiest place on earth.”  Both DiNenna and Joyner asked out loud during their 
testimonies why the U.S.  Army picked a prison that was in the middle of an active war 
zone for handling supposedly high-security threats.  Conversely, Zimbardo’s study was 
located in the basement of Stanford University, and neither the prisoners nor the guards 
faced the daily atrocities of war that American troops experienced.   In this way, although 
not emotionally safe, the prisoners in Zimbardo’s study were physically safe from bodily 
harm, had supplies such as food, water, and electricity, had security, and had constant 
support from both the school and creators of the study.   Additionally, Zimbardo’s 
participants were released upon showing signs of emotional distress, while at Abu Ghraib 
emotional distress and chaos was evidenced in many ways as a normal part of life.  
Additionally, American soldiers were not given any way out of the chaos of Abu Ghraib 
as this was not a study with a set duration.  Under oath and in his testimony, Graner 
called the prison “bizarro-world” in an attempt to characterize the chaotic environment at 
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Abu Ghraib, where screaming from prisoners in painful stress positions was common, he 
claimed, at Tier 1-A.    
  Another reason that I argue that Zimbardo’s experiment is different from the 
events at Abu Ghraib is that cultural differences did not exist in Zimbardo’s experiment.   
Unlike at Abu Ghraib, where prisoners were Iraqi, and where interrogation techniques 
were used that exploited Iraqi cultural fears, such as the use of dogs.   In Zimbardo’s 
study, all of the participants were American males who were students at Stanford.   This 
means that at Stanford, there was not the ability for guards to use different cultural values 
as a means and method of torture, as all of the Stanford participants basically had similar 
cultural experiences.   At Abu Ghraib, however, dogs were used as a means to intimidate 
and humiliate Iraqi prisoners. 
I argue that another dissimilarity between Zimbardo’s Prison Study and the events 
at Abu Ghraib is that women were present at Abu Ghraib, and only men participated in 
Zimbardo’s study.   This is foundationally important when analyzing misogyny and 
sexism at Abu Ghraib.    In the courts-martial of England and Harman, it came out in 
testimony that women and children were kept at Abu Ghraib.   Through interviews with 
soldiers who were witnesses at the trial, I learned that the women and children were 
“swept up” along with the men in disorganized arrest sweeps, and in some cases were 
kept as “hostages” to make the men talk during interrogations.  What is of great interest is 
that the U.S.  Government conceded in open trial that it kept women and children at Abu 
Ghraib, without charging them with any crime, but never stated the reason for their 
detention.   (The government reports also fail to investigate the reasons for detaining 
women and children.)  If the “backstage” reason stated by the soldiers is that, indeed, the 
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women and children were held as hostages, then it seems that the U.S.  Army engaged in 
a practice it condemns in its enemies, namely hostage-taking.   But the soldiers stated 
they were not asked the reasons for this curious fact while they were testifying on the 
stand, and thus one of the hidden realities of Abu Ghraib was exposed. 
2.4 Cultural Code of Masculinity 
Once more, there are indeed some similarities evidenced between Zimbardo’s 
study and the events at Abu Ghraib.    For example, both situations evidenced emblematic 
use of symbols for power such as uniforms, naked prisoners, and billy clubs.   Similarly, 
both Zimbardo’s prison and Abu Ghraib show similar behavior in prisoner care with the 
use of stress positions/situations where prisoners were hooded and chained/zip-tied, 
stripped naked, and the frequent restraint of bodies in an attempt to display power.   
Additionally, looking at abuse in Zimbardo’s study and also at Abu Ghraib, the nature of 
abuse at both locations turned sexual.   Both situations evidenced similar sexualized and 
homoerotic torture techniques—a mock (homosexual) wedding at Stanford, and forced 
masturbation and naked pyramids at Abu Ghraib.    I argue that this can be understood in 
terms of the connections between sex and gender, power, and sexuality, and that what is 
missing in Zimbardo’s account of the abuse during his prison study, and his application 
of his study to Abu Ghraib, is this specific kind of analysis.    
Consider how gender is socially constructed with regards to power, where 
masculinity is equated with heterosexuality, and value is given to this association.   In 
this way, the connections between sex, gender, and sexuality function as a culturally 
practiced ideology.   One of the characterizations of the American military that I 
continually refer back to is that it has been socially constructed as a masculinist and 
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heterosexist environment.   This means that value is given to the characterization of 
things that are masculine, where maleness and masculinity are equated and rewarded 
commensurately.   Consider the advertisements for the Marine Corps, where what is 
needed are a “Few Good Men,” or the Army’s advertisement where what is sought is “An 
Army of One’s Own,” and always a male soldier’s face is shown on the television.   
Additionally, consider some of the evidence that I found in the city of Ft.  Hood, Texas, 
where representations of these culturally constructed masculinist attitudes could be 
found.    
 Consider some of the images I found painted on the wall of the YMCA in old 
downtown Ft.  Hood, Texas.  The images of this collection can be found below, and 
equate soldiers with being male, with fighting in wars, with defense, freedom, and most 
of all with masculinity.   None of the soldiers pictures are women, and only children are 
shown in image where the male soldier is seemingly saying “goodbye” to his children 
and is going to serve somewhere away from home.   The mother is not even valued 
enough to be pictured in this case.   As an addition, I did not encounter any images or 
representations of women in the military, or advertisements seeking military employment 
for women during both of my extended stays in Ft.  Hood, Texas. 
 
  
 
Figure 1, YMCA (wall), Ft. Hood, TX (Caldwell, 2005). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2, YMCA (window), Ft. Hood, TX (Caldwell, 2005). 
 
 
 
These images testify to the masculinist nature of the environment in this military town, 
and with the larger cultural value that is placed on masculinity within the military itself.    
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Additionally, I argue that heterosexuality is the organizing sexuality in the 
American military, where gays and lesbians are not legally allowed to “openly,” and thus 
with open knowledge of their gayness, serve their country.   These characterizations of 
the military, that of masculinity and heterosexuality, culminates in what I term a “code of 
cultural masculinity,” where what it means to be male and masculine is understood as 
heterosexual in nature.    
American cultural values underwrite this fear of homosexuality, where 
homosexual men have frequently been targeted with violence in American culture and 
have thus faced massive amounts of discrimination physically and legally.   New 
legislation forbids the use of sexual orientation as a means for violence or the threat of 
violence with hate-crime legislation, where hate crimes are punished more severely than 
exactly similar crimes that are not driven by stated discriminatory practices.   I argue that 
homoerotic torture can be described in kind as a hate-crime of sorts, and one that is 
specifically engaging of our stereotypical cultural connections between maleness, 
masculinity, and straightness.    I argue that these qualities have historically been 
powerful perspectives in American society, and thus function as an organizing principle 
of our heterosexist patriarchal society based on power.   Interestingly, these associations 
are the ones that queer theory specifically questions in its recent theoretical 
conceptualization.    
The “code of cultural masculinity,” where both masculinity and heterosexuality 
function together as the power symbolic of the military, was evidenced in many ways at 
the Stanford Prison and also at Abu Ghraib prison.   At Abu Ghraib and during the 
Stanford experiment, both situations evidenced homosexual torture techniques to exploit 
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culturally constructed attitudes about masculinity and fears of homosexuality.   
Zimbardo’s paradigm for analysis does not show the importance of sex, gender, and 
sexuality as themselves torture techniques, which were used against both Iraqi detainees 
and Zimbardo’s American prisoners.   At both Abu Ghraib and also at Stanford, prisoners 
were made to endure humiliation and torture that can be understood as homoerotic in 
nature.    
Regarding Zimbardo’s experiment, male prisoners were dressed in very plain 
women’s dresses that went down to their knees, and were given no undergarments.   This 
outfit symbolizes the feminization of the prisoners, as their clothing is actually gendered 
in concept and revealing as a form of masculine humiliation.  The “phallus” is actually 
feminized given the vulnerability of the genitals themselves.   Although these outfits were 
not “sexy” in the typical fashion of the adult entertainer, they did function in a 
pornographic way, as genitals were exposed and nakedness was evident in movement.   
In this way, masculinity was taken away through the characterization of prisoners as 
women, and since they were actually wearing what Zimbardo himself called a “dress” 
(Musen and Zimbardo 1991).   This is an attempt to make the male prisoners feel exposed 
and powerless, as this image of the prisoner goes against the masculine power symbolic, 
and literally “strips” protective clothing away from men, thereby making them vulnerable 
and thus characterized as culturally feminine. 
Additional humiliation of prisoners can be understood in Zimbardo’s experiment, 
and as similar to Abu Ghraib, through the sexually humiliating punishment by the guards 
for prisoners to “get down and fuck the floor” (Gibney 2006).   This is an example of 
guards toying with prisoners to establish control through the use of raw sex.   
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Additionally, at the Stanford prison, there was a mock wedding between the bride of 
Frankenstein (played by one male prisoner) and Frankenstein (played by another), where 
these prisoners were forced to say “I love you Frankenstein” to his male-pseudo wife.  
One prisoner is depicted in this arrangement with his arms around the other prisoner’s 
neck, and both bodies are forcibly pressed together by the guard instructing the action.  
This example uses drag roles and forced transexuality as a means of humiliation, and 
questions heterosexuality and masculinity with the stated “I love you [prisoner] 2093” 
and the wedding theme itself (Gibney 2006).     
What is telling about how Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison Study came to an end is 
that it had to do with Zimbardo’s then girlfriend, now wife, Christina Maslach Zimbardo.  
Zimbardo took Maslach to the basement of the Stanford psychology building to show her 
the experiment and her reaction was that of disgust and disbelief.   Her response to 
Zimbardo was that the study had changed him somehow and she stated that “I’m not sure 
I want anything to do with you if you continue this study” (Gibney 2006).    It was that 
day that Zimbardo ended the study.   What is so telling about this ending is that it was 
effected by Zimbardo’s girlfriend, a woman, who clearly demonstrated a position of 
power in that her reaction gave Zimbardo the impetus to see the study for its unethical 
nature.   Had Zimbardo analyzed his study in terms of gender, surely this dynamic would 
have been exposed, as would have other connections of gender, sex, and sexuality. 
The sexualized abuse at Abu Ghraib can best be understood not only through an 
analysis of the photographs of abuse, but also through an analysis of testimony regarding 
the sexual nature of the abuse.   The American military’s heterosexism and masculinist 
power symbolic can be seen through the characterization of soldiers who did not 
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participate in the abuse, where homoeroticism was used as torture device (sodomy, 
simulated fellatio, etc.).   I am concerned about what homoerotic torture says about 
gender, masculinity, and power, and make the argument that the abuses at Abu Ghraib 
follow along in the footsteps of wider practices and attitudes of discrimination within 
American culture.    
Regarding the abuse at Abu Ghraib, consider the guards who opposed or did not 
participate in prisoner abuse.   At Abu Ghraib, the rallying call for abusing prisoners was 
“Go get some,” which itself has a sexual connotation.   If you did not participate you 
were characterized as a “pussy” (non-masculine, with the vagina referenced being 
historically the location of femininity itself, also a discriminatory identification for a male 
homosexual…not a word denoting powerful masculinity).   Those who did not participate 
admitted during the courts-martial that they were in fear for their lives from other 
American soldiers and that they slept with their rifles at night.   These were now 
American military soldiers who were given the status of “imprisoned guard,” clinging to 
their rifles in the dark, afraid of what might jump out of the shadows.   This can be 
conceptualized as an Abu Ghraib within Abu Ghraib, or a Stanford Prison Experiment 
within a Stanford Prison Experiment.  Making an American guard a “prisoner” in 
characterization is the equivalent of making those who did not participate “the other”— 
the symbolic terrorist who is not quite masculine enough for the military, and who is 
worthy of the same fear of bodily harm as that of the detainees.   What does fear say 
about the American military and about masculinity?  I argue that the soldier who shows 
fear goes against the masculinist and heterosexist code of the military (Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell) and is contrary to the image of the macho soldier.   Additionally, I argue that the 
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homophobic nature of the military and the associated legislated anti-gay attitude only 
serves to reify this stereotype of masculinity and its code.   
During the England trial, Jeremy Sivits stated that in order to cover-up these 
actions of abuse, Staff Sergeant Frederick told those who were there “you did not see 
shit!”  In addition, Specialist Wisdom testified that while he was at Tier 1-A, he saw 
prisoners running their sandbag-covered heads into the wall, and also saw naked 
detainees entangled on top of each other.   Wisdom stated that he saw Graner hit 
detainees and pose with them, and that he saw Frederick punch a detainee.   At that point, 
Wisdom claimed that he left the area where the abuse was taking place, and literally 
“walked out the door” and “told Sergeant Jones everything.”  Jones told him he would 
handle it, and told him to go back to the site of the incident.   When shown pictures of 
this abuse (specifically the images of Graner about to hit a detainee, arm cocked back 
with a blue-green glove on, Davis stomping of prisoners’ toes, and Frederick punching a 
prisoner in the side of the chest), Wisdom stated that he was asked “Are you going to get 
some of this?”  Additionally, Wisdom stated under oath that the detainees were not 
fighting back in any way.   As a matter of fact, when Wisdom saw naked detainees forced 
to masturbate, with one on his knees with his mouth open, and the other standing, he 
claimed that another soldier Elliott said to him “Do you see what they do when we leave 
them alone?”  At the end of his testimony, Wisdom claimed that given his experiences at 
Abu Ghraib and also of the trials that he would no longer consider his lifelong and 
original goals of pursuing a military career as an MP.   After these experiences, this was 
no longer an option for him. 
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When Jones took the stand at the England trial, he corroborated and added to 
Wisdom’s testimony, saying “Wisdom came to me.  I told him to go back to work.” Jones 
tried to explain to Wisdom that this was “justified use of force” and Wisdom was too 
“young” to understand- a seemingly feminine trait.   Jones stated under oath that he 
thought this was just “normal stuff” and that Wisdom was being sensitive, an 
“unmasculine” characterization for sure, and especially in terms of the macho military 
soldier ideal.   Jones had been in the US Army for thirteen years and at the time of his 
testimony worked as a police officer in Baltimore.   Wisdom came back to Jones a second 
time, and then Jones confronted Frederick about the incident.   Jones said that Frederick 
denied what had happened.   Per Jones’ request, Wisdom was actually reassigned to 
another duty and location, and Jones would not allow Wisdom to work or visit Tier 1-A 
for the duration of his stay at Abu Ghraib.   At the Harman trial, Jones’ testimony was the 
exact same, and during a very short cross-examination by defense co-attorney Captain 
Takemura, she said to him that it was hard to believe that this incident was never reported 
up the chain of command.   Jones just shrugged his shoulders.   
At the England courts-martial, Graner again took the stand, this time when the 
defense called him, and stated that the naked piling of detainees was a way of organizing 
prisoners that he needed to process.   These detainees, he stated, were being disruptive 
and talking, and finally Grainer claimed that he decided to put them in a naked pyramid 
so that he could control them better.   This pyramid, he believed, would allow for this 
control because if one prisoner tried to move then the others would fall, and it would be 
more difficult for them to cause a distraction.   Graner pointed out that he did not have 
any zip-ties to use as restraints for detainees, and that this was the best idea he could 
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come up with to control the unruly prisoners.   In addition to the pyramid, Graner stacked 
naked detainees on top of each other in sexually explicit ways as a means for control.   
Graner also stated that it was MI who ordered that the prisoners masturbate on each other.   
However, I argue that this tactic was not only about controlling prisoners, but was also 
directed at humiliating and “feminizing” the prisoners such that they were objectified and 
“othered,” where culturally constructed boundaries of masculinity were crossed in an 
attempt to punish through humiliation itself.   Additionally, there was added humiliation 
to male Iraqi prisoners as these humiliations were done in front of the American female 
guards.   Interestingly, Graner admitted on the stand that there were some restraint 
procedures that he felt uncomfortable with, although he did not elaborate this detail.   
Nonetheless, I still wonder what these procedures might have been.   Graner further 
stated that as cells became available, he put the detainees into them instead of following 
MI orders to force masturbation.   Even so, Graner stated on the stand that “I [he] did 
nothing wrong because nobody, prisoners or otherwise, were hurt.” 
During the Harman courts-martial, and during the prosecution’s testimony during 
the sentencing phase, it was as if the prosecution itself was offering up a ready-made 
defense because in many instances, the prosecution’s witnesses provided testimony that 
only aided in Harman’s defense.   Many of the same individuals testified and stated 
similar things in their testimonies. 
Specialist Israel Rivera took the stand, and added to the theme of fear and 
intimidation among the soldiers engaging in the abuse.   Rivera testified that Specialist 
Cruz invited him to join in the punishment of three Iraqi detainees who were thought to 
be “rapists.”  Rivera followed Cruz, and witnessed the three prisoners rolling, crawling, 
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and being verbally abused.   They were cut and bleeding from abrasions caused by the 
concrete floor.   Rivera said he stood watching, and was shocked, and that he did nothing. 
Defense co-attorney Captain Takemura asked him if the government had made a 
deal with him to drop charges against him if he testified against Harman.  Yes, he 
answered, and rattled off the possible charges against him: conspiracy, maltreatment, and 
dereliction of duty.   Interestingly, these are the same charges that were leveled at 
Harman!  Captain PT Takemura established that Harman was not in any photos taken of 
the abusive incident of October 25, 2003, and Rivera agreed.   Takemaura then asked 
Rivera what the soldiers did wrong that night, and he answered that they had a duty to 
protect the detainees, that they failed to protect them, and made no attempt to make it 
stop.  When asked why he did not attempt to stop the abuse, Rivera answered “I was 
afraid.  They had authority and rank.  It seemed foolish to say, ‘What are you guys 
doing?” He added that if they were willing to do this to detainees, why wouldn’t they do 
it to him? 
Sociologically speaking, Rivera comes across as a “pussy” in the masculine 
construction of the US Army.   The phrase “don’t be a pussy” was actually often used by 
soldiers speaking to each other when one of them did not want to participate in the abuse.   
In addition, River admitted that he was afraid, which goes against the unwritten Army 
code of masculine behavior.   To prosecute Rivera for these passive crimes would have 
embarrassed the US Army and its constructed “code” (Baudrillard) of masculinity.   
Thus, it was far less embarrassing to level the same charges against a female homosexual 
soldier, and namely Harman.   
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Additionally, it is interesting that this confession of fear was made to a female 
defense attorney, Captain Takemaura.  Takemaura spoke softly in the courtroom, and 
sometimes so softly that the judge requested that she speak louder.  She came across as a 
motherly figure that cared about the experiences of the soldiers that she questioned 
during their testimony, and she genuinely did care.  In this way, Takemaura provided a 
safe space for male soldiers to admit their fears of retaliation and retribution.  Hence,  
Takemaura had a use-value as a “motherly” female in the courtroom, where her gendered 
performance functioned as a tool for obtaining information from those on the stand—
information that might not have come out if questioned by a male attorney. 
 Captain Reese, the company commander at Abu Ghraib, testified concerning the 
deplorable living conditions for detainees and soldiers alike at Abu Ghraib, citing things 
such as insufficient food and water, contaminated water, toilets that were so unsanitary 
they had to be boarded up, filth, stench, and an overall primitive living atmosphere.   The 
Prosecutor asked Captain Reese whether it was true that the detainees wore women’s 
panties on their heads because of supply problems, which included a shortage of clothing 
for the detainees—and the Major answered “Yes sir.”  What struck me as strange is that it 
is a fact that the detainees came to Abu Ghraib wearing their own clothes.   So, what 
happened to their clothes after they were stripped naked?  Short of giving detainees 
women’s panties to wear—sometimes on their heads—as protection against the cold and 
humiliation, was the US Army truly incapable of giving them blankets, or in desperation, 
purchasing clothing for them in Baghdad?  Harman disclosed privately to me that male 
soldiers were sent into Baghdad specifically for the purpose of buying Iraqi women’s 
panties.   No doubt, these same soldiers could have been given the mission of purchasing 
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more appropriate clothing.   The military judge looked down and away, and the jurors did 
the same, following this exchange, and the Major was quickly dismissed. 
These examples of abuse at Abu Ghraib prison show that the mostly male soldiers 
at Abu Ghraib were reified and heralded when they acted in typically masculine ways 
with regard to abuse, especially Grainer and Frederick who acted in stereotypically 
masculine ways such as punching, beating, and forcing others to be humiliated.   
Additionally, these testimonies exposed the weak, powerless and vulnerable position of 
other male soldiers such as Wisdom and Rivera who did not participate in abuse, and who 
came across as passive and stereotypically feminine “pussys.”  Additionally, the 
confessions of weakness made by other male soldiers were themselves an embarrassment 
to the US Army and its image of the macho-instrumental soldier, and contrary to the 
masculinist and heterosexist ideal of the military itself.   This was most evident in the 
dramatic testimony of SPC Israel Rivera, the 19-year-old MI who testified that he was 
afraid to stop the abuse he was witnessing out of fear for his life, where what he was 
scared of was that his fellow-soldiers would abuse him physically had he protested.   
Thus, through a consideration of the testimony that was given at the England and 
Harman courts-martial, what is missing in Zimbardo’s paradigm for explaining the abuse 
at Abu Ghraib is an analysis of the connections with regard to power or maleness, 
masculinity, and heterosexuality.   This kind of analysis explains the homoerotic nature 
of the abuse and the evidenced sexualized and feminized torture techniques.    I argue that 
a fuller account of the abuse at both locations, the Stanford Prison Study and also Abu 
Ghraib, can be understood in terms of the connections between sex and gender, power, 
and sexuality, and that what is missing in Zimbardo’s account of the abuse during his 
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prison study, and his application of his study to Abu Ghraib, is this specific kind of 
analysis.    
As I have argued, it seems initially that experiments such as Zimbardo’s and 
Milgram’s can explain the abuse at Abu Ghraib.   However, I maintain that these 
paradigms either do not apply, or only show partly why the abuse took place.   
Specifically, these experiments do not fully account for the anomic absence of authority 
and the lacking of Riesman’s “moral compass” that was non-existent at Abu Ghraib.   
Through the use of additional perspectives such as an analysis of the connections 
between sex, gender and sexuality with regard to power, and an analysis of the gendered 
masculine and heterosexist nature of American culture and military, additional narratives 
about prisoner abuse are formed.   Because the above are not considered by Zimbardo’s 
paradigm, I argue that Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison Study does neither fully elucidate nor 
make significance sense of the abuse at Abu Ghraib prison. 
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3. GENDER, POWER, AND THE “RATIONALIZATION” OF RATIONALITY: 
 USES OF THE MASCULINE AND FEMININE SYMBOLIC NARRATIVES 
 
 
Media depictions, popular perception, and academic explanations for the 
infamous incidents at Abu Ghraib have utilized conceptions of chaos as a means to 
describe and explain the abuse.  In this section, rationality and chaos as descriptors are 
analyzed and probed via a gendered lens to demonstrate that both have become collective 
symbols that works to obscure and repress the cultural and emotional harms of 
inadequacy, shame, reprisal and barbarism that Abu Ghraib reflects back to the world's 
collective consiousnesses.  In this vein, the section demonstrates that rationality and 
chaos have becomes narratives and means to repress additional gendered explanations of 
what occurred in Saddam Hussein's former torture chambers- now owned and operated 
by the American military.  By demonstrating the rationality associated with modernity 
and its link to masculine and patriarchal systems, the section uses a gender analysis to 
demonstrate the rational and logically constructed symbols of both “rationality” and 
“chaos” that most now use to garner a non-understanding of Abu Ghraib's horrors.   
I provide a discussion of the chaos associated with Abu Ghraib prison and how 
this chaos does not fit into modernist narratives of rationality and order, where I equate 
order and rationality with the masculine symbolic code.  In this way, I describe the 
illusory order and actual chaos at Abu Ghraib as gendered.  Nonetheless, both the rhetoric 
of order and chaos obscures an additional explanation for the abuses, namely the 
masculinist and barbaric environment that was indicative of pejorative conditions and 
was responsible for the maltreatment of detainees.  
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Additionally, I discuss Foucault’s narrative of modernist power structures, and 
here I am especially interested in how power was used to punish both the body and soul 
at Abu Ghraib.  Foucault's identification of the body as the principal target of power has 
been used by feminists to analyze contemporary forms of social control over women's 
bodies and minds.  This becomes an important discussion of power coupled with gender 
in that bodies and souls (both American and Iraqi) were punished at Abu Ghraib—Iraqi 
women and children were held as bargaining chips at Abu Ghraib, dogs were used to 
intimidate Iraqi prisoners, nakedness in front of women as a means for control, and 
panties were put on male prisoner’s heads thereby “feminizing” them.   
I also discuss how Foucault’s identification of the body as the principal target of 
power actually provides a kind of social control over the prisoners’ bodies and 
souls/minds at Abu Ghraib, and especially given the gendered and associated sexualized 
nature of this torture, and the associated violation of Iraqi cultural constructions of 
masculinity.  
In addition, punishment coupled with power and gender can be applied to 
American soldiers’ experiences of Abu Ghraib, where both male and female soldiers 
openly disclosed that they were suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) 
from the abuse they suffered and witnessed in Iraq and at Abu Ghraib.   
 3.1 The Enlightenment Project and Rationality 
 
Modernist theory paradigmatically rests upon a foundation of reason and 
rationality as the privileged locus for both objectivity and claims of universal truth.  
Within this theoretical canopy, ideas of justice, fairness, and liberty have been 
conceptualized as products of the Western Enlightenment Project.  As a part of this 
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modernist paradigm, reason is defined as a coherent and healthy balance that is equated 
with sanity itself, such that rationality is understood as the discernment of common sense 
intellect and the empirically verifiable organization of logic.  It is through the connection 
of these concepts that Western modern societies are structured.  This paradigm of modern 
thought, which directly informs foundational modern theoretical presuppositions, in turn 
comes to define notions of the "good," and thus serves to both reify and maintain given 
modernist social constructions of reason and rationality.  Furthermore, these modernist 
presuppositions instruct social conceptual schemes from which society is understood and 
organized.  It is in this way that modernist notions of reason and rationality become the 
symbolic measure for theorizing and conceptualization.  These constructions themselves 
come to represent and function as the standard for thought, order, and the very basis of 
what some consider "respectable science."  
 However, many have argued that modernist grand-narrative schema serve to 
facilitate an oppressive and privileged position that is justified with reference to only 
certain conceptions of reason and rationality, namely those conceptions of the socially 
powerful (Rosenau 1992, McGowan 1991; Sarup 1993; Zimmerman 1997).  Feminist 
theorists, for example, argue in different ways that the voices or perspectives of those 
with little social power, women in this case, are silenced within modernist conceptual 
schemes ordered around patriarchal societies.  This line of argument rests upon the idea 
that those with social power are able to dictate the standard of reason itself, thereby 
delineating its benchmark.  This grand-narrative of reason serves as the basis for theory 
construction and informs feminist examinations of how science is done or understood 
(Fox-Keller [1985]1995; Fox-Keller and Longino 1996; Longino 1990; Longino 1986), 
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how knowledge is created (Abbott and Wallace 1996; Fraser and Nicholson 1990; 
Harding 1998; Harding 1993; Harding 1991; Harding 1987; Harding 1986; Stapleton 
2000) how gender is conceptualized (Butler 1999; Butler 1993a; Butler 1993b; Butler 
[1990]1999; Butler 2004; Beauvoir 1952; Fausto-Sterling 2000), how sex categories are 
understood (Balsamo 1996; Oudshoorn 1991), how sexuality comes to be understood 
(Fausto-Sterling 2000; Freud [1962]2000; Livingston 1991; Nestle 1984; Rich 1980; 
Rubin 1984; Rubin 2002; Sedgwick 1990; Snitow 1983; Terry 1999; Vance 1984), 
among many other modes of feminist conjecture. 
In a like manner, building on Adorno and Horkheimer (1979), some 
postmodernists argue that the modernist paradigm is at odds with the aims of 
enlightenment and liberation, thereby resulting in an invalid and contradictory logical 
system.  Specifically, these theorists claim that through the marking of the conceptual 
boundaries of “reason” and “rationality,” this coupling instead subtly masks modes of 
domination, forms of oppression, and sites of control (Ahmed 1992; Baudrillard 
([1995]2002); Baudrillard 1994; Baudrillard([1979]1990); Baudrillard 1981; Baudrillard 
2003; Bauman 1992; Best and Kellner 1991; Butler 1999; Butler 1993a; Butler 1993b; 
Connor 1997; Derrida 1978; Foucault 1988; Foucault 1972; Giddens 1990; Giddens 
1992; Haraway 1991; Haraway 1997a; Haraway 1997b; Haraway 2004; Irigaray 1985; 
Jameson 1991; Lyotard ([1979]1984); Lutz 1995; Mestrovic 1994; Mestrovic 1993; 
Mestrovic 1992;  Mestrovic 1991; Rorty 1989; Rosenau 1992).  In this way, modernist 
conceptions of reason and rationality become paradoxical and irreconcilable with the 
stated goals of the Enlightenment project itself, such that both actual suffering and 
theoretical casualties result— the seeming impotence of modern theory construction.  
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Thus, although reason and rationality ostensibly promise order and structure, these 
concepts can be shown to actually produce malice and oppression as well.  Indeed, it is 
sometimes even the case that accounts of rationality are themselves “rationalized” in an 
attempt to pragmatically fit the existing modernist theoretical canopy. 
 3.2 The Prison: Abu Ghraib  
Consider the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.  First, it was built by Saddam Hussein as 
a modern prison to control, in Foucault’s scheme, the minds and souls of the prisoners as 
opposed to torturing their bodies.  Paradoxically, it came to serve as a site of torture of 
the body under both Saddam Hussein’s regime, as well as the American liberation and 
occupation.  Second, the prison itself is about the size of an average airport in the United 
States, thus exhibiting its domination over the built and created environment.  Third, the 
“phallic” panopticon at Abu Ghraib stands out visibly in all photos of the prison.  For 
Foucault, the towering panopticon serves the function of controlling prisoners through 
surveillance such that the prisoners are never certain when they are under the gaze.  
Finally, despite these modernist features, Abu Ghraib during American occupation was 
vulnerable to attacks, defenseless, porous to Iraqis, and incapable of surveillance in 
Foucault’s sense.  It was chosen by the U.S. Army to serve as a prison again, this time in 
the middle of an active war zone, which also contradicts Foucault. 
Under the modernist paradigm, one would have expected this American run 
prison to exhibit all of the characteristics of a McDonalized society: efficiency, 
rationality, prediction, and control (Ritzer 2004; Ritzer 2003; Ritzer 1993).  Interestingly, 
these are also gendered characterizations of masculinity within modernist patriarchal 
paradigms.  Applying McDonalized characteristics to Abu Ghraib would mean, for 
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example, that the prison would have been well supplied with food, water, medical 
supplies, clothing, and other things, up to and including the rules of engagement and the 
rules of detention and interrogation.  Instead, the US government’s own reports, as well 
as testimony at the Abu Ghraib detainee abuse trials at Ft Hood, Texas, disclosed chaos 
with regard to all of these phenomenon: food and water were scarce (even for the 
American soldiers); supposedly there was no clothing for the detainees to wear and that is 
why many were housed naked; the Rules of the Geneva Convention were never posted; 
soldiers did not know what the rules of engagement were as they were changing 
everyday; and Military Intelligence (MI) and Military Police (MP) roles were blurred and 
confusing.  Interestingly, the association of duties between the MI’s and MP’s was itself a 
failsafe system of checks and balances that was itself disregarded.  All of these examples 
point to the irrational, barbaric, and harshness associated with the experiences of Abu 
Ghraib, which I argue led to cultural and emotional harms of the prisoners there, and 
harms also for the American soldiers. 
Examining testimony, everyone who was asked about the state of the prison at 
Abu Ghraib testified that the conditions were deplorable, and especially given the 
constant attacks made on the prison itself.  Many stated that it was not a “normal prison,” 
as its detainee population included a combination of women, children, terrorists, and 
common criminals as prisoners.   
On May 16, 2005, Captain Reese, the first witness for the defense at the courts-
martial of Sabrina Harman stated in open court that Abu Ghraib had “less than favorable 
living conditions” and that soldiers “lived in jail cells” which were dirty and littered with 
unusable medical paraphernalia.  At this same trial, although during the sentencing phase 
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on May 17, 2005, Major DiNenna also described the conditions of Abu Ghraib as 
appalling, with trash, debris, and evidence of looting throughout the prison.  He 
specifically called the prison a “trash hole,” and noted not only that wild dogs inhabited 
the compound itself, but also that the porta-johns at the prison were filthy and sometimes 
overflowing because they had not been pumped.  Major DiNenna testified that most of 
the soldiers at Abu Ghraib prison were sickly, where cases of vomiting and diarrhea were 
commonplace among them.  Additionally, Major DiNenna stated under oath that there 
were not enough medical personnel and that there were 2-3 medical evacuations per day.   
Additionally, Captain Reese commented on the high level of insurgency in the 
area around the prison, with constant mortar attacks made on the prison itself.  Major 
DiNenna’s testimony further described the external environment at Abu Ghraib as having 
“a high level of daily threat.”  Major DiNenna described the lack of lighting at Abu 
Ghraib, where nightly attacks took place in conditions with no internal lighting.  The 
lighting used each night at Abu Ghraib consisted of military vehicles surrounding the 
prison and turning on their headlights for visibility inside of the prison.  The lighting 
inside of the prison literally came from vehicle headlights located outside of the prison.  
This situation was “incredibly dangerous, with low morale and high stress” stated Major 
DiNenna.  In a word, these courtroom depictions of Abu Ghraib are themselves barbaric, 
where masculinist reason has mutated into representations of the female symbolic of 
inadequacy. 
Regarding prisoner uprisings at the hard site of Abu Ghraib (the actual prison 
versus the tent prison outside), Major DiNenna stated that these events took place 
because of lack of food, overcrowding (6-7 prisoners per cell), the mixing of Sunni and 
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Shiites, and lengthy prisoner detentions.  He even claimed that some prisoners had not 
been talked to regarding why they were being held for six or more months after initially 
being detained at Abu Ghraib.   These uprisings were acts of reprisal for neglect and 
abandonment, and the absence of any rational system for prisoner processing that one 
might have expected at an American run prison.   
On the topic of food and water at Abu Ghraib, Major DiNenna described the food 
at Abu Ghraib as undercooked, dirty, containing glass and debris, as well as “rat poop.”  
He described the water conditions at Abu Ghraib as scarce, and stated that soldiers and 
detainees had access to only two liters of water per day for all activities such as drinking 
and washing.  Furthermore, and against the military’s protocol, Major DiNenna testified 
that sometimes military MRE’s were used to feed detainees, which resulted in a long and 
tedious situation for guards, as they had to strip MREs of pork products for cultural 
reasons, and had to remove Tabasco sauce bottles because they could be used as a 
weapon.   In his testimony, Major DiNenna stated that “prisoners had nothing to do all 
day but come up with ways to make weapons,” resulting in a further threat to guards.  
Major DiNenna also stated under oath “The feeling at Abu Ghraib was that we had been 
abandoned, and that this was a forgotten mission because there were no resources for the 
‘city’ of Abu Ghraib.”   A gendered reading of being “forgotten” given the savage 
conditions of Abu Ghraib can be equated with the second-class citizenship that women in 
patriarchal societies still face around the world, where women themselves are prisoners 
of these masculinist systems. 
Still further evidence of irrationality and the lack of prediction and control at Abu 
Ghraib were evident in Captain Reese’s additional testimony that the Iraqi police officers 
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at Abu Ghraib were corrupt, and that there was not adequate personnel to deal with the 
prisoners.  Captain Reese stated that American military personnel worked 12-hour shifts 
with no days off, and that really 2-3 more companies were needed to ideally run the 
prison effectively.  Major DiNenna further claimed that there was a high level of internal 
threat to the American military given the large numbers of prisoners versus the small 
number of guards.  DiNenna even stated that there was such a low ratio of prisoners to 
guards that he postulated about 150 prisoners or more to each guard at Abu Ghraib, with 
guard’s stress levels elevated by working what he thought were 12-16 hours per day.  
Major DiNenna, like Captain Reese, also noted the corruptness of Iraqi correctional 
officers and police, who participated in bribes and shakedowns, and who smuggled in 
weapons such as handguns and razors, and let detainees free during work details.  There 
was some confusion, according to Major DiNenna, for the American guards in 
identifying Iraqi prisoners versus correctional officers because of the shortage of 
supplies, as there were no uniforms available that would signify roles and distinction—
guard versus detainee.  Thus, American guards were responsible for monitoring Iraqi 
detainees, Iraqi correctional officers, and also Iraqi police given the lack of organization, 
shortage of supplies, and corruption of Iraqi personnel.  This corruption, confusion, and 
lack of organization are all mutations of masculinist and modernist rationality, where 
atrocious and uncivilized conditions were experienced by actual individuals at Abu 
Ghraib. 
When asked about detainee care, Captain Reese stated under oath that prisoners 
were kept naked in cells as part of a MI tactic.  Interestingly, Captain Reese postulated 
that this could also be a supply issue, or maybe that the inmates had removed their own 
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clothing because they were “psycho.”  However, gender can be applied here too, where 
nakedness is equated with feminine vulnerability and prisoner control using nakedness is 
an attempt to maintain the compliance and subordination of prisoners to guards.  
Compliance and subordination are two narratives of women’s experiences in patriarchal 
societies.   Moreover, humiliation through the use of nakedness can be analyzed in terms 
of gender such that further humiliation of male Iraqi detainees was caused because these 
prisoners were naked in front of female guards, a violation of Iraqi constructions of 
masculinity. 
 Additionally, Captain Reese stated the prisoners in Tier 1A and 1B were “people 
with intelligence value,” although he admitted that prisoners were mixed together in a 
“hodgepodge” because there was little room at the prison for detainees, thereby providing 
a contradictory account of detainee value in Tier 1A and 1B.  This becomes problematic 
because some of the prisoners were just common criminals, some were Iraqi prisoners 
that were “CID holds” (Criminal Investigative Division) ((This is a fact omitted in the 
U.S. Government reports, namely, that not only were some prisoners “MI holds” to be 
interrogated, but the Criminal Investigative Division had its own separate prisoners and 
the reason for this has not been explored.), others were detainees that were being 
investigated by other government agencies (OGA) (such as the CIA, and the dozen or so 
other secret agencies such as the Navy, National Security Agency, etc.), and some 
prisoners were even “ghost detainees,” or prisoners who were not accounted for by record 
or number as located at Abu Ghraib.  These “ghost detainees” were of high value to the 
military and, according to Captain Reese, were brought in through “the backdoor,” with 
no prisoner numbers assigned to them and with strict instructions to “not let anyone talk 
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to them, MI would be back to check on them.”  This is a chaotic system of prisoner order 
at Abu Ghraib, as situations that caused harm to both prisoners and American guards 
existed in consequence.  Prisoners faced physical abuse in the form of torture and 
emotional confusion about their detained status, and guards experienced confusion about 
their duties and regulations—all mutations of the supposed rational system one might 
expect in place.  
Additionally, women and children were kept at Abu Ghraib prison in Tier 1B, 
which Major DiNenna described as the only place available for segregation of women 
and children.  He stated under oath that women and children were brought into Abu 
Ghraib if a male in their family was arrested, and under the guise of possibly offering a 
kind of protection.  However, it came out in court later that women and children were 
used as a means for bargaining, where males could turn themselves in so that their female 
family members would be released from Abu Ghraib.  This was evidenced specifically in 
that women and children were given no listed offense on their capture tags, which were 
functionally useful with regard to specifying crimes committed thereby leading to arrest 
and confinement at Abu Ghraib.  This rationalization for keeping female prisoners thus 
crumbles in terms of motivation when learned that women were kept for bribery 
purposes.  Additionally, this system of bribery uses women as objects for trade for their 
male family members, representing further instances of female subordination at Abu 
Ghraib. 
Captain Reese also stated under oath that there was no outline at the prison about 
how to treat prisoners (as of October 2, 2003), and hence alluded to an absence of 
detainee treatment guidelines.  The American soldiers at Abu Ghraib were supposed to 
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guard all types of prisoners, some considered as having especially valuable intelligence, 
yet the guards had no additional training to handle these special prisoners, and had no 
guidance of distinction for inmate control.  Thus, prisoners were all mixed together, even 
sickly and contagious prisoners with outbreaks of tuberculosis, according to Captain 
Reese.  It is interesting to note here that during the Harman courts-martial it was stated 
that the actual orders given by Romero, a superior officer to the “rotten-apples” or low-
ranking soldiers of Abu Ghraib, regarding detainee treatment and interrogation tactics 
was itself an unlawful order of instruction—“do anything, but don’t kill.”    
What is more, Major DiNenna’s testimony, as well as at least five other soldier’s 
testimony (Joyner, Wisdom, Jones, Darby, and Rivera), echoed that of Captain Reese’s 
description of the conditions at Abu Ghraib.  Thus the descriptions of Abu Ghraib were 
widely corroborated as inefficient, irrational, uncontrolled, and incalculable.  All of the 
examples of irrationality, inefficiency and lack of prediction and control at Abu Ghraib 
are instances of mutations of masculinist and modernist rationality schema.   
From the point of view of a rationally run bureaucracy, one would have expected 
that Abu Ghraib would have both a reliable chain of command in place, and that they 
would have also followed US Army protocol for responsibility.  In the myth of American 
dominance and the Western Enlightenment Project, the US Army is heralded as the best 
army in the world; hence, the US army is regarded as the most organized, efficient, 
responsible, and moral.  After all, Americans are the good guys and not the terrorists, 
right?  Nevertheless, evidence instead shows the lack of this kind of bureaucratic order.  
For example, the officers high in the chain of command were exempted completely from 
all culpability and all responsibility for the abuse at Abu Ghraib, and all responsibility 
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was shifted onto the lowest ranking soldiers.  To this day, the Army has not determined 
who was in charge of the prison as the commanding officer: Colonel Thomas M.  
Pappas? Lieutenant Colonel Jerry Phillabaum? Brigadier General Janice Karpinski (now 
Colonel Karpinski)?  
Additionally, the government’s own reports substantiated the testimonial claims 
of the courts-martial with the indication that almost none of the paperwork required to be 
filed by protocol was actually filed.  Instead, considering military reports, the Taguba 
Report found that any filing system was “nonexistent” and there were no “lessons 
learned” Army files (Taguba report, filed by Maj.  Gen.  Antonio M.  Taguba, concerning 
the alleged abuse of prisoners by members of the 800th Military Police Brigade at the 
Abu Ghraib Prison in Baghdad; ordered by Lt.  Gen.  Ricardo Sanchez, commander of 
Joint Task Force-7, the senior U.S.  military official in Iraq, following persistent 
allegations of human rights abuses at the prison of Abu Ghraib).  Moreover, there were 
no “interrogation plans” filed, and in general, the US Army admits that the prison was 
run on an ad hoc, learn as you go along and on-the-job-training basis (Taguba Report).  
(Remember Romero’s impromptu order of “do anything, but don’t kill.”) 
As well, the US Army protocol requires the ratio of one military guard to fifteen 
prisoners, but in reality the ratio at Abu Ghraib was one guard to 200 prisoners.  The US 
government reports (Jones and Fay) state that the Army knew that overcrowding was a 
serious issue, but failed to remedy the situation, and still fails to do so (Strasser and 
Whitney 2004).  As of this writing Abu Ghraib is still overcrowded with reported an 
average of 5,000 prisoners.  Moreover, the government reports state that approximately 
80% of the prisoners at Abu Ghraib were not insurgents, and were not “terrorists,” but 
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were ordinary Iraqis such as taxi drivers, persons mistakenly arrested during sweeps, or 
even hostages (Strasser et al., 2004).  In addition, women and children were imprisoned 
at Abu Ghraib as bargaining chips for obtaining information.  The absurdity of this 
situation is that most of the prisoners did not have the information that the Army wanted 
(Strasser et al., 2004).  Hence, the “feminine” irrational symbolic comes to replace the 
organized and coherent system, which was seemingly based upon reason as its template.   
To illustrate this paradox of stated Enlightenment goals versus the actual chaos at 
Abu Ghraib, consider the prosecuting attorney’s explanation of why prisoners wore Iraqi 
panties on their heads.  Captain Christopher Graveline (the prosecutor for both Specialist 
Sabrina Harman and Private Lynndie England) stated that the reason for the panties on 
the heads of the detainees was that there was a shortage of supplies of clothing, so that 
American soldiers were sent into Baghdad to purchase Iraqi panties as “clothing.”  
Captain Graveline made this statement in open court on May 16th 2005, and Major 
DiNenna, the supply officer for AG, concurred with this statement on the stand, saying 
“yes sir” to the prosecuting counselor.  Interestingly, this “clothing” was seemingly used 
as a technique for humiliating detainees, as it was placed on their heads, and was not used 
as a cover or barrier against the environment or as part of a prisoner uniform.  A feminist 
application of Foucault’s contention that the body is the principal site of power in modern 
society is useful in explaining the social control of Iraqi prisoners in terms of their bodies, 
masculinity, and sexuality.  In this case, humiliation was the power that was used to 
control the masculine body through the use of feminine panties, where Iraqi cultural 
constructions of masculinity were themselves mocked with feminine objects of 
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humiliation.  This violation of the cultural code of constructed masculinity thus results in 
shame, compunction, and chagrin for the Iraqi prisoners. 
Nonetheless, many testimonies supplied evidence that nakedness was common 
and was used to control bodies, and was not a lack of supply issue.  What is more, one 
only has to consider that these detainees were arrested or detained while wearing 
clothing, and did not all arrive at Abu Ghraib prison naked.  So clothes were at one point 
available; however, it was common practice to control the body through nudity, and it 
was repeated in court over and again that it was a detention technique to strip detainees 
naked.   Social control was thus a product of power as applied to the body in gendered 
ways that offended cultural constructions of gender itself, where nakedness is associated 
with feminine vulnerability and masculine control over the naked “feminized” body is 
evidenced by the guards.   
In these outlined ways, the descriptions of Abu Ghraib evidenced the lacking of 
“masculine” order, control and rationality associated with the modernist Enlightenment 
paradigm.  Hence, chaos as an explanation for the disorder and abuse at Abu Ghraib can 
actually be understood in a gendered manner, where chaos comes to represent 
conceptions of the female symbolic narrative of vulnerability, disorganization, and 
emotionality—all binary opposite characterizations of reason and rationality. 
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Figure 3, Abu Ghraib Prison, “Panties on Head” 
(http://www.antiwar.com/news/?articleid=2444) 
 
 
 
3.3 Foucault and Power 
On the face of it, it might seem that prisoner abuse was a means for establishing 
what Foucault labels as the power of the sovereign (Foucault 1988; Foucault 
[1977]1995).  In a modernist patriarchal society, this “sovereign” is associated with 
masculinity such that power is aligned with the male perspective.  At Abu Ghraib, 
punitive abuse was used as a means for the goal of creating a power relationship (those in 
control versus prisoners) in a chaotic setting.  For example, Major General Miller is 
quoted in the Frontline: The Torture Question, PBS documentary (Kirk and Gilmore, 
2005) as stating words to the effect “unless the detainees feel like dogs everyday, you’re 
not doing your job properly.” Considering the photographs below, there is clear evidence 
that the use of dogs as a means of disciplinary power, as well as to play off of Iraqi fear 
of dogs and beliefs that dogs taint religiosity, attempted to create a sense of order itself.  
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Through the use of dogs to scare prisoners, a power relation was created that depicted the 
“masculine” power of the guards and the “feminine” vulnerability of prisoners.  
Additionally, it was documented in the Fay Report that civilians employed by the military 
used dogs to scare prisoners, hit them, and encouraged soldiers to abuse them (see photo 
2 and 3) (Mann 2004; Strasser 2004).  These are examples of raw masculinist power over 
the body through the use of force and in an attempt to create a means for control. 
 
Figure 4, Abu Ghraib Prison, “Fear of Dogs” 
(http://www.antiwar.com/news/?articleid=2444) 
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Figure 5, Abu Ghraib Prison, “Fear of Dogs 2” 
(http://www.antiwar.com/news/?articleid=2444) 
 
 
 
 Ironically, and in contra distinction to Foucault, the use of power by the American 
military became a disruptive force, or understood in terms of the irrational and chaotic 
feminine symbolic.  Intended to bring apparent order in an environment of chaos, 
American power-tactics actually produced more chaos, which can be understood as the 
by-product of mutated masculinist and modernist reason and rationality schema.  Again, 
against Foucault, the reality of the situation at Abu Ghraib was that the sovereign was 
exerting power over both the soul and body.  Moreover, the American soldiers did not 
present themselves as exerting the power of the sovereign in a raw and naked sense.  
Instead, the wolf-like power-tactics came in the sheep’s clothing of democracy and rule 
of law, hidden in commands from officers who would never testify (because they were 
given immunity) that they indeed ordered and provided training for these interrogation 
tactics.  
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For example, as shown in the courts-martial, detainees arriving at Abu Ghraib 
were handed a fly sheet, written in English, which stated words to the effect, “Welcome, 
you are now at an American run prison, you will be treated decently and humanely, and 
not like you were treated under Saddam Hussein’s regime.” The irony is that the 
detainees were treated as if they were detainees under Saddam Hussein’s regime.  
Foucault’s theory does not account for this subversion of the ideals of social order, 
democracy, and the enlightenment project. 
 Perhaps it is for this reason that Baudrillard wrote a book entitled Forget Foucault 
([1977]1987).  Foucault’s theory can be construed as a modernist attempt to depict a 
mere shift in the ordering principle of the Enlightenment from the body to the soul.  To 
be sure, prior to the leak of the photographs, which depicted the abuse, Americans were 
received as using “psychological yet humane” methods of interrogation as required by the 
US army field manual on interrogation, FM-34-52.  In reality, FM 34-52 was rendered 
obsolete by various memorandums from the white house and Lt Gen Sanchez, such that 
the concepts of torture, interrogation, and abuse became unintelligible.  This is an 
example of how a “standard” for prisoner treatment imploded in meaning such that it 
resulted in confusion and chaos with regards to interpretation. 
Consider the following discussion about interrogation techniques and the 
treatment of detainees.  In a statement released on November 4, 2005, Senator John 
McCain described the amendment he offered regarding detainees held by the U.S.: “Mr. 
President, I rise to offer an amendment that would (1) establish the Army Field Manual as 
the uniform standard for the interrogation of Department of Defense detainees and (2) 
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prohibit cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment of persons in the detention of the U.S. 
government” (McCain 2005). The amendment passed 90 to 9 in the U.S. Senate.  
Nonetheless, there is chaos in this perception of order.  First, the Army Field 
Manual or FM 34-52 is not a long-lasting normative standard because it can be changed 
and because there exists confusion at the present time as to whether the 1987 or the 1992 
versions (which differ greatly on the issue of how detainees should be treated) apply. 
Indeed, the Senator seems to be aware of the tentative nature of FM 34-52 when he writes 
in his statement: “My amendment would not set the Field Manual in stone—it could be 
changed at any time.”  Hence, there is no standard being put forth with regard to detainee 
interrogation, and only a simulacrum of standard itself.  Second, the latter part of the 
amendment is equally problematic because the terms “cruel,” “inhuman” and 
“degrading” hold divergent meanings for different human actors, groups, and cultures 
(Caldwell and Mestrovic 2006).   
Both parts of the amendment have fairly long histories of debate and discussion: 
The first part, regarding FM 34-52, is discussed at length in the Fay and Schlesinger 
reports as contributing to the overall “confusion” at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere that led to 
abuse.  The second part was discussed in the media in the Fall of 2005 regarding CPT Ian 
Fishback’s failed attempt at whistle blowing: many of his letters to commanding officers 
and to Senator McCain were published in The Washington Post (Priest and Wright, 
2005), and indicated that he and other soldiers were confused as to the meaning of what 
constituted acceptable interrogation techniques versus cruel, inhuman, and degrading acts 
that constitute abuse (. The amendment that was passed by the U.S. Senate does not cite 
the Geneva Conventions, which offer a more fixed and stable normative standard in that 
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they have remained unchanged for many years, would require a consensus of many 
nations to be changed, and prohibit specific actions and behaviors that leave little room 
for interpretations (for example, nudity is flatly prohibited, so that no soldier has to 
decide whether forcing detainees to be nude is cruel, inhuman, or degrading) (Caldwell 
and Mestrovic, 2006).   
This leads to a chaotic and confusing interpretation of what acceptable methods of 
detainee interrogation actually are, and shows that attempts to bring order and control to a 
chaotic situation actually resulted in the production of additional chaos.  McCain’s 
amendment is part of what can be construed as a postmodern sea of circulating fictions 
regarding detainee abuse. The several circulating fictions include the following: that the 
abuse was confined to a few “rotten apples” at Abu Ghraib when the U.S. Government’s 
own reports document abuse at Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan, and elsewhere in Iraq; 
that the “interrogation techniques” were normative when the Government’s own reports 
concede that they were already out of sync with FM 34-52; that abuse occurred and 
occurs as the outcome of interrogation when ample testimony emerged at the courts-
martial at Ft. Hood, Texas that the abuse was often done for sport and amusement, and 
not for any official purpose at all; and that the problem of abuse can be fixed by referring 
to ambiguous normative standards which are already cited as the source of confusion that 
led to abuse (Caldwell and Mestrovic, 2006). 
All of the U.S. Government reports refer to the possible impact of a memorandum 
issued on September 14, 2003 by Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez on abuse at Abu 
Ghraib. The Schlesinger Report of August 2004 shows that “a list of techniques 
circulated from Guantanamo and Afghanistan to Iraq. . . . In August 2003, MG Geoffrey 
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Miller . . . brought to Iraq the Secretary of Defense’s April 16, 2003 policy guidelines for 
Guantanamo—which he reportedly gave to CJTF-7 as a potential model—recommending 
a command-wide policy be established.  He noted, however, the Geneva Conventions did 
apply to Iraq.”  However, the Schlesinger Report fails to investigate how and why LG 
Sanchez would engage in writing rules of interrogation that are “unauthorized” in the 
sense that he was applying policies that circumvented the Geneva Conventions to Iraq 
(“techniques circulated”), where the Geneva Conventions apply, but also circumventing 
the 1992 edition of the Army Field Manual. This move does not seem “rational” from the 
rational-legal perspective, as it is understood in the West, e.g., it is contradictory, or 
“rational” and “irrational” at the same time.  Again, this leads to chaos and not a rational 
and orderly outline of detainee interrogation and treatment protocol. The reality of the 
situation regarding interrogation tactics and techniques is that the concepts used to 
discuss these tactics themselves implode in Baudrillard’s sense with regard to meaning, 
such that the concepts of torture, interrogation, and abuse become unintelligible.  In this 
way, the Americans were paying lip service to the enlightenment project’s goals of 
rationality and order, and especially given that these concepts became themselves 
inarticulate and incomprehensible. 
Nevertheless, power as depicted at Abu Ghraib was a spectacle aimed at 
maintaining prisoner compliance.  However, the real postmodern spectacle is that the 
power over the soul degenerated into abuse of the body and soul, and was documented 
for the entire world to see.  It is therefore technology itself that allowed us a new, 
compelling, and undeniable way of seeing the hidden reality of Abu Ghraib.   
  
75
 
 There seem to be at least three separate Western discourses in play.  The first is 
the American discourse of conquering another nation for the sake of liberation and 
democracy.  The second seems to be the discourse of being above the law; the rest of the 
world must follow the Geneva conventions, but the US chooses when and if the Geneva 
conventions apply at Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan, and in Iraq (Mestrovic 2005).  The 
third discourse seems similar to Baudrillard’s notion of seduction (which represents 
mastery over the symbolic universe) (Baudrillard [1979]1990), and involves a subversion 
of the first by the second, namely a pretense of bringing liberation and democracy while 
secretly contradicting these very principles through abuse.  For Baudrillard, seduction is 
associated with the “feminine” and the ability of the “feminine” to rule by mastery over 
the symbolic universe (and “the code”) versus by “masculine” power.   
However, although at first glance the third discourse seems similar to 
Baudrillard’s notion of seduction, Baudrillard himself links his notion of seduction to his 
overall discussion of “the code” that organizes the economy of signs and symbols in 
society.  In the case of the detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib, the “code” becomes a false 
reality that is not merely a simulacrum that has been severed from reality, but a seduction 
of reality itself—or at least reality’s appearance.  Abu Ghraib was not a hyperreality of 
appearances as Baudrillard’s seduction might suggest (Baudrillard [1979]1990).  Instead, 
real actual documented empirically verifiable abuse occurred at Abu Ghraib under the 
guise of American simulacra regarding democracy and liberation.  Neither Foucault’s nor 
Baudrillard’s theories capture the complexity of the situation at Abu Ghraib and its 
relationship to the larger American culture. 
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 The American public is complicit in this subversion of its own enlightenment 
ideals by rationalizing the abuse in various ways.  For example, Muslims were depicted 
in our culture and some media as “terrorists’ who deserve this kind of treatment because 
of the events of September 11th.  (I remember viewing President Bush’s announcements 
after the events of September 11th, and especially given the heightened targeting of 
perceived Muslims for hate-crimes, that American’s should not view all Muslims as 
terrorists, and that only a few Muslims used religion as a base for terrorism.)   Further 
evidence for the association of Muslims with “terrorist” can be found in Akbar Ahmed’s 
book Islam Under Siege, where Ahmed begins by stating “Around the world, Muslims 
minorities are often concerned with whether they will be perceived as terrorists.”  
Additionally, once this mindset exists towards Muslims, it becomes possible to objectify 
them as things rather than as persons, and this was evident in the homoerotic and 
gendered abuses that prisoners faced at Abu Ghraib.  For Baudrillard, this is must exit 
logic—“The have-nots will be condemned to oblivion, to abandonment, to disappearance 
pure and simple” (Baudrillard 1988, p.111).  
Further evidence of the rationalization of abuse can be found in the current 
statements made by Vice President Dick Cheney regarding the necessity of restrictive 
rules regarding the treatment of detainees under circumstances where detainees might 
have pertinent information (Priest and Wright, 2005).  In 2001, Vice-President Dick 
Cheney, in an interview on “Meet the Press,” said that the government might have to go 
to “the dark side” in handling terrorist suspects, adding, “It’s going to be vital for us to 
use any means at our disposal.” Similar to Baudrillard’s notion of must exit logic, we 
seemingly have “must torture logic”; however, our torture logic goes beyond 
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Baudrillard’s theory of exclusion in that we now must punitively and actively torture 
anyone we suspect has information and use any means are permissible.  We are the 
gardeners Bauman (1992) critiques and we are clearing the weeds in an attempt to 
fashion and remake an environment that conforms to our notions of reason, and our will 
must be represented, as we are the world’s police.    
 But really through this spectacle, no voice has been given to the prisoners 
themselves even if some of the people in Abu Ghraib have indeed been given faces, albeit 
that they are not given their real names.  One of the most fascinating aspects of this 
situation at Abu Ghraib that came out in the trials is that the prisoners were given 
American nicknames such as Gus, Gilligan, Shitboy, Bigbird, the Claw, and so on.  These 
nick names can be understood in terms of American pop-culture television shows such as 
Gilligan’s island, Sesame Street, etc.  This “Disnification” (Mestrovic 2005) of the 
prisoners is in itself a form of dehumanization and abuse, and can be equated with the 
objectification of women in larger American society.   The US government reports stated 
that the dehumanization at Abu Ghraib set the stage for the physical and sexual abuse that 
followed, and was based on this objectification of detainees.  Despite all of this we are 
not forced to recognize that the Iraqis are people too.  These pictures have become icons 
that blend into the violence and gratuitous sexuality in American culture, cinema, and 
pornography. 
Reflecting on American culture, it is not surprising that there is a parallel between 
the objectification of women and crimes of power committed against them, and the 
objectification of prisoners and the associated sexualized and gendered abuses they 
endured.  The point here is that objectification is a form of dehumanization, and at Abu 
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Ghraib the result of these acts was the vanishing of prisoner identity and the 
reconceptualization of identity in a sub-human and bestial manner.  As a matter of fact, 
examples of treating prisoners as on-par with animals have been provided above.   
 If Foucault is correct about his notion of punishment of the soul, then the irony of 
the situation at Abu Ghraib is that punishment of the soul occurred through the taking of 
the pictures, which is in itself a violation of the Geneva Conventions.  These pictures 
highlighted the homoerotic nature of the punishment, as well as the compulsory and 
common nudity.  The homoerotic punishment evidenced in the iconic photographs of 
abuse is a cultural violation of Iraqi masculinity, and places the detainees in a subordinate 
category of both vulnerable “female” and unmasculine “homosexual.”  In a word, the 
punishment of the soul has taken the form of humiliation.  It is important to understand 
that contrary to Foucault and Baudrillard, humiliation is not just a means of control, 
although it can be depicted in this way.  Rather, humiliation is in itself not only a 
violation of the Geneva Conventions but also a form of psychological abuse and 
objectification.  In reality, this kind of deep shame is itself savage and is not rational 
detainee treatment.  It is on par with the medieval physical forms of torture that Foucault 
writes about in Discipline and Punishment ([1977]1995). 
 Another contradiction in the enlightenment project is that one would expect the 
“interrogation” to occur in designated interrogation rooms under organized procedures set 
forth by US army field manuals.  Instead, as documented by the US government reports, 
The Human Rights Watch, as well as courtroom testimony, the interrogations, which 
turned into abuse, occurred in disorganized and unauthorized locals such as showers, cars 
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and trucks, aluminum storage containers, hallways, and other places that were 
“unofficial.” 
 What is interesting is that the panopticon cannot see into these spaces, making 
these spaces themselves what Foucault referred to as the “control room” (Foucault 
[1977]1995).   In a sense, the abuse is occurring outside the purview of the panopticon, as 
the abuse was hidden and not in full view of the panopticon.  One of the most common 
statements during testimony at the trials made by soldiers in response to participating in 
abuse was a secret code: “You didn’t see shit!” This can be compared to situations of 
child and spouse abuse, which take place in the private sphere, outside of the view of 
everyone else and away from the gaze of the public sphere.  As stated in numerous 
testimonies during both the Harman and England trials, “You didn’t see shit!” was the 
mantra associated with covering the Abu Ghraib detainee abuse by those who 
participated in the abuse itself. 
 Photos are the panopticon, since they show the abuse to the whole public 
consciousness.  This allows the public to visit Abu Ghraib.  Too much focus on the 
photos negates the fact that the abuse is far-reaching and widespread.  Additionally, 
sometimes the photos themselves were destroyed, a fact that came out at the Ft.  Hood 
trial of Sabrina Harman in Megan Ambuhl’s testimony, when she stated that she was 
personally ordered to remove all traces of the photos from the computer hard drive 
located in Tier 1A, at the Abu Ghraib prison.  In their landmark lawsuits, the ACLU is 
still negotiating with the government in the name of freedom of information for full 
release of all of the photos, as the public has not been privy to the many additional 
photographs of abuse.  In a word, the photos themselves become a focus of masculinist 
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power and control in that they construct and tell the “truth” of Abu Ghraib to the world.  
This becomes a scapegoat for reasons of insurgency and anti-American targeting, and 
also a rationalization for keeping the photos secret from the public eye.  In the closing 
arguments of the Lynndie England case, the prosecution made the argument that seven 
soldiers (the “rotten apples”), and England especially, were to blame for the insurgencies 
and anti-American targeting.  In the Enlightenment society, the photos would be seen as a 
whistle blowing tactic, yet this meaning becomes subverted as the blame for targeting is 
shifted onto the lowest ranking of military soldiers.  Nonetheless, in her trial, England 
was cited as the cause for blame for future deaths to American soldiers. 
 There are other forms of torturing the soul, as well as the body, yet Foucault 
seems to operate under an untenable principle that the body and soul are radically 
divided.  However, psychological research has demonstrated that mental pain and cruelty 
has an immediate and long lasting effect on the body through stress, which in itself leads 
to physical symptoms.  Reconceptualized in this way, other forms of abuse at Abu Ghraib 
can be seen: torture of the body and soul simultaneously; the desecration of the Koran; 
exploiting Iraqi fear of dogs as a means of torture and control; contaminating Islamic 
religious prayer sessions with the presence of dogs; rape, which inherently involves 
torture to the psyche and body simultaneously; religion used to torture the soul through 
anti-religious sentiment and actions.  An additional abuse includes the hooding of 
detainees as an example of dehumanization, objectification, and psychological torture in 
that the detainees hear noise and experience physical blows, yet are fully unaware of 
what is going on except through sound, and therefore cannot anticipate or predict action.  
This is torture because it is mental abuse and capriciousness for the victim.   
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Figure 6, Abu Ghraib Prison, “Detainee Mental Abuse” 
(http://www.antiwar.com/news/?articleid=2444) 
 
 
 
Additional torture of the mind is evident in the holding of women and children 
prisoners without charge and without hopes of being freed from Abu Ghraib.  Feminists 
have applied Foucault’s identification of the body as the principal target of power to 
analyze contemporary forms of social control over both women's bodies and minds, 
where femininity is policed in terms of certain juridical laws of culturally constructed 
gender (Bartky 1988, Bordo 1988, Sawicki 1994).  In this case of women and children 
prisoners, the emphasis on practices through which power relations are reproduced 
converges with the feminist project of analyzing the politics of personal relations and 
altering gendered power relations.  In this specific example, women prisoners do not have 
power over their bodies in that they are imprisoned, such as the argument goes with 
regards to women and their experiences in the institutions of marriage, motherhood and 
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compulsory heterosexuality.  Hence, at Abu Ghraib, women do not have any power over 
their bodies or minds as prisoners, and thus women's relationships to their bodies and 
minds are constrained by their status at Abu Ghraib as pawns and as supposedly 
“protected” prisoners. 
Furthermore, and I think Baudrillard would agree, a simulacra of torture took 
place at Abu Ghraib when mock torture sessions were constructed, where both shock 
wires were placed on detainees as well as hoods.  This is a simulation of torture because 
no shock was delivered and only the situation was reconstructed to give the effect of the 
abuse.  Interestingly, this was exactly the kind of abuse that Saddam Hussein was 
believed culpable of.  The picture below details this abuse, and captures the notion that 
this is torture of the soul through the mock torture of the body. 
 
 
Figure 7, Abu Ghraib Prison, “Simulacra of Abuse” 
(http://www.antiwar.com/news/?articleid=2444) 
 
 
 
Lastly, in one situation, a detainee’s body was marked with the misspelled word 
“rapeist” on his arm and as a sign of his crime.   What is now known because of sworn 
testimony in the court cases concerning the detainee abuse is that the detainee actually 
did not commit the crime of rape.   In this instance, the detainee had to experience 
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humiliation and a sense of grave injustice that was inflicted on both his body and soul, 
the word rapist was physically written on the body with a marker and the detainee was 
subsequently beaten as a result of this label.  What is more, Harman, a female American 
soldier wrote the word on the detainee’s leg, and I argue that this labeling of a male as a 
“rapist” speaks to Harman’s cultural socialization, where in America men are responsible 
primarily for the violent crime of rape against women.  
 
Figure 8, Abu Ghraib Prison, “Rapeist” 
(http://www.antiwar.com/news/?articleid=2444) 
 
 
 
3.4 Durkheim 
For Durkheim, the key points regarding crime and punishment are that 
punishment reestablishes the social order, restores the social order that the crime violated, 
and is part of society’s self-correcting mechanism.  For Durkheim, crime offends the 
collective conscious, meaning that when the social collectivity reacts punitively to an act, 
the said act becomes a crime.  Says Durkheim, “In other words, we must not say that an 
action shocks the common conscience because it is criminal, but rather that it is criminal 
because it shocks the common conscience.  We do not reprove it because it is a crime, but 
it is a crime because we reprove it” ([1893] 1933, p.  80). However, the US government 
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reports show that the social system at Abu Ghraib was indeed not self-correcting.  The 
abuse and “punishment” of the detainees were crimes in themselves that further disrupted 
the social order.  Moreover, considering the trials themselves, all the responsibility was 
shifted onto a few “rotten apples,” which did not restore a sense of law and order in the 
US Army or in the American collective consciousness.   Again, culpability was pushed 
onto a “few rotten apples” and thus the prison did not function as an instrument for 
restoring social equilibrium.   
 Additionally, according to Durkheim, punishment can or cannot be cruel and is 
aimed at reestablishing the social order.  This punishing gives order to the collective 
conscious, and societies become more humane as they progress from a punitive law 
society to a restitutive law society-- so now we don't chop heads on blocks or have public 
hangings, but instead use homoerotic poses and acts as the metaphysical guillotine of 
punishment.  Many see the war itself as punishment for the September 11th bombing of 
the trade centers, as the image of the “terrorist” is labeled and congealed for the 
American public as the enemy by President Bush and the media.  The message is this: 
Iraqis are terrorists with weapons of mass destruction and Iraqi people are "insurgents" 
that are in the way of inevitable democratic progress.  In this way, it seems that David 
Riesman ([1961]2000) might label the American social character as that of an other 
directed culture, one that was attacked and shamed on September 11th, and who 
desperately is trying to reestablish the role of world domination so that our image of the 
“nation-self” is a positive and strong collective image.  This image also gives us power 
over the rest of the world in that we are the symbolic bully, who not only does not play 
well with others, but also acts out when excited.  Have we become molded of the same 
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symbolic material that figures such as Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein are 
fashioned?  
Instead of punishing Saddam physically (body) we put him on display in his 
underwear in the media, a clear narcissistic slashing of the soul.  Putting Saddam on 
display in the world media and as one of our prisoners, as well as showing his sons dead 
on worldwide television, are all crimes that violate the Geneva conventions.  None of 
these actions are in line with Durkheim’s theory, which holds that punishment is 
supposed to restore social order.  Although U.S. punishment of Muslim nations did 
temporarily reinforce national solidarity in the U.S. (given the huge popular support for 
the war at its onset) as a strong nation coming together to defend freedom and 
democracy, it also disrupted solidarity in Muslim nations.  This disruption of the Muslim 
social order can be read as a form of punishment in itself.  For example, the humiliating 
punishment of Saddam only serves to further humiliate people in Muslim nations and 
promotes more insurgency and chaos (Ahmed 2003).  These leaders, according to Akbar 
Ahmed (2003) in his book Islam Under Siege, are heroes to Muslim nations, and we 
depict them in real live simulacra of MTV’s Real Life.  Thus, the war and disruption of 
social cohesion in the Muslim nations can be viewed as punishment of the body and soul 
of the Muslim “nation-self.”  Additionally, at this time, support for the war has lowered 
and thus the perceived benefit of national social solidarity in terms of rallying around the 
punishment of Muslims is itself fleeting.  Instead, one could argue that solidarity is 
beginning to be about supporting the end of the American occupation of Iraq, and this 
interpretation functions in understanding recent Muslim solidarity as well. 
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 The war itself can also be understood as punishment for offending the sovereign 
(GW Bush and family), as a private grudge, or even an easy excuse for targets to blame 
for the devastation on September 11th.  For on the world’s stage, our image was tarnished; 
yet, we are the world's policemen, not because we are good police (obviously given our 
current American prison problems coupled with the problems we have at prisons in Iraq, 
Guantanamo, and Afghanistan), but because we portray ourselves as the world's police, 
looking to bring democracy, security, and flowers.  Instead, we give the illusion of order 
and function under a simulacrum of rationality.  However, all the while, Foucault’s 
medieval spirit of punishment has just mutated into a new form of the same. 
  3.5 Moving beyond Foucault’s Continuum of Punishment and Cruelty 
Foucault argues that physical cruelty as a form of punishment has been replaced 
with notions of more humane punishment of the mind and soul in modern nations that 
operate under the principles of the Enlightenment project (Foucault [1977]1995).  
Regarding Abu Ghraib, this does not seem to be the case.  Instead, the Enlightenment 
project, as well as postmodern notions of simulacra, are themselves subverted by cruelty 
that involves both the body and the soul. 
 Subversion is used through the holding of “ghost detainees,” which are people 
who are held without being formally charged.  This can be seen as an example of what 
Foucault calls the sovereign's right to make charges against a person that they do not 
know about (Foucault [1977]1995).   Even the notion of “rights” are themselves an 
enlightenment ideal that is based on a narrative, which is itself a simulacra.   
Consider the recent story in Time magazine that reports on the murder of a ghost 
detainee by CIA agents at Abu Ghraib after being captured by Navy Seals November 4, 
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2003.  Printed plainly in Time magazine was the following: “The death of secret detainee 
Manadel al-Jamadi was ruled a homicide in a Defense Department autopsy” (Zagorin 
2005).  It was stated in The New Yorker that a forensic pathologist testified that al-
Jamadi died from asphyxiation while being shackled in a crucifixion-like pose (Mayer 
2005).  Indeed, no charges have yet to be leveled at the CIA, and the agent who 
specifically was mentioned, Mark Swanner, continues to work for the CIA.  Likewise, in 
The New Yorker, reports of up to four more detainee deaths at the hands of the CIA were 
acknowledged, yet “US government's policies on interrogating terrorist suspects may 
preclude the prosecution of CIA agents who commit abuses or even kill detainees” 
(Mayer 2005).  Where are the rights of these detainees? Are they being considered?  
It is not surprising then to know that at the Sabrina Harman trial, one photograph 
in particular was never shown—the one with her smiling and giving the thumbs-up over a 
body packed in ice, the body of Manadel al-Jamadi.  If this photograph were shown in 
court and at the trials, it can be imagined that more questions might be asked about who 
that was Sabrina was smiling over, and more importantly, how did that detainee die?   
What is known about the photograph, however, is that Harman was ordered to smile and 
to pose in the picture by Graner, a male guard at Abu Ghraib.  In this way, power over the 
body was gendered for Harman in that she was forced by a male superior to participate in 
the photo of al-Jamadi.  Power over al-Jamadi’s body and soul was evidenced in his death 
at the hands of the CIA. 
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Figure 9, Abu Ghraib Prison, “Sabrina Harman Smiling Over the Body of Manadel al-
Jamadi” 
(Tentatively identified as of May 20, 2004) 
http://www.antiwar.com/news/?articleid=2444 
 
 
 
 Subversion is also used in this war when one considers current reports of “black 
sites,” or secret prisons run by the CIA, reportedly in locations of the former Soviet 
Block Countries.  This is yet another example of how the CIA operates outside of the 
law, thereby making the American notion of the rule of law a simulacra itself 
(Baudrillard [1981]1994).  In many ways when Baudrillard claims that “the Gulf War did 
not take place” and that there has been a “perfect crime,” he may now possibly be found 
heralding that “American law does not exist” either, and that we have now entered into 
the “spirit of terrorism” (Baudrillard [2002]2003; Baudrillard [1995]2002; Baudrillard 
[1991]1995). 
 For Foucault, confession (a form of subversion) is integral for punishment 
(Foucault [1977]1995), and perhaps this is why it was so important for the MI's to get the 
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confession out of detainees.  After all, we are seemingly looking for the truth through the 
punishment and control of detainees.  However, the American MI’s used what Foucault 
would term medieval methods of torture such as physical blows and physical suffering to 
extract these confessions, while simultaneously professing adherence to enlightenment 
narratives.   
 The trials themselves might be considered, under the common sense definition of 
a “trial,” to be aimed at finding the truth, much like a confession of sorts.  However, after 
attending two separate trials dealing with detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib, it became clear 
to me that these trials were really games of subversive strategy with revolving fictions, 
images, and chances for one-upmanship.  If Foucault is right, and punishment is now 
aimed at just punishing the soul, then the “bad-apples” would not be shackled in body 
chains that connected at the ankles, wrists, and waist, and also surrounded by giant 
guards and journalists taking photos as they left the courtroom after the verdict.  This 
kind of punishment is aimed at both the control of the body and the soul.  Lynndie 
England and Sabrina Harman were not just handcuffed on a guarded military base, but 
their hands were shackled to their legs on a guarded military base— the largest Army 
base in the nation, and in front of the entire world view of the media who waited, 
leisurely camped, and strategically placed to get the best photos of this humiliating 
spectacle.  I argue elsewhere that this spectacle was really about how female soldiers, 
England and Harman, offended the masculinist code of the military by virtue of being 
female in the masculinist military itself. 
 Punishment is thus an interesting concept coupled with gender and power, and 
can even help explain why relationships existed between the detainees and the guards of 
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Abu Ghraib prison.  From the point of view of the detainees, there was the Stockholm 
Syndrome of the prisoners— laughing, joking, or complying with their abusers.  This was 
documented in court during the Harman trial when Sabrina herself stated that Gilligan, 
the man in the hood with the electrodes attached to his fingers, agreed to be hooded 
during the mock execution photographs.  Sabrina said he was their friend or their 
“trustee.” However, the Stockholm syndrome also applies to some of the abusers 
themselves, as a large number of soldiers (both male and female) with whom I spoke 
openly with disclosed that they were suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD) from the abuse they suffered and witnessed in Iraq and at Abu Ghraib.  Thus, in a 
sense both the American soldiers and the detainees became victims of the very 
punishment that they exacted.   
 3.6 The “Rationalization” of Rationality 
Within this section, I demonstrate that rationality associated with modernity has a 
conceptual link to masculine and patriarchal systems, and thus use a gender analysis to 
understand “rationality” and “chaos” at Abu Ghraib.    
Throughout this analysis, rationality itself has not been used to correct the social 
order; rationality has not been used to restore the legitimacy of the Geneva Conventions 
or the Army’s Field Manual 34-52; instead, rationality has been used to rationalize torture 
instead of stopping it.  This can be understood as a mutation of the masculinist symbolic 
“code” in that it is neither rational nor logical.  At the Abu Ghraib prison, rationality 
applied should have resulted in order, control, and a prison of safety.  Instead, what both 
the detainees and military personnel of Tier-1A and Tier 1-B at Abu Ghraib prison 
encountered and experienced was a prison within a prison.  “Rationalization” of supposed 
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rationality itself occurred throughout the Abu Ghraib prison, within government reports, 
inside of the courtroom itself, and throughout the sworn testimony within the courtroom. 
At the Abu Ghraib prison, there was the rationalization that abuse of detainees 
only happened specifically in Tier-1A and only at Abu Ghraib.  However, in reality, 
abuse was happening all over the compound of Abu Ghraib (for example, when detainees 
were being taken out of transport trucks, when detainees were moved or searched, etc.), 
and abuse is still happening all over Iraq according to Captain Ian Fishback’s account in 
the Human Rights Watch Report (2005).  This is especially important to point out 
because abuse was occurring before the soldiers from the 325MI and 800MP brigades 
(the “rotten apples”) arrived in August of 2003 at Tier-1A of Abu Ghraib.  More 
importantly the abuse is still continuing after the abuse was reported in January 2004, and 
well into the year 2005.  The abuse has been documented to extend well beyond the 
boundaries of the Abu Ghraib prison, and has been documented at FOB Mercury, FOB 
Tiger, and other bases in Iraq, not to mention at US military bases in both Afghanistan 
and at Guantanamo Bay.  But, what remains important is that much of this abuse was 
gendered in that it aimed at garnering power through gender humiliation and homoerotic 
torture over both the body and soul. 
 Within US government reports, the reports themselves do admit that the chain of 
command was responsible for the abuse and chaos at Abu Ghraib, but rationalized that 
culpability fell entirely on the lower ranking soldiers, two of which were the only women 
at the hard site of Abu Ghraib, and who were shown not to have participated in abuse.  In 
this way, in other sections, I argue gender was used to punish females within the 
masculine-based U.S. military.  
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 Within the courtroom, the rationalization was that these were just a “few rotten 
apples” doing the abuse, when even experts such as Dr. Stjepan Mestrovic testified that 
there was a larger “poisoned environment,” and using similar terminology as within the 
government reports themselves, as evidenced by the expansiveness of the abuse.  
Additionally, the judge had complete control of what would be admitted for evidence into 
the trials, thereby performing the iconic role of masculine control.   Hence, the wider 
reasonable connection between abuse at Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay, and Afghanistan 
was never allowed to be heard within the courtroom.  Says Dr. Stjepan G.  Mestrovic, 
right before the judge forcibly cleared the courtroom, sent Mestrovic, the expert witness 
out of the courtroom, and sent the panel immediately back into deliberation, “connect the 
dots of the migration of abuse, Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan, Abu Ghraib, Iraq.” Even 
Captain Fishback’s report on the Human Rights Watch Report webpage was denied entry 
into the trial as evidence because of its supposed yet seemingly incorrect “non-relevance” 
to the abuse cases being tried at Ft. Hood.  Instead, the rationalizing in the courtroom was 
that this abuse was caused by a few “rotten apples,” and seemingly continues in part, it 
was argued at the courts-martial, because of their doing. 
 Considering the testimony heard at the trial of Lynndie England, not one officer 
was allowed to testify as a means to rationalize that the chain of command could not have 
known of the abuse.  In this way, these officers could not thusly be held liable or culpable 
for the abuse itself.  The government reports demonstrated clearly and rationally that the 
officers in charge of Abu Ghraib knew or should have known under US Army protocol 
that the abuse was occurring.  Hence, the testimony itself was skewed.  The officers 
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allowed to testify were subpoenaed and testified in exchange for not being prosecuted.  
Thus, a “deal” was made, and thereby a rationalization for their “acquittal” occurred. 
 Is through the rationalizations in each of these aspects—the prison, the 
government reports, the courtroom, and the testimony—that reason itself was presented 
as a simulacrum.  “Reason” itself was not killed, as Baudrillard would have us believe 
([1995]2002) , but an economy of rationalization has sprung up to replace it, where at one 
time rationality and enlightenment ideals attempted to flourish.   
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4. ABU GHRAIB, PARSONIAN GENDER ROLES, AND COURTS-MARTIAL  
 
EXPERIENCES 
 
 
Reflecting on my experiences (and many pages of notes!) of the courts-martial of 
Sabrina Harman and Lynndie England, as well as the many sworn statements and 
testimony, I argue that  Parsons’ notion of instrumental and expressive gender roles 
describe the different role themes that developed at these trials (in session and in private 
meetings with the defense council).  I analyze sworn statements and testimony, and I 
apply Parsons’ notion of gender roles to the treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison 
and the now infamous photographs depicting the conditions and abuse at Abu Ghraib.  
Throughout this discussion, I show that the Parsonian distinction between instrumental 
and expressive roles served a multitude of functions simultaneously, and especially given 
the masculinist code of the military.  However, I move beyond Parsons, and argue that 
given the complex social situations at Abu Ghraib, Parsons’ notions of “instrumental” 
and “expressive” are limited with regard to their explanatory power in the following 
situations:  when expressive means were linked to instrumental ends; expressiveness 
towards superiors as a means to an ends; and expressive fear in male soldiers.  In general, 
Parsons accounts for the rigid stereotypes of the military with regard to male and female 
roles; however, Parsons does not account for the fact that males can be expressive, 
females can be instrumental, and above all, that expressive functions can themselves be 
“instrumental” in terms of power relationships1.  Moreover, the “instrumental” goals-
means relationships established at Abu Ghraib was non-functional, and ironically, 
resulted in chaos, not the desired, instrumental goals.  There were complex issues going 
                                                 
1 For a non-critical application of Parsonian’s gender categories applied to the Courts-Martial of Sabrina 
Harman, see Mestrovic and Caldwell 2006. 
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on at Abu Ghraib and in the courts-martial, and a sophisticated application of Parsons’ 
initial typology leads to new concepts such as expressive torture, expressive power, 
instrumental torture, and instrumental chaos. 
4.1 Instrumental and Expressive 
 
Formulated in full by the late 1960’s, Parsons used the sexual division of labor in 
the family as the basis for his conceptions of male and female “sex roles,” or a specific 
division of roles based on the biological distinctions of sex (Parsons [1937]1949; Parsons 
1951; Parsons 1951; Parsons and Bales 1955).  (This theory can be thought of as the 
stereotypical gender roles of the “Leave it to Beaver” era.)  For Parsons, the feminine role 
was the “expressive” role associated with the mothering duties of taking care of children 
and providing emotional support, which was functional in nature for both the family and 
for social solidarity.  The feminine role was expressive action oriented towards internal 
integration, or the amalgamation of the group, as well as assimilation and incorporation.  
This means that Parsons associated the expressive role with group functioning that had a 
focus on concern with the welfare of others.   The masculine role was, according to 
Parsons, the “instrumental” role, or those tasks associated with being a wage earner or 
other goal-oriented and presumably “rational” tasks.  Additionally, Parsons characterized 
the masculine role as oriented towards instrumental action, aimed at the external 
environment such as the work place or public and political sphere of society.  The 
masculine role identifies the male as an agent who thinks in terms of rationally-linked 
goals and means, and whose behavior is esteemed in terms of competence and 
independence (Parsons and Bales 1955 ).   
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Parsons’ description of gender roles is based on his perception that biological 
distinctions of sex inform gender behavior, and specifically inform the ways that gender 
roles become so conceived.  In Parsons’ structural-functional account, gender associated 
with sex categories serves as a means for organizing social life.  These distinct sex roles, 
Parsons explains, are transmitted through socialization, and became associated with 
occupational and family roles.   
Some argue that Parsons’ account of gender reifies gender stereotypes and ignores 
power relations within families, as women’s work in the home is not valued as much as 
man’s work outside of the home, as women’s domestic labor is not paid labor.  
Additionally, other concerns are that Parsons seems to imply an inequality in sex roles 
that is left unquestioned in terms of power, and this too could be another reason women’s 
work is not valued similarly to men’s work in our culture.  As a matter of fact, women 
working in the public sphere, and outside of the home, earn less than their male 
counterparts.   
Feminists and other gender theorists explicitly question the association of sex and 
gender categories in terms of their relationship as causal explanations between categories, 
and argue that Parsons does not critically evaluate the divisions of these roles in terms of 
gender stereotypes.  Although the Parsonian perspective seems helpful in that it attempts 
to give an account of how gender integrates society both structurally and descriptively in 
terms of beliefs associated with expectations, this perspective is problematic in that it 
holds a view of gender that is not fluid and assumes similar social conditions for all 
women as well as men.  Clearly, there will be women who are primarily “instrumental” 
in their orientation and men who are primarily “expressive,” such as creative artists.  
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Additionally, Parsons’ analysis ignores the rigid constructions of gender roles as well as 
the strains and social costs of these characterizations.  Finally, for feminist theorists, 
Parsons theorizing is problematic in that his notion of gender “complementarity” amounts 
to little more than female subordination to male domination.   
Nonetheless, Parsons does give us a theoretical way to understand the social 
expectations of gender roles that women and men occupy within culture—particularly 
U.S. military culture--or at the minimum how gender is classified within American 
culture.  This cultural ideology of gender behavior becomes so ingrained that men and 
women are described as behaving differently because of their compliance with distinct 
gender role expectations.  This kind of cultural ideology of gender behavior is shown, for 
example, in popular cultural psychology books such as Men are From Mars, Women are 
From Venus.  Hence, cultural ideology functions as a powerful viewpoint in that it 
organizes society, and in this case, attitudes around gender.  We can see examples of this 
in advertising messages, in the attitudes and beliefs of laypersons within our cultures 
regarding gender, in fashion prescriptions, in cultural analyses of etiquette, among other 
social phenomena.   
Thus, what I am concerned with is identifying the gender role distinctions 
between Parsonian instrumental and expressive roles, and the functions that these roles 
serve with regard to power in the U.S. military in general, and at Abu Ghraib and Ft.  
Hood in particular.  I argue that the masculinist code of the military reifies the 
stereotypical gender expectations found in larger cultural practices, and thereby also 
functions as prescribing appropriate gender expectations and behavior through the 
differentiation and distinction between gender roles.  In this way, the institution of the 
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American military is gendered with regards to gender role expectations and personalities, 
such that the powerful dogma of masculinity organizes social relations and social 
interaction. 
Again, what is important to remember, is that feminists critique this Parsonian 
social organization based on the bias of masculinity because it represents the structural 
brass tacks of patriarchy, and is thus organizing approach to society that does not 
consider power and subjugation. 
 Nonetheless, I find Parsons’ distinction useful when discussing the organization 
of the military around power, where what is powerful is the ideal of masculinity itself.  
The United States military is not a bastion of feminism, where what is most important is 
that women are equal to their male counterparts.  I asked a several male military 
personnel (a former marine, soldiers at the trials, etc.) if women were given equal 
opportunity to men in the military, and many said yes, especially given affirmative 
action.  However, when I pressed for a listing of some of the work that women could not 
be assigned to in the military the evidence mounted.  For example, women have been 
historically limited with regard to combat roles, are not given military occupational 
specialties that are require combat arms, are not placed in either infantry, artillery, 
forward observer, machine gunner, mortar man, or sniper roles, and cannot be fighter 
pilots.  What I realized is that women have not been given the full opportunities that men 
are given in the military, and that with opportunity comes the association of value, where 
what is valued is Parsons’ notion of masculinity, which functions as the standard of value 
itself.  This ideal of masculinity thus becomes the powerful perspective for judgments of 
value and opportunity within the military. 
  
99
 
 
 
4.2 Meeting With the Defense Attorney: September 21, 2005, The Trial of  
 
 Lynndie England 
 
The first day that I was on the Army base at Fort Hood, I was involved in a 
meeting with one of the defense attorneys and expert witnesses.  This was basically the 
meet and greet where my dissertation chair, Dr. S.G.  Mestrovic, an expert witness for the 
defense in Sociology and Psychology, was to discuss strategy with defense attorney 
Captain Jonathan Crisp.  Dr. Mestrovic and I were new to the town of Killeen, Texas, and 
were still getting used to being some of the only civilians on the largest American Army 
base in the world. 
Captain Crisp’s office was a large room with many desks, with smaller rooms 
jutting out from the main one, full of things like coffee machines, copiers, and other 
office equipment.  It was obvious that others shared this space with Crisp, and he told us 
that this was the area that he was given to prepare for the England trial.  We all were 
talking and getting to know each other, getting comfortable in the surrounding chairs, and 
waiting for one of the other expert witnesses to arrive, Dr. Thomas Dennne.  After 
mentioning that Dr. Mestrovic did not look like a Harvard graduate or a Texas A&M 
Sociology Professor given his casual attire (slacks and a blue long sleeved button-up 
tailored shirt), I wondered just what Crisp had in mind with regard to his anticipated 
characterization of Mestrovic.   
As I sat down in a circle of chairs, I imagined Mestrovic with a copy of Kant’s 
Critique of Pure Reason, a smoking and curvy pipe full of vanilla tobacco, a vest and 
hounds tooth shirt, chinos, tie, and briefcase, stroking his long beard contemplating the 
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meaning of truth.  However, Mestrovic looked to me like he always does, clean cut, 
appropriately dressed for the occasion, a university professor ready to delve into the 
business at hand— thoughts churning away in his head, solving and answering questions 
I believe he poses to himself.  It was telling of Crisp’s perceived mental image of 
Mestrovic given what he knew of him—that he is a professor, an expert witness, and 
indeed does have three degrees from Harvard.  I wonder what Crisp expected?  I 
understood this conversation as a dance of masculinity between two powerful men 
depending and working with each other, sizing each other up in order to know what to 
expect during the trials.  This was about trust and fear.  I witnessed Crisp sizing 
Mestrovic up in his mind; nonetheless, the environment was very comfortable.  Details of 
the trial began to be discussed, including when Mestrovic would be able to analyze 
psychological reports and interview Lynndie England herself. 
Interestingly, as more people began to enter the office, one of the rituals that the 
men participated in was undressing.  Now, I am not talking about undressing down to 
their skivvies, but I am talking about taking the military marks and insignia off, 
unmarking the body itself in a powerfully marked military environment.  In other words, 
Crisp unexpectedly took off his uniform down to his t-shirt, and I wondered at what point 
he would stop undressing.  Mestrovic and I exchanged looks in an attempt to understand 
this ritual and then it was explained to us.  First off, the uniforms themselves were very 
hot and itchy.  It was September in Texas, and it was indeed sweltering outdoors.  In 
addition, meetings had been taking place all day in an attempt to pick a jury—another 
“hot spot” situation for sure.  In an account that is in line with Veblen’s conspicuous 
consumption, these undressing male defense attorneys and aides began to describe the 
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difference in the quality of the uniform shirts.  Apparently, there were the “good” shirts 
and the “crap” shirts.  This distinction was not based on fabric, as both shirts were made 
of polyester.  But, this distinction had to do with workmanship of materials and how the 
shirt itself actually laid on the body—how it fit.  This was obviously of great importance 
to the different members of the Army in the room, and I was shown again and again the 
differences between the shirts themselves.  I must admit, however, that even in a roomful 
of half-dressed men in white undershirts who repeatedly explained the fashion 
differences between the qualities of their military uniforms, I cannot tell the difference 
between the two uniform options.  I just hoped that in the courtroom, the main attorney 
for the defense would be wearing the “good” shirt, so as to give the impression and 
appearance of goodness and quality to the judge and jury.  Mestrovic kept his shirt on for 
the duration of the meeting. 
One of the expert witnesses entered the defense office area, and introduced 
himself to both Mestrovic and I as Dr. Thomas Denne.  Denne and I began to make small 
talk and decided to go down the hall to get a cold drink from the pay machines while 
everyone else in the room was getting situated.  I asked him what he did and if he did 
research still, and he told me he was a school psychologist in West Virginia, and had 
known England since she was very young.  He said he even worked with her when she 
was a student.  Denne and I discussed his research on learning, and I commented on the 
many books about learning theory I had, as a graduate assistant to Dr. Mestrovic, checked 
out and looked through in preparation for this trial.  We spoke of Piaget, Kohlberg, and of 
other learning theories.  Denne told me that England was oxygen deprived at birth, had 
been diagnosed with learning disabilities in kindergarten and that although she made 
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progress in school, she was highly speech impaired as a youth (more so than her 
condition now, with only the occasional stutter and pause), and even had trouble initially 
learning to read.  I thought this was especially interesting since my mother had recently 
implemented a program as an administrator in charge of student services for a Houston, 
Texas school district that teaches kids to read by actually reading to trained dogs.  These 
dogs became the students’ friends and helped them become comfortable reading in front 
of an audience.  He had heard of these kinds of programs, and my initial (and future) 
impressions of Thomas Denne were that he was an extremely kind, compassionate, child-
learning focused, “parental in nature” expressive individual.  Additionally, given all of 
his training and experience with learning difficulties as a counselor, I was doubly 
impressed with his dedication to child learning and instrumental approach that put into 
practice learning programs.  He was a “good” guy and I immediately felt safe with him.  
He was here, not for notoriety, not for fame, not because he was paid, but because he had 
a genuine concern and connection to Lynndie England.  He was a trained and certified 
expert, had personal knowledge of England’s early learning experiences, and was also her 
friend in the largest sense of the word.  In his role as an expert witness at the trial, he 
would be fulfilling an instrumental masculine role; yet, given his deep care for England 
and her situation, he was expressive in nature.  In this way, as a male, Denne was both 
instrumental and expressive.   
I felt confident and secure that this witness would be able to tell his story of 
working with the young England, openly and professionally discussing her limitations, in 
such a way that would make sense to the jury and provide an explanation of the images 
containing her smiling within the pictures of abuse.  This was one of the big questions of 
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the trial…Why were people smiling in the photographs?  Why was England smiling?  
The defense offered by Denne was that she was going along with the abuse, and this 
would be explained in its entirety in the courtroom in terms of her compliant personality.  
Could she tell right from wrong?  Well, according to Denne, England “goes along” 
(expressive) with the behavior of authority figures.  (Interestingly, one of the other expert 
witnesses for the defense, Xavier Amador, also testified to this fact and pointed to 
Stanley Milgram’s research on authority figures in his testimony.)  England’s “going 
along with” nature can be understood as expressive, although might have been aimed at 
perceived needs that she saw as instrumental, and namely that what Graner was doing 
was ethically correct and that she should support these actions.  It was Graner, after all, 
that ordered England to pose and smile in the photographs of abuse. 
As we returned to the defense office, Mestrovic motioned to me and gave me my 
first assignment.  I had to play the instrumental role of copying his curriculum vitae that 
was to be provided to the jury so as to legitimize his status of expert witness.  Mestrovic 
was off to interview England and other witnesses that evening, and I was on my way to 
the nearest copy shop.  I did secretly look at his “resume” after printing the first copy on 
the ten-dollar-rent-by-the-hour-computer, and it was true, he did have three degrees from 
Harvard.  I must mention that although I was told to simply make copies of the CV for 
the jury, not only did I have copies made, but I also had the almost two-inch packet 
professionally glue-bound like a book you would buy at Barnes and Noble, complete with 
double thick front page and clear book sleeve cover.  I am not kidding; the presentation 
materials on the outside were as impressive as the qualifications inside.  This was, after 
all, my mentor, and I was in his professional academic service.  I knew that image was 
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important in the courtroom, and I was doing my best to make my mentor shine like the 
military shoes at Ft. Hood.   
I couldn’t have known it then, but the following day when Mestrovic was on the 
stand and the judge, defense, prosecution, and jury were being handed and reviewing his 
CV, they asked why he only had three degrees from Harvard, and not his fourth degree, 
the PhD, from there as well?  Mestrovic answered, “Because at Harvard they only allow 
you to obtain three degrees and then they make you go to another school.”  Score!  
Legitimacy!  I anticipated that the courtroom would be tricky to maneuver, and was 
pleased that my years of miserably working in advertising had finally paid off.  In trial it 
is all about image and the manipulation of argument in one’s favor, which was much like 
advertising sales.  Well, we could play that game of legitimacy.  In this way I had shown 
power through being expressive in taking care of making high-quality CV copies. 
Even though this was a tiny victory in the courtroom—one specifically focused on 
the image of an expert witness, and one only I felt—I believed that I had helped in some 
small way to create the means for Mestrovic’s expert interpretation of the events at Abu 
Ghraib to be heard—really heard and considered—by the jury.  Maybe if they listened to 
Mestrovic they would see that Lynndie England was a scapegoat, a pawn in Charles 
Graner’s masochistic plan of detainee control and abuse, and that she did not at all 
voluntarily, knowingly, and intentionally propose the abuse that she was charged with.  In 
open court, during the pre-hearing of suppressed information regarding the courts-
martial, the most she was even associated with (although not by all testimonies) in terms 
of detainee abuse was stepping on detainee’s fingers. 
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Nonetheless, justifiable evidence in the form of a particularly well-formatted CV 
provided additional kudos for Dr. Mestrovic and for his testimony to have significant 
meaning given his credentials—and they did.    I realized afterwards that I, too, had fallen 
into the instrumental-expressive role distinction without being aware of it at the time.  
Mestrovic disclosed to me afterwards that he did not even consider photocopying his CV 
onto high-quality bond paper, but was concerned only with getting a sufficient number of 
copies for the jurors.  On the other hand, due to socialization, I was concerned with the 
appearance or “expressive” aspects of this task.  As a female, then, I played both 
instrumental and expressive roles at the courts-martial.  Additionally, both Denne and I 
played a key role of “expressive power” in the courtroom with regards to his testimony 
that was filled with genuine regard and care for England, and my use of image legitimacy 
regarding Mestrovic’s CV.  Additionally, I used expressive means of image linked to the 
instrumental ends of courtroom legitimacy.  Moreover, the male defense attorneys 
displayed expressiveness concerning their uniforms, yet this expressiveness was also 
aimed at the legitimacy of image, or the instrumental function of a quality uniform. 
4.3 Instrumental Responsibility: September 22, 2005, Courts-Martial of  
 
 Lynndie England 
 
 It is important to know about the initial trial of Lynndie England that took place 
earlier in August 2005.  In August, Lynndie England pled guilty to prisoner abuse at Abu 
Ghraib prison in Iraq.  Judge Colonel James Pohl, the same judge who would preside 
over both of the England trials, evaluated the pre-trial information, and was not 
convinced that England knew her actions were wrong at the time.  In a dramatic move, he 
declared a mistrial in August, in the midst of ongoing proceedings, due to the fact that her 
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ex-boyfriend and convicted soldier, Charles Graner, testified that England was following 
his orders.  According to the judge, England could not plead guilty and have testimony 
that she was following unlawful orders at the same time.  It was at this first trial that the 
now infamous images of Lynndie England came into question.  Among others of 
importance was the photo of England holding a leashed detainee who had been dragged 
out of the cell with a belt around his neck.   
Graner testified at England’s second trial as well, this time that the use of the belt 
to extract prisoners from cells was a legitimate technique for detainee handling.  He said 
that he had looped the leash around the prisoner’s shoulders and body in an attempt to 
“coax” him out of a cell, and that it slipped up around his neck.  Graner, the reputed 
ringleader of the abuse, testified at England’s sentencing hearing that pictures he took of 
England holding a naked prisoner on a leash at Abu Ghraib were meant to be used as a 
legitimate training aid for other guards.  In this way, this procedure for dealing with 
prisoners had instrumental importance in that it was a means for action aimed at 
controlling detainees in a chaotic environment.  Additionally, Graner’s insistence of 
photographing the move was instrumental in that it would act as an aid for future 
teaching techniques regarding prisoner handling, and so according to Graner was just 
documenting his detainee procedure.   
What is important, however, is how Graner used England as a witness to his 
abuse.  Looking at the Abu Ghraib photographs, everyone thinks England was abusing 
prisoners, but really Graner was abusing England.  Graner said in his testimony that he 
asked England to hold the strap while he took photos that he could show to other guards 
later to teach them this “legitimate” prisoner-handling technique.  In typical expressive 
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fashion, England “went along” with Graner’s request—in order to please him, an 
instrumental goal.  In this way, England can be understood to act expressively towards a 
superior as a means to an end.  Extensive testimony was presented by two expert 
witnesses, Dr. Denne and Dr. Amador, regarding this interpretation of England’s role in 
the infamous leash photograph.  The gist of this testimony was that the overly-compliant 
England was a victim of Graner’s abuse, but not a perpetrator, and not even a co-abuser.  
Again, the instrumental end that England was aimed at was compliance with her 
boyfriend’s request, which she thought was legitimate because she viewed him with 
legitimacy, and for no other reason.  Thus, England did not question Graner’s order in 
terms of legitimacy, and this was her expressiveness evidenced. 
Interestingly, in a recent analysis of the abuse at Abu Ghraib, Barbara Ehrenreich 
uses this image of England holding the leash around the detainee’s neck to argue against 
the stereotypical characterization of women as caregivers instead of as able to perform 
aggressive acts (Ehrenreich 2007, 2).  However, what Ehrenreich did not realize is the 
situation under which the photograph was taken, and thus mistakenly vilified England as 
acting aggressively (instrumental) instead of simply going along with Graner’s 
instructions (expressive).  Moreover, Ehrenreich seems to assume, along with most 
journalists, that the act of holding the leash in order to please her boyfriend is on the same 
order of aggressive abuse that England’s boyfriend exhibited by punching blindfolded 
prisoners.  Ehrenreich and others jump to unsubstantiated conclusions based upon 
prejudgments made on the basis of photographs, without considering the social context 
that was explained by four separate expert witnesses at the trial.   
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However, when England pled guilty on the stand, she told the judge she knew that 
the pictures were being taken purely for the amusement of the guards.  England told the 
court that the physical beatings and sexual humiliation were done for the guards’ 
entertainment and took responsibility for the smiling, thumbs-up poses she struck for 
photographs that made her the face of the prisoner abuse scandal.  Inside information 
from the defense attorneys suggests that she made these “admissions” in the hope of 
getting a lighter sentence by pleading guilty, and also in order to get the trial process 
“over with,” because of the immense stress that it was causing to herself, her baby, and 
her mother.  These actions were expressive in nature, yet linked to instrumental ends.  
Although England did not abuse the detainee in the photo that shows her with the leash in 
her hand, and did not instrumentally pile detainees naked or into pyramids, she was 
pictured alongside these detainees.  She appeared to be guilty of these actions, but simply 
appeared in the photos themselves.  England’s testimony proved to be confusing for the 
courts because, as Pohl said, “A one-person conspiracy is not possible” and thus the two 
statements from Graner and England could not be reconciled—at least not in his 
judgment.  On the other hand, the defense attorneys were baffled by the judge’s reasons 
for declaring a mistrial. 
Judge Pohl threw out England’s plea of guilty and declared a mistrial, and instead 
entered a plea of not guilty for England regarding a charge of conspiring with Private 
Charles Graner to maltreat detainees at the Baghdad-area prison.  This first trial thus 
resulted in the scheduling of a second trial in September 2005 for Lynndie England.  
Conspiracy is one of the most serious charges in the UCMJ (Uniform Code of Military 
Justice) and carries the more severe sentences in contrast to dereliction of duty and 
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maltreatment.  Captain Crisp expressed strongly his opinion that the judge declared a 
mistrial so that England would be charged with conspiracy.  Captain Crisp was also 
frustrated by the fact that “conspiracy” is relatively easy for the government to prove—
any action that involves the actions of two or more persons can be interpreted as a 
conspiracy, even if one of the actors did not intend what the other or others in the group 
intended—and extremely difficult for the defense to disprove.  To put it another way, 
“conspiracy” is the penultimate “instrumental” crime, because it colors the commission 
of other crimes committed during the “conspiracy” as being performed deliberately in 
terms of rationally chosen goals and means. 
On the first early September morning of the actual second trial for England, and 
the day after jury selection, there was much discussion about whether England 
participated in a conspiracy to maltreat detainees.  The prosecution argued that she had 
stepped on detainee’s fingers and toes and that with these actions, England was to be 
understood as culpable to this conspiracy.  Specifically, the prosecution argued, England 
was guilty of maltreatment of subordinates.  This would be considered an instrumental 
action since it involved the planning and carrying out of a rational plan of action for 
detainee treatment, much like the prosecution’s initial attempt to link England to Graner’s 
use of a leash to remove detainees from their cells.   
 However, as the defense pointed out, England was not bound in any previous 
agreements to treat detainees in this manner.  For moral responsibility, it was argued by 
the defense (and some philosophers would agree), she did not have this previous 
agreement for action, also known as “intention” or “motive.”  (Other philosophers would 
not care what England’s motive was, and would only focus on outcome of action; 
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however, this was not a philosophical discussion.)  After a lengthy discussion, Judge Pohl 
upheld his previous ruling that England had not made an agreement prior to these overt 
acts, and therefore could not have entered a plea of guilty, although she could still be 
tried for conspiracy to commit these acts.  In this way, England’s “going along” with the 
actions of abuse led to her charge of conspiracy, which in this case can be understood as 
an expressive crime. 
 I heard from numerous journalists that they found these lengthy, intricate legal 
arguments concerning responsibility and conspiracy as frankly boring and 
incomprehensible.  As a rule, the journalists did not see England as a “conspirator,” or 
truly capable of “instrumental action” in this regard.  However, journalists disliked her 
intensely—and made no effort to hide this fact—for reasons that appeared to be 
“expressive,” namely, they labeled her privately as a “slut,” “bad girl,” “tomboy,” and 
other emotionally-based stereotypes. 
 4.4 Expert Witnesses: Instrumental Help to the Rescue, September 27, 2005,  
  Courts-Martial of Lynndie England 
 “Look at this!” he whispered, leaning over the person next to me, directing my 
attention to his pants.  “My zipper has broken and I cannot close my pants correctly!” 
It seemed like a plea for help.  Even though this particular expert witness for the 
defense had already testified, surely his credibility would be muted if his problem became 
exposed in the courtroom during one of the most covered military courts-martial to 
date—the trial of Lynndie England at Ft. Hood’s Williams Judicial Center.  He continued 
looking at me for help and I found myself torn.  Do I stay and experience the illusion of 
justice in the courtroom before me?  Do I jump to action and solve this problem, thereby 
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conspiring with the expert witness to maintain the illusion of credibility surrounding his 
previous testimony?  I knew what I had to do.  I had been solving problems all day long, 
and this was one of the easier ones yet. 
Ok, so I am both an expressive caregiver and an important instrumental problem 
solver—all the while maintaining my female identity.  Apparently, I had begun to 
perform roles, both expressive and instrumental, when I had arrived at Ft.  Hood—from 
copying, giving pep-talks, and helping the defense come up with sound arguments, to 
bringing breakfast to some of the expert witnesses (ok, it was free at the hotel, but what if 
they had skipped breakfast?), making sure there were enough cigarettes to go around, and 
getting drinks for some of the expert witnesses.  In fact, the previous day, I had solved an 
emergency for another male expert witness, as his testimony had been moved up on the 
docket, and he was in dire need of a suit jacket so as to fit the image of expert witness on 
the stand.  One must look the part, so I borrowed a three-button dark and formal blazer 
from someone very well known in the media.  I thought it had a nice collar-cut and 
looked very professional.  It was, upon inspection later that day, an Armani jacket.  I 
must confess, it did add just the right touch of “professional expert” on the stand! 
“All rise!” the bailiff barked as the judge, Colonel James Pohl, entered the 
courtroom and sat at an elevated position, the highest in the room, and looked down upon 
the courtroom itself.  I quietly left my position on the front row, right behind the defense 
table where England and her lawyers were seated, and I whispered to a very grateful man, 
“I’ll be right back, no problem.”   
As I made my way past the other expert witnesses, the reporters and media, and 
finally past the guard at the courtroom door, I imagined the response from the all-officer 
  
112
 
jury that a “pantless” expert in the military courtroom would elicit.  Would this response 
be the same one they showed when viewing the pictures of the naked Iraqi detainees in a 
pyramid?  Or perhaps the same response educed when viewing the image of England 
giving the thumbs-up signal to the camera?  Amazement?  Distress?  Confusion?   I 
wondered which would be more offensive, and again remembered that I was located on a 
military base, where masculinity itself was on display and in full view.  The economy of 
the phallus was the norm here—an instrumental position of power from which the 
military derives its own identity.  While also wearing the clothing of the feminine 
expressive, I decided to wear the mask of masculine instrumentality and left the 
courtroom in search of a solution. 
I walked down the hallway full of MP guards and realized that Charles Graner (a 
witness currently serving 10 years time in Leavenworth Prison) must be in the building 
and that they were here to guard him, as well as to ensure England’s safety.  Down the 
wooden hallway I walked, noticing on either side the framed pictures of past military 
successes.  I moved towards the glass door of the court building and saw a female soldier 
wearing all black fatigues, armed with a protruding weapon.  Her “phallus” was a gun, 
what I believed to be the standard military issue M-9 pistol.  As I approached her, she 
stood her post firmly at the front door.   
“Do you by chance have a safety pin or a stapler or something like that?” I asked 
the military police guard in an attempt to solve the problem I had left the courtroom to 
remedy.  I was on my own “mission.” 
The guard asked another MP, who was also all decked-out in black fatigues, with 
the MP band on her upper arm signifying that she was indeed here to guard the building 
  
113
 
in typical police fashion, making it secure for the trial, for those at the trial, and also to 
secure the safety of the defendant.  This guard did have a safety pin and she gave it to me.  
This example shows a female enacting an expressive role, yet who was also instrumental 
with regard to security, and is thus an example of expressive power.  The guards then 
resumed their jovial conversation with their fellow military personnel, who were engaged 
in a card game in a nearby makeshift break room.   
As I made my way back through the hallway of military police, I noticed again 
the plethora of security and wondered why the need for so many guards?  After all, this 
trial was located at Fort Hood, the largest and most secure Army base in America.  To 
drive onto the base, one must obtain an official “letter of invitation” (also called a 
subpoena in the case of the expert witnesses), pass a previous and lengthy check of 
credentials in order to secure an on-base pass, and also must show identification (in 
addition to the aforementioned on-base pass) that must match the armed guards’ list of 
invited guests at the motor vehicle entry way.  Moreover, the compound itself was 
surrounded by a fence topped with barbed wire, which I am sure was guarded by foot 
soldiers.  Throughout the compound, there were parking lots full of tanks and military 
vehicles.  These seemed to be the ones they were going to use in Iraq, as they were all 
painted tan and brown desert colors of camouflage.  Nonetheless, even though I am a 
feminist and activist, and consider myself a strong woman, I felt overwhelmed and 
intimidated in this space.  Simultaneously, however, I was delighted that I was 
experiencing a rare opportunity, which consisted of entering an environment that was so 
foreign to my own previous encounters that I was forced to simply observe these alien 
surroundings. 
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Quietly moving through the door of an in-session courtroom, and down the isle to 
the third seat on the right of the front row, I silently handed the expert witness the safety 
pin and he was mutely elated.  I had performed an instrumental role that was expressive 
in nature, and again, contra to Parsons—all the while as a female.  The expert witness 
responded with a huge smile and look of relief.  I took my seat and rejoined the 
courtroom proceedings in the England trial. 
4.5 Expressive Harman and Instrumental Crimes, May 16, 2005, ourts-Martial 
of Sabrina Harman,  
 
The courtroom itself had all blonde, wooden paneled walls and was divided 
basically in half with the jury, judge, defendant, and prosecution on one side of the waist 
level wooden wall, and seating for viewers on the other side, nearest the main entry door 
of the courtroom.   American flags were displayed and most everyone there, aside from 
the expert witnesses, the media on the last row, and allowed visitors, were wearing 
military uniforms of different kinds and markings.  There was a swinging waist-level 
door between the front and back division of the court for people to access the front-stage 
action of the courts-martial.  This was the same building, courtroom, and judge as the 
England trial.   
From my perspective on the front row, the defense was on the right side of the 
room, nearest the jury, and the prosecution was on the left side, nearest the judge, court 
reporter and records keeper.  The defense consisted of two lawyers, and in this case, for 
the Harman trial, they were civilian Frank Spinner and Captain Takemura of the 
military’s trial defense services.  The prosecution consisted of Captain Chris Graveline, 
Staff Judge Advocate, and Captain Neill, his assistant.   The witness stand was to the left 
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of the judge when he was facing the court in his elevated judge-area, and centered in the 
courtroom from my perspective.  Behind the witness stand there was a door that the jury 
moved through when they were isolated from court proceedings, where they were locked 
in private jury deliberations.  The room was well lit and voices boomed during 
examinations.   
 During the courts-martial of Sabrina Harman, there were many sworn affidavits 
and testimony that she had not committed any detainee abuse—she had not hit anyone, 
she did not yell at anyone, and she did not engage in any behavior that was sexual or 
physical abuse in nature.  This means that she was not connected in any way through 
sworn testimony and affidavits with any detainee abuse such as forced masturbation, 
homoerotic torture, the human pyramid, or the forced nakedness and sexual positions 
used at Abu Ghraib.  Frederick Graner’s testimony was that Harman actually helped 
prisoners, and as evidence he pointed to an event on October 20, 2003, where Harman 
“saved a guy who was in pain and chained to a wall by his wrists.”  As a matter of fact, 
there was deposition testimony from an actual Iraqi prisoner, named Alyasari, who 
claimed that Harman had done no harm to any detainees.  Additional letters of 
depositions by other Iraqi detainees were also provided.  For example, Exhibit I was a 
letter from a detainee who knew Harman as a guard and stated that Harman was a kind 
person who “did good things with mutual respect” and who also had a “peaceful 
personality.” Additionally, this detainee claimed that Harman gave him aid with meals 
and medications, called the doctor for emergency services, brought clothes for the 
detainees, and “was a good woman with no cruelty in her.”  Says the detainee, “I consider 
her a sister for her kindness.”  Exhibit J, another letter of deposition, stated that Harman 
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was the only good woman at Abu Ghraib, and indeed the only good guard.  This detainee 
also pointed out that when Harman was on guard duty that the detainees could sleep 
because she provided them with a quiet environment, and fully refused the accusations 
that Harman was guilty of the offences that she was being charged.  Thus, Harman was 
described in Parsonian language as adopting the “expressive role” given her following 
actions:  she made sure detainees had their eyeglasses and medicine, she got some of 
them blankets, and she reported some of the abuse she saw, albeit to no avail.  However, 
it is possible that she was acting instrumentally in that her way of dealing with prisoners 
led to prisoner compliance, where expressive means are thusly linked to instrumental 
ends. 
In the opening statements of this trial, Captain Graveline focused on two specific 
photographed incidents—the infamous naked pyramid that occurred on November 7, 
2003 and the incident on October 25, 2003 in which three Iraqi detainees were stripped 
naked and forced to crawl on their stomachs as “punishment” for raping an Iraqi boy.  
Captain Graveline noted that the three detainees actually had neither committed rape nor 
were terrorists, instead stating that they were ordinary Iraqi thieves.  Captain Graveline 
also established that the detainees involved in the pyramid incident were not terrorists 
and had no intelligence value to the United States.  Hence, from the very beginning of the 
trial, the prosecution had established the relative innocence of the detainees who were 
abused by American soldiers for their assumed guilt.  Additionally, Captain Graveline 
established the homophobic and masculine cultural atmosphere at Abu Ghraib, where 
mostly male soldiers would punish male detainees primarily through the means of 
cultural exploitation, homoerotic and sexual humiliation, as well as bodily punishment 
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and punishment of the soul—all punishments were made in an attempt to reify the 
masculine role of power.   
Captain Graveline confined Harman’s role in the first incident to writing the word 
“rapist” (which she misspelled as “rapeist”) on the legs of one of the detainees.  It is 
telling that Harman focused on the alleged rape as the means for marking the detainee’s 
body, where expressiveness means coincide with the instrumental ends—that of writing 
on a detainee’s body for identification purposes.  Given the chaotic situation of the 
incidents of November 7, 2003, where detainees were stripped naked, forced to climb 
into a pyramid, forced to masturbate, and forced to simulate fellatio— the idea of rape 
was brought to the front-stage of the abuse given Harman’s markings.  This is not at all 
surprising given the violence against women that occurs in the United States in terms of 
rape, and so it was telling that a female American soldier focused on this particularly 
vicious crime committed against women.  What is also telling is that the detainee abuse 
of November 7, 2003 was ordered and orchestrated by the male soldiers, where the 
pyramid and nakedness were described as tactics used to control bodies and to provide 
order of detainees—this can be read as about power.  That said, in the courtroom, the use 
of the human pyramid was specifically described as being used as a means to control 
prisoners, or to adapt to the specific environment of chaos at Abu Ghraib.  In this way, 
these means for controlling prisoners can be understood in terms of instrumental chaos.  
Additionally, writing on detainees was also common for MI, as this was one way that 
they separated detainees in an attempt to control, making the role of the guards 
instrumental, and again as within a chaotic environment.   
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Regarding the incident of October 25, 2003, Captain Graveline mentioned that it 
involved eight soldiers and one Iraqi translator, but singled out Harman—who, in fact, 
left the scene after a few minutes with Meghan Ambuhl to go to use the phones in the 
internet café at Abu Ghraib (This was in Ambuhl’s testimony regarding the evening of 
October 25, 2003.)  The lead defense council, Frank Spinner, argued that that the Army 
took a young woman and forced her to “experience” a failure of leadership.  (Note that 
the very language used by the defense attorney is passive and “expressive”—she was 
forced to experience, much like she was raped in her forceful experience).   
According to Spinner, this “experience” started earlier than the alleged date of the 
crime, November 7, 2003.  Spinner argued that the context for the pyramid incident 
includes the many officers who failed her because they did not supervise Tier 1-A.  These 
officers include but are not limited to the following: CPT Reese, CPT Brinson, COL 
Pappas, LTC Jordan, LTC Phillibaum, and COL Karpinski.  The defense argued that the 
prosecution was shifting all the blame onto a few low-ranking soldiers at Abu Ghraib—
soldiers that were not trained for the positions they were put into.  In this way, Harman 
was not trained for what she saw and had to deal with.  Spinner told the jury he would 
make some concessions and he would contest other claims by the government.  He 
conceded that Harman was promoted from E1 to E4 for duties in which she was never 
trained.  But he would contest that Harman entered into conspiracy or agreement with 
intent.  Yes, Spinner claimed, she was in the photo of the naked pyramid; however, she 
did not enter into an agreement of intent to torture (instrumental).  According to Spinner, 
Frederick and Graner were the “primary interface with MI,” and were part of ongoing 
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intelligence activities—these would be the instrumental functions of Abu Ghraib.  The 
goal was get intelligence and the means was “use interrogation techniques.” 
 Captain Reese, the first witness for the defense characterized Harman as an 
“average soldier” who, while stationed at Al Hilla (her location prior to the Abu Ghraib 
prison) was “good with the local kids who looked forward to seeing her.”  Captain Reese 
continued, “She built a great relationship with the local kids which was good for the 
image of the United Stated government.”  Indeed, Harman was even invited into some of 
the local’s homes for meals and chai tea, and the defense produced large pictures of these 
meals featuring Harman and Iraqi families eating and drinking together as evidence.  
Meghan Ambuhl’s testimony also supported this expressive role characterization of 
Harman as good with children and concerned with Iraqi’s welfare.  Ambuhl stated under 
oath that Harman purchased a refrigerator, food and clothing out of her own money for a 
local family, and that children flocked to her constantly.  Her impact was a positive one 
and she left a great impression on those with whom she came into contact with.  Harman 
actually also received many gifts from Iraqis, while no other soldiers received any.  
Furthermore, Ken Davis (the second witness for the defense) stated under oath that he, 
Harman, and Graner passed out bibles and candy to Iraqis at least 6-7 times—actions 
which can be understood as expressive feminine roles associated with Harman as 
caregiver, gift giver, and friend.  First Sergeant Kempenski’s testimony at this trial also 
supported this image of Harman as having a positive impact on the Iraqi community, 
where people knew her by name.  Kempenski told a story of trucks full of children 
driving by yelling “Sabrina,” thereby providing evidence of Harman’s favorable impact 
on soldiers and also Iraqi families, and filling a gap of a country in need of compassion.  
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Hence, Harman’s actions as a female soldier were expressive in means, but can be 
understood as linked to instrumental ends.   
 Once Harman was reassigned to Abu Ghraib, Captain Reese stated under oath that 
she had received some training on non-lethal techniques, including cell extraction and 
riot training, but did not receive training specific to the Geneva Conventions or training 
to be a prison guard.  This training can be considered in terms of Parsonian language as 
instrumental since it was focused on goals and means.  Captain Reese stated that Harman 
had never trained to work with MI (military intelligence), and because of a shortage of 
people, those soldiers (such as Graner) who were civilian correctional officers were put in 
charge of Tier 1A and 1B, the tiers where the photographed abuse took place.  These 
were the individuals who were “in charge” of Harman, who had no training in these 
areas.  Her “work” at Abu Ghraib was basically to be a “gofer”—to get soldiers coffee, 
sandwiches, and carry out menial tasks with detainees—all “expressive roles” in 
Parsonian language.  Nonetheless, these tasks were instrumental in their ends.  
Interestingly, she wasn’t even given a formal position at Abu Ghraib, and especially not 
one associated with the instrumental masculine role of MI or MP.  What is more, 
Harman’s immediate supervisor testified in open court that she was better suited to be a 
relief worker (expressive) than a soldier in general, and an MP (military police) soldier in 
particular.  (As a side note, Lynndie England’s work at Abu Ghraib was to “process 
inmates,” another “expressive role” aimed at organization, much like the work of an 
administrative assistant.  These kinds of jobs are called “pink collar” because they are job 
roles that women usually have.  Thus, England’s work was also expressive in that it was 
aimed at incorporation and the amalgamation of the group.) 
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Harman’s crimes consisted of posing in photographs, taking photographs of 
others committing abuse, and of not reporting abuse or leaving when abuse was 
committed by others.  These are all passive actions or passive aggressive actions at best.  
The prosecution argued that even though Harman never participated in any of the naked 
stacking or homoerotic torture, she should have known that this kind of handling of 
detainees was wrong, and even without training.  Even though (as of October 2002) 
Captain Reese stated that there was no written protocol about stress positions, or any 
written guidance regarding how to treat detainees, the prosecution argued that Harman 
did receive VPW training in boot camp, or training dealing with prisoners of war.  Hence, 
the prosecution was arguing that Harman was culpable for knowing that the abuse that 
was taking place was wrong, even though she did not participate.   
The Prosecutor, Captain Graveline, argued that Harman’s smile in the 
photographs implied that she was taking pleasure in “maltreatment” of detainees (this is 
active).  He claimed that her staying during some of the abuse even if she did not commit 
it was “dereliction of duty” as well as “conspiracy.”  This kind of accusation describes 
Harman as located in the masculine “instrumental role,” as the actions of “maltreatment,” 
“conspiracy,” and “failure to do one’s duty” all assume an active relationship to goals and 
means that Parsons and society in general ascribe to males.  Even the explanation given 
to her smile in the photographs of abuse was transformed from an “expressive role” (a 
passive, going along with the abusive situation) into an active, instrumental role aimed at 
sadistic pleasure.  However, there was no testimony at the courts-martial that associated 
Harman with abusing detainees, and thus her smile in the photographs can be understood 
as expressive abuse at best—as “going along” and not stopping abuse.   
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What is more, it came out in the Harman courts-martial testimony that in addition 
to Harman, male soldiers also did not report the abuse of Iraqi detainees.  Instead, these 
male soldiers expressively “went along” with the abuse and, as stated in testimony, this 
was because they feared their fellow soldiers’ retaliation.  In this way, male soldiers 
exhibited expressive fear, which is opposite of the stereotype of the American military’s 
rigid masculinist code.   
During closing arguments, Harman’s charges were gone over and they consisted 
of dereliction of duty (she had a duty, knew this duty, and did not follow through with her 
duty in that she did not report the abuse she witnessed, did not try to stop the abuse, 
participated in photographs of abuse and did not try to stop the photographs, and did not 
try to stop the stress-position handcuffing and abuse of detainees), maltreatment of 
subordinates (writing rapist on the detainee, photos of the pyramid, use of Gilligan and 
fear, and her experiences of others abusing detainees), and also conspiracy (an overt act 
on Harman’s part regarding her “agreement” to commit maltreatment).  The prosecution 
argued that Sabrina had to know that the order given by her superior Romero to “do 
anything, but don’t kill” was not lawful based on common sense and given her 
experience and background.  In this way the prosecution argued that common sense 
judges lawfulness.  However, the defense argued that to aid and abet in a crime, the 
criminal must share intent and must make an attempt to aid the persons committing the 
crime.  The prosecution argued that Harman “participated” by virtue of being there when 
the photographs were taken, by writing rapist on the detainee’s leg, and laughing, joking, 
and smiling for photographs depicting abuse.  In this way, they present Harman as 
entering into a conspiracy, thereby making her responsible for all conspiracy actions. 
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The defense countered whether this was evidence of Harman’s intent or a result of 
group dynamics.  “Shame on the Army,” said defense attorney Spinner in regards to an 
ill-equipped, ill trained, junior specialist to challenge NCO leadership (Romero) to do the 
right thing.  This is an example of expressiveness towards a superior as a means to an 
ends, as Harman did not question her superior’s commands, and instead “went along” 
with them. 
Considering the smiles in the photographs of Harman, Spinner argued that coping 
skills differ between individuals, and that Harman was simply coping in a stressful 
situation.  Mestrovic later testified that Americans always smile for the camera, it is what 
they do.  Additionally, Mestrovic claimed that based upon the results of her psychiatric 
tests, it was his professional opinion that Harman’s smile was not sadistic, and was 
instead a smile that should be interpreted as “going along” and as a defense mechanism 
for her fear—further evidence of expressive torture since Harman did not attempt to stop 
the abuse, but also did not participate in the actual abuse in the physical sense.  Harman 
was then characterized as being desensitized with regard to deviant behavior because of 
the chaotic environment of Abu Ghraib, and that nothing had happened thus far when 
abuse reports were made to those higher up in the chain of command, so why would 
Harman think she could make a difference.  This goes back to the idea that what is 
valuable is regarded with interest, and in the military women have historically not been 
valued in the same way as their male counterparts.  So again, Spinner focuses on the 
failure of leadership at Abu Ghraib as the reason for the abuse and as a means to 
minimize culpability for Harman. 
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The prosecution countered that Harman did have a choice and she could have 
reported the abuse to many different outlets.  The prosecution used as evidence a list of 
places to report crimes, and argued that sometimes good people do bad things.  They 
further claimed that it was not the position of the prosecution that “Harman is the most 
evil person ever,” but that Harman did indeed have a choice and that she could have 
reported abuse. 
Interestingly, it was at this time that the judge’s cell phone rang in open court, 
providing further evidence that this courts-martial was indeed a strange fiction with a 
seemingly twilight-zone theme of perplexing, outlandish, and curious foci.   
4.6 Gilligan and the Pyramid: Instrumental and Expressive Torture 
I argue that even the abuse at Abu Ghraib can be understood distinguished into 
two types, as either instrumental or expressive.   
Consider the detainee named “Gilligan.”  Defense attorney Frank Spinner, in an 
attempt to characterize the nature of the relationships that Sabrina Harman had with 
Iraqis asked in open-court “Why was Gilligan standing on the box?”  Spinner was 
referring to the detainee who was nicknamed by American guards at Abu Ghraib 
“Gilligan,” an instrumental action by the guards aimed at labeling detainees in language 
that was culturally familiar.  (Interestingly, in the courts-martial Graner was referred to 
by the prosecution in a tongue-in–cheek manner as “God” since most of the blame for the 
abuse of detainees was deferred to this “ringleader.”  But, concerning the naming of 
detainees, Graner does function as “God” per say since it was stated in court that he was 
the one responsible for nicknaming detainees.)  Gilligan was the detainee in the now 
infamous Abu Ghraib detainee abuse photographs who had a bag over his head, was 
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standing on a supply box naked, with electrical wires coming from his hands, as if 
waiting to be electrocuted.  Spinner postulated in court that the technique of sleep 
deprivation was part of the duty of interrogators trying to save lives, he answered.  
Graner’s testimony concurred with Spinner’s postulation exactly, and specifically in the 
initial trial of Lynndie England.  Again, inadvertently, Spinner was framing Harman’s 
role in the Gilligan incident as passive, albeit instrumental in consequence. 
Spinner then made claims in court that at first glance might sound absolutely 
absurd given that we were at a military trial that was looking into abuse of detainees.  
Spinner argued that Harman had struck up a “friendship” with Gilligan and that he was a 
trustee of sorts who was cooperative, and helped American soldiers clean the prison, 
among other things.  Ambuhl’s testimony also solidified this fact when she stated under 
oath that Harman’s interactions with Gilligan were friendly both ways.  Spinner stated in 
court that Gilligan and Harman were joking and being silly when he was standing on the 
box, and that because of the jovial nature of this “friendship,” there was no way to 
conclude that this incident constituted maltreatment on Harman’s part.  This is a specific 
example of expressive torture, as no actual physical and means/ends torture was taking 
place.  Instead, this was a “game” of torture. 
Now, it is true that there is something deeply disturbing about referring to a 
relationship between a soldier and a detainee as a “friendship,” in which the soldier is 
forcing a frightened, hooded detainee to stand on a box for hours at a time.  If Gilligan 
really was joking and laughing—he must have been desperate.  It can be argued that 
Gilligan acquiesced to the humiliating and frightening situation and followed orders 
given by the guards in order to possibly resolve tension and conflict, and in possible 
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avoidance of further abuse, thereby demonstrating expressiveness towards superiors as a 
means to an ends.  Then again, it seems that Spinner was touching upon the expressive, 
feminine role that Harman adopted.  Harman could be and apparently really was 
“friends” with a detainee that she was “abusing,” meaning that Harman was evidencing 
both expressive power and expressive torture.  This is a real issue that psychologists call 
Stockholm Syndrome, in which abusers and the abused do indeed form emotional 
attachments between each other, and in this case the attachment can be understood as 
expressive.  Additionally, this “friendship” could have been instrumental on Gilligan’s 
part in order to avoid actual physical torture at the hands of other guards through his 
expressive behavior of “going along.”  Apparently, Gilligan’s expressive behavior was 
somewhat instrumental in that it garnered him the status of trustee at the prison in Tier 1-
A.  Nonetheless, although the photo of the hooded detainee was described in the 
courtroom as a joke, this specifically is an example of expressive torture. 
Further evidence for this “Stockholm Syndrome” characterization of the 
“friendships” that Harman made with detainees includes two statements from letters of 
depositions, exhibit I and J.  Exhibit I is a letter from a detainee, where this detainee 
states that he considered Harman a “sister for her kindness,” and especially after the 
detainees had been tortured.  After these abuses, Harman “took care of the detainees like 
a sister.”  Exhibit J also points to the strange Stockholm-like attachment between Harman 
and the detainees, where in this statement the detainee claims that Harman made jokes 
and laughed with the detainees on a regular basis.  Additionally, at the Harman courts-
martial, Meghan Ambuhl’s testimony pointed to the kind of care that Harman gave Iraqi 
detainees after being tortured.  Ambuhl stated that she and Harman had secretly changed 
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the stress positions that detainees were put in when their limbs turned blue so as to make 
them more comfortable.  Ambuhl pointed to the importance of the secrecy of this action, 
as Hubbard, a fellow soldier who changed the stress positions of detainees, was taken off 
of detainee watch once she was found out to have aided in the comfort of detainees.  The 
mere act of being concerned with the comfort of abused detainees shows Harman’s 
expressiveness, and her changing their position can itself be understood as instrumental 
to their wellbeing.  Again, this is an example of the Stockholm-like relationship that 
Harman had with detainees, which illustrates expressive torture.   
Further evidence of this Stockholm-like relationship that female guards had with 
detainees was evident in Sivits’ testimony at the England courts-martial where he stated 
that England and Ambuhl “took care of women and children in Tier 1A.”  This idea of 
“taking care” is extremely maternal in nature and equates women (in this case England) 
with caregiver.  Some of the “care giving” that these female guards did was to bring 
medical supplies such as inhalers to detainees, and also escorted detainees around the 
prison.  However, this “care giving” role was aimed at taking care of detainees (women 
and children) who were in custody of the military, an act specifically in violation of the 
Geneva Conventions.  So, England’s caregiver role cannot be understood in the free and 
maternal sense that a mother would care for a child, but instead as expressive abuse or 
expressive unlawfulness at best. 
 However, detainee abuse can also be understood as instrumental torture.  
Considering the naked human pyramid of November 7, 2003, this tactic was described as 
an instrumental way to control bodies and to provide order of detainees, and to control 
prisoners within the chaotic environment of Abu Ghraib.  However, nakedness and 
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homoerotic practices offend cultural constructions of Iraqi culture and masculinity, and 
serve as a means of torture through humiliation.  Also, the practice of writing on 
detainees to identify their crimes can be understood as instrumental in that it served a 
purpose and was aimed at the goal of identification and order.  However, nakedness itself 
was a common way to humiliate the detainees through devaluation, which can be 
interpreted as yet an additional way of torturing instrumentally.   
Reflecting back upon the England trial and the photograph of her with the leash 
around a detainees neck, I argue this too can be understood as instrumental torture given 
Graner’s reasoning behind the photograph itself.  Graner claimed that he asked England 
to hold the “leash” while he took a picture of the cell removal tactic in order to record a 
tactic for detainee cell removal.  However, in his attempt to demonstrate what he thought 
was a “rational tactic,” his actions are documented by the photograph showing a detainee 
being dragged out of a cell like an animal—further evidence of instrumental torture.  The 
act of dragging and the Graner’s reasoning behind the actual act of taking the photograph 
were aimed at an instrumental goal, yet the torture itself was humiliating and degrading. 
 What is interesting when considering “instrumental” torture is that this torture 
was ordered and orchestrated by male soldiers in an attempt to reify the masculine role of 
power.  The pyramid, writing on bodies, nakedness, and the leash—all of these abuses 
can be understood as means to create the position of power over detainees.  In the one 
case where a female (Harman) wrote on a male, it was the word “rapist,” which in our 
culture denotes the perpetration of male violence against women.  This can be understood 
as a cultural message or symbolic, where war itself can be understood as an extension of 
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rape—a theme that an American woman can easily identify with given the nature of the 
crime against women. 
 However, feminist writer and activist Barbara Ehrenreich argues that the certain 
naive view of feminism, where women are depicted as caregivers and men as associated 
with cruelty and violence, has been challenged with the role that women have played 
regarding abuse at Abu Ghraib prison (Ehrenreich 2007, 4).  I agree that this naïve view 
that characterizes women as good and men as evil is shallow and needs revision, 
especially in feminist theory.  But, I might remind Ehrenreich that what we see in 
photographs is not always the entire reality.  Images have a context, and much like it is 
important to understand the context women face when formulating feminisms and activist 
agendas, it is important to understand the context of a photo to really know the truth of 
the matter.  During the courts-martial, what was said in numerous testimony and 
deposition was that neither England not Harman were the abusers at Abu Ghraib.  
(England was said to have stepped on detainee fingers by Graner, but the testimony of 
Wisdom seemingly absolved her of this culpability.  Nonetheless, this was not the locust 
of abuse being equated with “torture” at Abu Ghraib.)  I agree with Ehrenreich that 
women can indeed be abusers, and in very small ways in comparison abuse did take place 
at the hands of women at Abu Ghraib.  Nonetheless, this abuse cannot be equated with 
the perception of abuse given the photographs of detainee treatment at Abu Ghraib, 
which is why I distinguish between instrumental and expressive abuse.  Remember, 
Harman repeatedly reported the abuse she saw and to no avail.  In this case, a woman did 
say “no,” it is just that her voice was not heard given the masculinist system of value 
within the military.   
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 I am also surprised that feminist, activist, and playwright Eve Ensler bought into 
the “reality” of the photograph of Lynndie England holding a leash that was tethered 
around a detainee’s neck without asking about the context of the picture.  Ensler posits 
that England must have been sexually abused in her childhood and that this abuse must 
have hurt her in some fundamental manner to make her act this way now.  Ensler states 
“She’s been robbed of her self-esteem and went into the military to get some of it back” 
(Ensler 2007, 18).  Ensler argues that within this military, England was able to achieve 
some level of power and prestige, and that England felt that she had to prove herself 
within this masculinist atmosphere.  Ensler even goes so far as to say “women’s ability to 
empathize has been so tragically damaged that we [women] are capable of torture” 
(Ensler 2007, 18).  Ensler does not bother with the testimony of numerous expert 
witnesses who interpreted the leash incident in terms of England’s desire to expressively 
please Graner, and also the fact that she posed for a photo in which she held the leash for 
a few seconds, but was not involved in actively and instrumentally dragging the prisoner 
by the leash.  Ensler asks the question “I still don’t get how you could put a leash on a 
human being…I still don’t see how putting a leash on someone and dragging them 
around and humiliating them could ever be right in your brain” (Ensler 2007, 18).  First, 
England was not dragging the prisoner around, and second, the military doctor at Abu 
Ghraib testified (through a written affidavit admitted into evidence) that the leash was 
used to control this prisoner under the doctor’s orders because the prisoner was psychotic, 
and the medical staff had no medications or other means to normatively control the 
psychosis.  Ensler sees England’s actions aimed at proving herself within the masculinist 
military cultural atmosphere and states, “She had to out-macho the most macho in order 
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to prove that she was ‘one of the guys’” (Ensler 2007, 19).  Ensler speculates widely, 
without investigating, facts, evidence, or testimony regarding this incident. 
 Regarding the sexualness of the abuse, Ensler argues that England (and the 
women of Abu Ghraib” were acting out their aggressions with regard to abuse that must 
have happened to them.  What is ironic is that only men were shown in the courts-martial 
to be the abusers with regard to the sexual and homoerotic nature of abuse, and thus 
Ensler’s analysis should be instead focused on the men doing abuse, and thus conversely, 
and according to Ensler, these male guards as having a history of sexual abuse.  
Moreover, there was no evidence at all that England or Harman had been sexually 
abused—and this is something the four expert witnesses in psychology and psychiatry 
automatically considered, and rejected as an explanation. 
 Ensler asks if it is possible for women to act differently than men if women have 
power in a patriarchal system.  My answer is yes, it is possible.  My proof is that 
England, Ambuhl, and Harman, the women of Abu Ghraib Tier 1A and 1B, did have 
power and did not act in abusive ways.  Instead, they were shown to be helpers in their 
jobs and with regard to detainee treatment.  Even the “torture” that they were involved in 
was not only expressive in nature, but very minor compared to the physical and mental 
torture of the male guards of Tier 1A and 1B.   
 I argue that England and Harman both had power in the prison of Abu Ghraib and 
used this power to transform this situation through telling those above them of the abuse 
taking place in this part of the prison.  Additionally, through courts-testimony and court 
room exhibits (such as Harman’s letter to her wife regarding her fear of the situation of 
abuse at Abu Ghraib), these women did act as Ensler’s “vagina warriors,” a term Ensler 
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uses to describe women who make sure abuse doesn’t happen to other people, and who 
are aimed at ending violence against other humans (Ensler 2007, 19).  Ensler even goes 
so far as to call for the women of Abu Ghraib to take responsibility for the abuse that they 
are assumed to have caused or actively participated in given their depictions in the leaked 
photographs of detainee abuse.  Unfortunately, this goes against most philosophical 
theories of ethical accountability in that these women would be taking the blame for 
actions that they did not commit.   
What is important to remember is that assumptions regarding single images are 
dangerous and that images occur within contexts and should be understood in these 
terms.  What the problem here may be is that women are being shown in photographs 
doing things that are out of our conceptual association of women as caregivers, and not 
abusers, but the victims of abuse itself.  In the situation of both England and Harman I 
argue that these women were indeed “the abused” given their assumed actions regarding 
the photographs of abuse and their assumed moral culpability for these actions.  I 
honestly expect more from feminism that this kind of shallow analysis.  This is about 
power, and specifically the power of image, and as feminists know frames of reference 
are necessary for interpretation of the “facts” of women’s lives. 
In this section, I have analyzed the courts-martial of both England and Harman, 
sworn statements and testimony, treatment of the detainees, as well as the now infamous 
photographs depicting the conditions and abuse at Abu Ghraib.  Throughout this 
discussion, I have shown that the Parsonian distinction between instrumental and 
expressive roles served a multitude of functions simultaneously and especially given the 
masculinist code of the military.  For example, Parsonian theory applied to an analysis of 
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meetings with the defense attorneys and expert witnesses for the defense; when analyzing 
the charges that Lynndie England faced in both of her trials and when providing an 
interpretation of the infamous picture of England with the leashed detainee; an analysis of 
my experiences at the trials; the charges against Sabrina Harman and the kind of work 
Harman did at Abu Ghraib; and also to an analysis of the “torture” of the detainees.  
Specifically, I show how power, usually unaccounted for in Parsonian gender role 
distinctions, can be understood with regard to Parsonian instrumental and expressive 
roles.  Moreover, I move beyond Parsons, and provide a complex and sophisticated 
application of Parsons’ initial typology that leads to new concepts such as expressive 
torture, expressive power, instrumental torture, and instrumental chaos. 
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5. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF IDENTITY SIMULACRA AND GENDER  
 
 HYPERREALITY: AMERICAN MILITARY AND THE CASE OF ABU  
 
 GHRAIB 
 
 “The simulacrum is never what hides the truth-- it is truth that hides the fact 
that there is none.  The simulacrum is true" ~Ecclesiastes  
 
 
 Jean Baudrillard, sometimes called the high-priest of postmodernism, develops a 
theory of postmodern culture, which postulates that culture itself is now dominated by 
simulations.  This means that objects and discourses have no firm origin, no referents, 
and no ground or foundation upon which to locate meaning.  Specifically, according to 
Baudrillard, the Sassurean process of signification (signifier + signified = a meaningful 
sign) has failed to produce meaning.   
One of the issues I am interested in analyzing is what was “real” and what was 
“simulacra” about the role of women at Abu Ghraib prison and at the trials.  I am 
interested in providing a discussion of how what is considered theoretically "real" 
instructs the formation of conceptual and organizational paradigms, and especially 
categories for thinking about sex and gender.  Recent understandings of gender in 
sociology describe gender as something that is socially constructed and specific with 
regards to conception only within a particular context.  This means that what is 
understood as “feminine” or “masculine” differs with regard to each culture’s 
construction of gender categories.  These social constructions come to define how gender 
is understood and performed within society, and thereby function as a theoretical 
“reality” within these cultures and constructions themselves.  In this way, and using 
postmodern theory as a perspective for understanding realness, gender identity and 
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identity in general can be understood as something that is produced in relation to a 
socially constructed normative category of “realness.” 
I describe Baudrillard’s notion of simulacra and simulation in order to provide an 
understanding of how “reality” and the associated notion of “real” are constructed in 
postmodern theory.  Within this discussion, Baudrillard’s term ‘hyperreality’ is defined to 
mean that which has no referential origin or reality apart from a self-legitimating system.  
In a postmodern culture, it is this hyperreality that comes to function as the “real,” or a 
simulacrum of reality itself (Baudrillard 1983).  A hyperreality for Baudrillard is a 
condition where reality itself becomes replaced by simulacra, and I argue that gender 
constructions themselves are simulacra categories for identity.   These systems exist 
because we as a culture have socially constructed them as correct ways for understanding 
and categorizing our experiences, however they have no reality behind their signs, and 
are thus hyperreal in that they function as canopies for thought, yet are ultimately 
constructed categories themselves.  In a postmodern culture, it is this hyperreality that 
comes to function as the “real,” or a simulacrum of reality itself that can never be fully 
pinned down.   Regarding gender categories, Baudrillard would argue that gender 
significations are free-floating symbols that individuals in a postmodern culture latch 
onto as a means for identity construction.2  Again, these significations are simulacrum 
because there is no firm referent or origin to which they attach themselves with regard to 
meaning, and thus only have a use-value of fleeting substantiation. 
This notion of simulacra becomes important for Judith Butler’s theory of gender 
performance (and her philosophy of identity categories) in that Butler states that all 
gender is drag (Butler 1993a; Butler 1993b).  This means that, according to Butler, 
                                                 
2 Nonetheless, in Seduction, Baudrillard is complicated on this point as the “feminine” is very real for him. 
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gender meanings are not attached to any category for explication, and that gender 
categories themselves are neither naturally connected to either heterosexuality nor 
connected to sex categories for their elucidation.3  Gender, for Butler, is thus only 
theatrical production—a hoax or over-performed dramatic, and this is gender’s 
“realness”—the production of gender.  Specifically, I think that Butler is theorizing 
similarly to Baudrillard in her statement about drag in that gender is something that is 
done, performed, consumed, and produced according to a relational system of gender 
categories (a hyperreality) that have been socially constructed by society.  In this way, 
these gender categories are simulacra in that they do not refer to any reality outside of 
their conception.  Traditionally, sex, gender, and sexuality categories have been 
understood as intricately related for their elucidation.  However, Butler, and most 
feminist theorists, now argue against this association, and state that these categories are 
theoretically independent and separate from one another.  Thus, the hyperreality of 
gender lies in the idea that gender is understood in terms of socially constructed 
categories, and thus do not reflect anything about “reality” itself.   
However, for Butler, and unlike Baudrillard, there is a legitimating system based 
on power that serves to render gender performances as valuable within society (Butler 
1993a, 1993b).  This means that, for Butler, “realness” regarding gender identity is 
something that we conform to with regards to cultural norms of identity realness, and can 
be thought of as a parody or as mimicry.  (The “real” in this case being rigid gender 
conceptualizations based on heteronormativity and a binary understanding of sex 
                                                 
3 The connection of Baudrillard and Butler is important and has not been made in gender theorizing thus 
far. Most feminists reject postmodern theory because they believe that it loses the ability to theorize about 
women’s experiences in specific contexts.  However, I argue that postmodern theory allows for a further 
and vital insight into how gender is conceptualized in association with power. 
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categories.)  In this way, Butler describes the cultural rules and laws for gender 
understanding and value, yet deconstructs these rules through the separation of sex and 
sexuality categories from gender categories.  Butler’s project then is to get away from 
understanding gender in terms of sex categories and heteronormativity, as she does not 
argue for the parroting of existing gender categories, but points out that these categories 
faultily constitute juridical systems for gender value (Butler 1993a; Butler 1993b; Butler 
2004).   
Consequently, for Butler, what is important is that these “rules” for gender value 
are foundationally social constructions, thereby attesting to their “simulacra” (in 
Baudrillard’s terms) statuses.  Although Baudrillard does not posit any kind of 
Foucaultian and juridical power doctrine for gender identity, both Butler and Baudrillard 
see gender as ultimately a social construction.  Because of their social construction, 
gender categories themselves can thusly be understood as simulations and simulacra, 
which are located in Baudrillard’s world of hyperreality, as the reality of the “self” has 
been replaced by simulacra, or the representations of things (the self in this case) that 
come to replace the thing being represented.  In this case, an individual’s gender has 
come to be replaced by the postmodern fleeting identity tags of gender (Baudrillard) and 
the associated system of allowable gender representations that dictate “realness” (Butler). 
In this section, I analyze Baudrillard’s descriptions of boundaries in a postmodern 
culture, and apply this account to Abu Ghraib prison.  Also, I discuss gender identity in a 
postmodern culture using the example of the “metrosexual soldier.”  I analyze the notion 
of drag and Baudrillard’s seduction, and show that Sabrina Harman actually “seduces” 
the masculinist and heterosexist military’s “code” through her being both female and 
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lesbian, and also a member of the masculinist military.  This means that Harman 
evidenced signs of masculinity, heterosexuality, and homosexuality in her identity 
performance, thereby displaying more signs than reality.   
Another issue I analyze is “simulacra” in relation to gender issues at Abu Ghraib 
and the subsequent courts-martial.  I show that spaces and roles within the military have 
been gendered in their constructions in terms of the code of normative gender realness (a 
simulacra of realness itself), and show how individuals and actions both reify and subvert 
these gendered constructions, thereby questioning the “realness” of these constructions.  
Within this discussion, I show how the social construction of gender and its “real” 
performances (because reality is in the performance) actually culminate in an 
understanding of gender that is itself a simulacrum, in that gender categories are socially 
constructed in terms of a “code,” with regards to the role of women at both the prison and 
the trials.  I analyze the gendered construction of the military as a simulacra of 
masculinity (remember, gender is not real, it is produced/educed), how military uniforms 
give bodies legitimate expression while also policing gender according to the code of 
gender enforced, evidences of “femininity” within the masculinist military through the 
ritualized style of the body in terms of military gender politics, the association of the 
doctrine of separate spheres within the military itself vis-à-vis gender roles and gender 
expressions, and the perceived consequences of offending the masculinist and 
heterosexist symbolic military code.   
I analyze non-normative gender practices that call into question the validity of this 
entire system of gender and show its “real” nature to be simulacra.4  I argue that it is 
                                                 
4 I am aware that masculinity is also culturally contextual and socially constructed, and describe the 
masculinity within the military as that of the Parsonian instrumental soldier, which culminates in a 
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possible that Baudrillard’s notion of simulacra can come to function as a “policing” 
technique, albeit impermanent, where what are being enforced are power-simulacra.    
This notion of “power-simulacra” is a term that is helpful in understanding power 
associated with Baudrillard’s theorizing, where power is understood as the legitimation of 
certain, yet unstable, significations.  Real bodies are given legitimacy in terms of the 
social construction and championed simulacra of gender.  Again, gender and identity 
categories gain legitimacy in terms of a socially constructed normative standard, where 
what is “real” is understood as relative to the standards of a particular power 
configuration, even though this power configuration is itself simulacra, and is thus not 
associated with any connection to sex or sexuality.  Actually, this is all about the power 
to define, albeit in no long-lasting or rooted way, the function of categories for gender 
elucidation that affect social legitimation and social value.  Thus, these categories are 
simulacrum in their construction, but real in their consequences.  I evidence this claim 
with many examples of how the “code” itself is shown to be faulty characterizations of 
reality, and thus that the “code” is itself “hyperreal.” 
 Finally, Butler’s notion of identity categories is important with regard to how the 
“rotten apples” marked and inscribed their bodies through the use of tattoo, both claiming 
and subverting a system of allowable constructions of identity simultaneously.   
5.1 Identity and Signification as Hyperreal Simulacra: Maps and the  
 
 “Metrosexual Soldier”” 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
stereotypical account of masculinity as it is understood by laypersons within society.  This is not a critical 
approach or understanding of masculinity, yet is functional with regards to how I saw masculinity 
constructions emerge within the courts-martial.  I provide examples that counter this construction of 
masculinity, thereby evidencing different possible constructions of masculinity.  This paper is not focused 
on a critical discussion of masculinity itself and instead endeavors to describe how conceptions of 
masculinity serve to create categories of understanding gender based on power. 
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If once we were able to view the Borges fable in which the cartographers of the 
Empire draw a map so detailed that it ends up covering the territory exactly (the 
decline of the Empire witnesses the fraying of this map, little by little, and its fall 
into ruins, though some shreds are still discernible in the deserts -- the metaphysical 
beauty of this ruined abstraction testifying to a pride equal to the Empire and 
rotting like a carcass, returning to the substance of the soil, a bit as the double ends 
by being confused with the real through aging)-- as the most beautiful allegory of 
simulation, this fable has now come full circle for us, and possesses nothing but the 
discrete charm of second-order simulacra. 
 
    Jean Baudrillard (1994), Simulacra and Simulations 
 
In Baudrillard's above citation, he concerns himself with abstractions of a map 
and the delineation of boundaries.  He leads us to a contemplation of how lines of 
demarcation, even in the metaphorical and theoretical sense, are established.   He 
suggests that these lines of demarcation are in the service of a specific conception of the 
"real," and therefore instigates thought about how this "real" is constructed or located.   Is 
the map of written boundaries “real?”  Is the territory itself bounded in some way that 
allows for the production of a map?  Simulation is the term that Baudrillard uses to 
induce the project of locating the "real.”  However, for Baudrillard, simulation is the 
notion that what is referred to as “real” is without origin or reality.  This means that what 
once might have referred to some “referential being or substance” now holds no identity 
apart from the actual simulation itself (Baudrillard 1983, 169).  The distinctions between 
object and representation, “thing and idea,” according to Baudrillard, are no longer valid 
relationships (Baudrillard 1983).   
Consequently, for Baudrillard, locating the "real" becomes a perpetual game of 
referential referents, both pointing toward and away from "truth," as "truth" itself is 
shown to be only a phantasm or spectacle.  Says Baudrillard, "Today's abstraction is no 
longer that of the map, the double, the mirror, or the concept.  Simulation is no longer 
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that of a territory, a referential being, or a substance.  It is the generation by models of a 
real without origin or reality: a hyperreal" (Baudrillard 1994).   Thus, Baudrillard uses 
the term ‘hyperreal’ to denote the so-called “reality” that a simulation refers, a world of 
self-referential signs (Baudrillard 1983).  In a hyperreality, “reality” itself has collapsed, 
and only image, illustration, or simulation is left.  Additionally, in a hyperreality, the 
model of “reality” is more real than the reality it supposedly represents (Rosenau 1992).   
With regards to gender, Baudrillard would say that gender “realness” is nonsense, as tags 
of identity are fleeting, and the postmodern culture only allows individuals the ability to 
grasp gender identity-signs in unsubstantial ways.   
This “reality” is not a counterfeit representation or a “dissimulate,” as no attempt 
to represent any “reality” takes place.  Instead, Baudrillard’s point is that what is indeed 
real is the absence of “reality.”  Says Poster, “[Baudrillard’s] simulations are different 
from fictions or lies in that they present an absence as a presence, the imaginary as the 
real, absorbing the real within itself” (Baudrillard 1983, 6).   
Additionally, Baudrillard discusses illusions, and claims that illusions make no 
sense in a hyperreality, as the “real” is no longer possible, from which an illusion would 
replicate itself (Baudrillard 1983, 180).  Says Baudrillard,  
 
Representation starts from the principle that the sign and the real are equivalent.  
Conversely, simulation starts from the Utopia of this principle of equivalence, from 
the radical negation of the sign as value…Whereas representation tries to absorb 
simulation by interpreting it as false representation, simulation envelops the whole 
edifice of representation as itself simulacrum (Baudrillard 1983, 173). 
 
Thus, for Baudrillard, “It is no longer a question of imitation, nor of reduplication, nor 
even of parody.  It is rather a question of substituting signs of the real for the real itself” 
(Baudrillard 1983, 170).  Considering identity in a postmodern culture, it follows that 
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realness is about signification and not about any ontological claim, but a grasping of 
hyperreal tags of identity such as gender.  Thus gender categories for Baudrillard are only 
phantasmic creations that do not point to any kind of natural identifications of the body, 
neither in terms of sex, sexuality, or any other categorical claim of coherence.  Instead, 
gender simulations are representations of identity that are illusory. 
Consider Baudrillard’s map.  It is neither the territory nor the map that demarcates 
boundaries.  Instead, it is the "real," and specifically a second-order simulacra of the 
"real," that allows us to make sense of both the map's territory and the map itself.  Even 
though the map has eroded and the territories can no longer be depicted with any 
exactness to that of the map, a "real" still exists for Baudrillard.  For Baudrillard, what is 
being made sense of is neither the map nor the land boundaries of territory.  Instead, what 
Baudrillard seems to suggest is that notions of "real" are constructed in such a way that 
these notions themselves dictate "realness.”  In this way, the map is "real" in terms of the 
theory of "realness" itself, and in no other way.   
Considering both the map and gender, what is “real” is the construction of 
“reality,” and nothing else.  Both the map and gender are thus self-referentially validated 
in terms of some constructed theory of “realness.”  What is "real" in this construction is 
the construction of the "real," and nothing more.  Thus, the consequence for signification 
is that the signification becomes the “reality” through its construction. 
Consider the Abu Ghraib prison.  Like a map, one might think that when referring 
to “Abu Ghraib” that they were referencing something that was stable in signification and 
demarcation.  However, as I have described in prior sections, the reality of Abu Ghraib 
prison is that it was not well defended from daily mortar attacks, where on a frequent 
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basis the prison itself was bombed, thereby leading to the actual destruction of territorial 
boundaries.  Additionally, a prison might be characterized as having a closed and 
bounded region, where the separation of prisoners and American military troops was 
distinct.  However, the prison was itself porous, meaning that it was permeable to 
outsiders entering the prison grounds.  One example of this that American soldiers spoke 
of was specifically unauthorized Iraqis who were selling cameras on the compound itself.  
Additionally, American military personnel actually lived in jail cells next to prisoners.  In 
this way, like Baudrillard’s map, the boundaries of the prison and its rigid instantiation 
were themselves simulacra, yet functioned in a rhetorical way so as to allow for 
reference.  “Realness” was thus a product of signifying references, and nothing else, as 
boundaries did not explicitly exist. 
Although I doubt that Baudrillard would engage in discourse that promoted an 
understanding of the "real" grounded in the metaphysics of the object itself, I do believe 
that the reason for his project is to show how systems of "realness" are constructed and 
reified, and in turn function as that which is indeed itself "real."  For example, one way to 
understand identity in a postmodern culture is the grabbing of signs by individuals that 
function as identity, where the signs serve as the demarcation of the self.  This is the case 
with the hyperreal simulacra tag of gender identity.  Philosophically, this is a radically 
different way to understand identity, as this conception has nothing at all to do with the 
individual self, creating identity from within, body versus soul or mind, etc., as 
simulations of identity are something to be consumed and produced.   
Consider the postmodern gender identity of metrosexual.  This category for 
identity is something that was socially constructed to describe a sexed male who is 
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heterosexual, but who participated in conspicuous ritualistic grooming that is 
stereotypically (although problematically) associated with both femininity and 
homosexuality, such that ritualized grooming is equated with hyper-femininity and 
“gayness.”   
Now consider the juxtaposed image of the decorated war hero soldier, who is 
polished in presentation, shoes shined, representing the many achieved medals and 
ribbons, hair molded in such a certain way as to conform to a “code,” and who ritually 
and vigorously performs the identity “soldier” through production and consumption of an 
idealized image-sign.  In this way, the military identity, like the metrosexual, can be 
understood as the conforming to a certain characterization associated with the 
significations of a certain free floating image-signs.  Hence, the “metrosexual-soldier” is 
a simulacra identity, one that is achieved through the imitation of the socially constructed 
code of gender itself.  Again, in this way, "real" becomes a constructed simulation of 
reality, and is thus, according to Baudrillard, itself hyperreal.  As stated, this hyperreality 
functions as the "real."  Says Baudrillard, "It is the real, and not the map, whose vestiges 
persist here and there in the deserts that are no longer those of the Empire, but ours" 
(Baudrillard 1994, 1). 
Hence, the postmodern world that Baudrillard describes is one that questions an 
objective standpoint or privileged position for determining what counts as “real.”  This is 
an important postmodern project in that the ideal of an all-encompassing and objective 
notion of reality is challenged.  Additionally, one outcome of this project is that power 
structures are identified as providing conceptual schema for understanding reality.  
Interestingly though, what Baudrillard questions is not only the existence of a so-called 
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“real,” but he also questions the notion of a simulated model of reality that exists as the 
standard from which to judge the “real.”  Says Baudrillard, “the age of simulation thus 
begins with a liquidation of all referentials” (Baudrillard 1983, 170).  This becomes 
interesting when thinking about identity in that Baudrillard shows how power is used to 
prescribe and inscribe those identities that are allowable for consumption and production 
of identity itself—or allowable simulacra.  
This discussion, of "realness" and boundary demarcation, captures one theoretical 
project that contemporary postmodern feminists and gender and culture theorists alike 
concern themselves with, namely the questioning and critiquing of how systems, both 
used to understand the world and to organize knowledge, have been themselves 
constructed.  The interesting focus of this critique is on how some notion of "real" has 
been valued and in turn reified such that it (the "real") functions as the foundational 
system for understanding within this paradigm.   A simulacrum of “real” thus functions 
as a foundational metaphysics.  Certainly feminists are interested in the conceptualization 
of these systems and especially with regards to their theoretical foundations, as these 
foundations are the sites (the "real") from which blueprints for social order is located.  
These blueprints, in turn, facilitate the erection of social reality (or a social epistemology) 
in terms of some specific design (as instructed by the "real").    
Feminists and postmodernists alike have questioned this "design" (this "real") in 
terms of its problematic theoretical construction, and specifically with reference to gender 
and race inequalities, assumptions of heterosexuality, and the primary positing of 
whiteness.  At the center of this project is the elucidation of the ways in which our world 
is parsed, separated and categorized, such that an understanding of the organizational 
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schema (the "real"), forced upon that which is being conceived of (thereby making its 
conception "real"), is itself dissected and critiqued (and for the postmodernist, 
deconstructed).  In this way, this feminist project "speaks" to Baudrillard's metaphoric 
attempt to locate the "real" map/territory boundary, as both projects are focused on an 
understanding of how "real" is defined and informed by a pre-existing system that itself 
dictates "realness."  In this way, both projects are concerned not with metaphysical 
realness, but with theoretical paradigm foundations and that which is conceptually "real" 
in terms of this paradigm.  
 5.2 “Power-Simulacra” and Gender Categories 
 
Contemporary feminist, gender theorist, and rhetorician, Judith Butler, has a 
theory of identity categories that can be applied to further explain Baudrillard’s notion of 
simulacra.  This coupling of Baudrillard and Butler is unique and is not something that 
either postmodernists or critical theorists have considered.  Butler’s critique of identity 
categories, however, is important to consider when discussing notions of “realness” in 
that she also shows how categorical “realness” and value are relationally constructed with 
regards to gender categories, and in terms of sex and sexuality categories.  Like most 
feminists and social scientists, Butler’s project speaks to the separation of the categories 
of sex, gender, and sexuality, such that these categories are understood as distinct, and 
unlike stereotypical understandings of gender, where male=masculine and 
female=feminine, and both associations are conceptually heteronormative.      
Butler’s discussion of relationally understood categories demonstrates two 
important things:  the relational power that each binary has to the other, and the limiting 
options for identity construction given the conceived of categories for identity itself.  
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Butler's argument is that theoretical binary pair relations (such as male/female and 
masculine/feminine) are both unstable and incoherent foundations upon which to 
construct theoretical paradigms.  Butler considers the relationship between binary pairs, 
and uses the theoretical tactic of destabilizing the dominant binary in order to challenge 
its dominant status.  This, in turn, questions not only the elevated status of the dominant 
binary, but also questions the entire binary relationship's categorical claim of coherence.  
Binary relations result in problematic understandings of gender for Butler, and as it turns 
out, Butler shows that it is the subordinate binary that actually challenges the status of the 
binary relationship.  Additionally, this project is important with regards to gender 
categories in that it destabilizes both the association of male/masculine and 
female/feminine in terms of gender and sex categories, showing its ultimate socially 
constructed connectedness.  Thus, Butler shows the hyperreality between these 
connections themselves.   
Consider as an example gender constructions in the American military.  One way 
that gender has been constructed within the U.S. military is through the masculinist 
system of the military itself, where masculinity functions as the dominant power-
simulacra with regards to gender hierarchy.  (Remember, for Baudrillard this “power-
simulacra” is a fleeting attempt at signification, but for Butler this is a juridical law for 
gender value.)  This economy is one that is based on power, control, reason, strength, 
rationality, and order— traits used to describe masculinity in the binary system of 
masculine/feminine.  This economy can be juxtaposed to understandings of femininity, 
where femininity is defined as irrational, emotional, in need of control, and weakness, 
and in terms of a relational definition to masculinity.  The masculinist economy of the 
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military is one normalizing structure that constructs and reifies notions of gender value 
within the military itself.  In this way, the masculinist economy functions as the “real” 
with regards to judging and policing gender expressions, as this “realness” allows for 
understanding gender value within the military context.  Hence, the dominant simulacra 
of gender has been conceptualized within the military as masculine, and this is its 
hyperreality, as this description of masculinity as a standard culminates in an 
understanding of a “power-simulacra” that is constructed within this cultural context.   
This is a text of gender that is socially constructed with regards to value, among 
other things, and therefore has no reality apart from the system within which it is pieced 
together.  Hence, this is a discourse of gender that is simulacra at its foundations, where 
power can be understood as compliance with these simulacra formations.  For Butler, and 
unlike Baudrillard, actual power is associated with this account of gender, as bodies are 
policed and given value in terms of legitimation with regard to the rules of this system 
itself. 
Additionally, Butler is especially concerned with heterosexist frameworks for 
understanding sex and gender, such that male/masculine and female/feminine are 
understood in heterosexist opposition, and she calls these “exclusionary gender norms.”   
Butler wants to open up the possibilities for gender and questions the ways in which the 
very thinking of what is possible in gendered life is foreclosed by certain habitual and 
violent presumptions—namely the denotation of constraining, socially constructed 
gender categories themselves.  It makes sense then that Butler’s project is aimed at 
making gender conceptualizations thinkable, because in the absence of reality, only the 
socially constructed categories used to understand (the simulacra of) identity allow for 
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conceptualizations of identity.  These presumptions are exactly the categories of the 
“real” that Baudrillard writes about, as these presumptions constrain the understanding of 
gender itself.  These categories are not “real’ in the metaphysical sense, but function as 
“real” in terms of organization and group solidification, and thus as “power-simulacra.” 
Consider Sabrina Harman and her military courts-martial in terms of the 
military’s masculinist simulacra identity and also Butler’s heterosexist “exclusionary 
gender norms.”  It came out in the Harman courts-martial that Harman is a lesbian 
soldier.  The social construction of gender has historically equated both femininity and 
masculinity with heterosexuality in that femininity and masculinity were seen as opposite 
binaries, thereby mimicking heterosexual lived-relations.  The social-construction of the 
military follows this gender characterization in that it is conceptually a heterosexist 
institution, where homosexual individuals are not welcome per membership as 
homosexual individuals.  Instead, homosexual military personnel are required in 
accordance with military’s “exclusionary sexuality norms” to render their identities 
secret.  This is the consequence of the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy that has been 
implemented by law into the armed forces, thereby constructing a standard of the “real” 
for identity.   
Nonetheless, it remains that there are indeed homosexuals within the military, yet 
they are closeted in their identities.  This is a perfect example of Baudrillard’s notion of 
the “code” as instructing “reality” in that “reality” is not represented, and only formed 
through the simulation of heterosexuality, thereby culminating in the simulacra of reality 
in terms of the “power-simulacra” of heterosexuality.  Harman’s identity thus functions 
as a simulacrum identity of heterosexuality in that she is understood in terms of a military 
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“power-simulacra” of heterosexuality; yet, she is also subversive of this identity given 
her actual status as lesbian.   
Butler’s project also shows the socially constructed notion of gender itself to be a 
hyperreality in the sense that Baudrillard employs, as gender is shown to be a system of 
“realness” that is constructed and reified, and in turn functions as that which is itself 
“real.”  Remember Baudrillard’s map, where what is deemed "real" is in terms of the 
theory of "realness" itself, and in no other way.  For Butler, gender categories are thus 
“real” in that they are self-referentially validated in terms of this theory of gender 
“realness”—or what can be understood as Baudrillard’s “code.”  Thus, gender itself can 
be understood as hyperreal simulacra of reality in that it comes to represent reality, serves 
as a blueprint for social reality and social realness in its phantasmic creation, and 
functions as a means for the comprehension of identity productions that are culturally 
allowable and thus deemed “legitimate.”  For Butler, this is about value within a power 
system in that legitimation is the consequence of adhering to the culturally instructed and 
created “code” for understanding gender, where those who fall outside of these gender 
prescriptions are neither given affirmation for their gender productions nor the 
opportunity to construct gender in a way that is socially comprehensible.  Consequently, 
what I am saying is that the socially constructed categories of gender are in service to a 
reified notion of the “real,” which is simulacra at its theoretical base.  Gender thus 
becomes a self-legitimating system when understood in terms of binaries that seemingly 
police the way that gender is thought about and done.   
Interestingly, one of the comments heard at the Harman sentencing was that she 
was being punished for being a lesbian in a heterosexist military, a female within a 
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masculinist military, and as a scapegoat for detainee abuse given her many minority 
statuses. 
Butler’s critique of heterosexualized identity categories thus rests on the notion 
that the polarities of what is included in a category and what is not included are 
inherently reactive, both reflecting and reflected, in the claiming of an identity category.  
When individuals conform and contort their identities to the hyperreal categories of 
gender, or when gender identities are conceived of in terms of these categories, what has 
taken place is the rule by simulacra of reality.  Says Butler commenting on normative 
sexuality identities, “gay is to straight not as copy is to original, but, rather, as copy is to 
copy” (Butler 1993b,41).   This statement echoes Baudrillard’s claim about simulacra as 
being “a copy of a copy, for which there is no original” (Baudrillard 1983,169).  
Interestingly, since gender categories are socially constructed and understood in terms of 
a context, there is no original understanding of gender, and only a hyperreal doctrine used 
to control actual bodies.  Perhaps the claim should be that “gender is a simulacrum—a 
copy of a copy for which there is no original.” 
It is important to remember that Butler thinks that the identity category that 
instructs heteronormativity is itself rallied against at the site of these identity productions 
and categorical power struggles through the use of parody and mimicry, “through 
repetition of the law [of heterosexuality] into hyperbole” (Butler 1993b,122).  This is 
very Foucaultian with regards to understanding power, and Baudrillard argued against 
Foucault’s theoretical conceptions of how power operated.  Nonetheless, for Butler, 
through contesting the dominant category (the theoretical act itself) the ideal of 
heterosexuality is subverted, thereby culminating in the questioning of the theoretical 
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primacy of the category heterosexual (Butler 1993b).  Think here of Harman’s lesbian 
identity as a member of the heterosexist army.  The message about the “rule” or “code” 
of military heterosexuality is that it is only a simulacra code, as plenty of closeted 
soldiers exist within the bounds of the American military system, and thus subversion of 
the “law” has taken place.  The heterosexual doctrine of the military is thus shown to be a 
rule by simulacra of reality in that it does not represent any reality in its conception.  
Again, there are after all plenty of gay and lesbian soldiers who would attest to this if 
sanctions would not be taken against them.  Interestingly, many former military members 
speak out against the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy once they exit the military itself.   
Hence, Butler’s project is aimed at understanding how notions of “realness” come 
to be elevated as themselves “real” within discourse.  This part of Butler’s theorizing can 
be aligned to Baudrillard’s notion of hyperreality, a condition where simulacra come to 
function as that which is theoretically real.  For the military, then, a hyperreality exists 
with regard to the simulacra of heterosexuality that is required by the “code.” 
5.3 Seduction and Drag 
 
Interestingly, Baudrillard develops a thesis on gender with his understanding of 
seduction as belonging to the order of sign and ritual, and as that which removes a 
dimension from real space (Baudrillard 1990).  Says Baudrillard of seduction, “The only 
thing truly at stake is mastery of the strategy of appearances, against the force of being 
and reality” (Baudrillard 1990, 9).  Seduction, then, is itself a seduction “…a mode of 
circulation that is itself secretive and ritualistic, a sort of immediate initiation that plays 
by its own rules…” (Baudrillard 1990, 81).  Seduction is an attempt to lure theory away 
from what Baudrillard thinks seduced it, namely the political, significatory and libidinal 
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economics of depth and meaning.  Says Baudrillard “…seduction’s enchantment puts an 
end to all libidinal economies, and every sexual or psychological contract, replacing them 
with a dizzying spiral of responses and counter-responses…” (Baudrillard 1990, 86).   
This is similar to Butler’s notion of policing strategies of gender, where what is 
necessary to show the ultimate constructedness of these normalizing systems is their 
“repetition into hyperbole”—exaggeration thereby demonstrating inherent meaningless 
(Butler 1993a).  Additionally, Baudrillard’s seduction shows what Butler is concerned 
with making clear, namely that legitimating systems and conceptual schemes (political, 
libidinal, etc) inform and provide the “code” behind ways of thinking. 
Again, important to Baudrillard’s theorizing is the idea of simulacra, which refers 
to a lack of meaning, and without possibility of meaning.  Applied to gender, Baudrillard 
would argue that all gender categories have imploded with regard to meaning, and 
therefore do not serve to categorize the world in any meaningful way.  Contrary to this 
nihilistic claim, Butler states that gender categories have been constructed in ways that 
limit gender conception (Butler 1993a).  For Baudrillard, there are too many conceptions 
of gender to make any sense of the category itself, and thus the category implodes with 
regard to meaning.  For Butler, the existing schemas for gender understanding are 
limiting and need to be exacted to include all possible meanings.  Nonetheless, both 
theories speak to the constraints of existing gender schema deemed “real”—Baudrillard 
with his notion of hyperreality and Butler with her attempt to render normalizing 
categories meaningless.  
 It is important here to point out that I read Baudrillard as attempting to get out 
from under theoretical canopies that instruct ways of conceptualization.  But, what 
  
154
 
Baudrillard does not account for is that even his descriptions of gender seduction 
considers real bodies, such as transvestites, that are envisaged in terms of power-
simulacra, or the simulacra of gender that has been reified socially to serve as “reality,” 
albeit a hyperreality itself. 
Consider Baudrillard’s account of transvestites.  Baudrillard gives an example of 
seduction, namely that of the Barcelona drag queens, who wear women’s makeup and 
clothing, but keep their moustaches and hairy chests.  Again, there is an excess of 
appearance for Baudrillard, as there are more signs than “reality,” again pointing to the 
irony of too much reality or hyperreality.   
 
Uncertainty is the greatest in the play of femininity, such as with transvestism.  With 
the transvestite, the signs are not duplicated with biology- they don't match up.  
This is the seduction of the signs themselves.  Perhaps the transvestites ability to 
seduce comes straight from parody- a parody of sex by its over-signification 
(Baudrillard 1990, 14). 
 
 
Thus for Baudrillard, there are too many signs of gender, both masculine and 
feminine, thereby providing a dilemma with regards to categorization of either.  Within 
this image there is an excess of appearance, more signs than there is reality, and thus too 
much reality such that the signs do not match up.  So, for example, considering the 
transvestite, the signs are not duplicated with biology.  For Baudrillard, this is not 
production, but the seduction of the signs themselves.  "Perhaps the transvestites ability 
to seduce comes straight from parody—a parody of sex by its over-signification 
(Baudrillard 1990, 14).   This is his “seduction”—a hyperreal simulacra of reality itself. 
Baudrillard articulates the complexity of the relationship between production, seduction, 
and the drag queens when he says that “The signs of the drag queens make the claim that 
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femininity is naught but the signs with which men rig it up…It is a challenge to the 
female model by way of a female game” (Baudrillard 1990, 14).  This is the strength of 
seduction, the implication that a category is actually nothing (the female is “nothing” for 
Baudrillard), the artifice is greater than the reality, and that “the feminine exists in the 
signs but there is no reality behind the signs” (Baudrillard 1990, 14).  In this way, the 
signs themselves suggest a challenge in terms of integrity of the category feminine, and 
for gender categories in sum.  Hence seduction is an ironic, alternative form that breaks 
signification and provides “a space of play and defiance” (Baudrillard 1990, 21).  This is 
a theoretical dual of sorts, according to Baudrillard, since seduction is above all a strategy 
of displacement—it is seduction that prevails in the long term because it implies a 
reversible, indeterminate order (Baudrillard 1990, 22). 
 Consider Sabrina Harman as an example of Baudrillard’s seduction.  In numerous 
photographs of abuse at Abu Ghraib, she is shown displaying masculinity in her dress, in 
her membership as a military soldier, while wearing the masculine drag of a military 
utilities uniform (a t-shirt and fatigues), and as not evidencing femininity in her 
appearance.  In this way, Harman was wearing the “drag” of the military and not the 
“drag” of femininity.  Additionally, Harman was a military soldier who existed as female 
within the masculinist “code” of the military itself, thereby further evidencing the use of 
masculinist “drag” for identity.   
Considering gender and sexuality, Harman actually existed as both a female and a 
lesbian within the heterosexist and masculinist “code” of the military, and this was most 
evident when her wife took the stand on her behalf during her courts-martial as a 
character witness.  There was a seduction (an excess of appearance) with Harman as a 
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member of the military, as a lesbian, and as a female, and these identities rendered the 
military’s masculinist and heterosexist “code” unintelligible, thereby showing its ultimate 
constructed and simulacra nature.  By the very virtue of Harman being female within the 
masculinist military, and as a lesbian with a closeted heterosexual identity within this 
military, these identities seduced the military’s code of constructed masculinity and 
heterosexuality.  Harman evidences simulacra in that she was identified in terms of all of 
the following:  a military “power-simulacra” of heterosexuality, a homosexual given her 
lesbian identity, and a female in the masculinist military.  This is a subversion of the 
“code” into oblivion, which makes Harman’s identity a “seduction,” according to 
Baudrillard.  Additionally, by remaining under the radar and the “don’t ask don’t tell” 
requirement of the army, Harman subverted the very system that attempted to control her 
by being gay and wearing the drag of the military uniform openly.  This is subversive of 
the military’s heteronormativity and is an example of troubling the gendered masculine 
code of the military.  Hence, there are too many conflicting signs, both masculine and 
feminine, heterosexual and homosexual, thereby leading to this seduction.   
According to Baudrillard, the “feminine” is not just seduction; it also suggests a 
challenge to the male in that the status of the categorical male cannot be understood as 
the inversion of the feminine.  With this example, and in accord with Butler, Baudrillard 
questions the connectedness of gender and sex categories and shows their ultimate 
disassociation.  Even so, says Baudrillard, “Every structure can adapt to its subversion or 
inversion, but not to the reversion of its terms.  Seduction is this reversible form” 
(Baudrillard 1990, 21).  This is evidenced with Harman’s inversion of the sexuality and 
gender signs of the American military “code,” thereby showing its hyperreal nature.  
  
157
 
Hence, Baudrillard understands seduction as an ironic, alternative form, one that breaks 
the referentially of sex and provides a space of play and defiance (Baudrillard 1990). 
This is similar to Butler’s project of destabilizing binary pairs and showing the 
dominant binary to be a faulty construction of power over the subordinate, yet 
Baudrillard takes it one step further and claims that an implosion of meaning has 
occurred given the displacement of symbolic referents.  For Baudrillard then, seduction 
represents mastery over the symbolic universe, while power represents only mastery of 
the real universe (Baudrillard 1990).  Butler is concerned with this “real universe” (and 
the consequences for embodiment and actual bodies), where narratives of gender exist 
and structure reality in terms of power.  Although it is true that Baudrillard renders 
gender meaningless via seduction and the displacement (read “implosion”) of symbolic 
referents, Butler basically does the same with her identification of gender categories as 
tied to power, and as meaningless outside of these power systems, and especially since 
gender cannot be understood as apart from these normalizing systems themselves. 
Consequently, Butler’s point in Gender Trouble (Butler [1990]1999) is "to show 
that the naturalized knowledge of gender operates as a preemptive and violent 
circumscription of reality,” which can be equated with Baudrillard’s notion of simulacra.  
To the extent that gender norms establish what will and will not be intelligibly human, 
what will and will not be considered "real," they “establish the ontological field in which 
bodies may be given legitimate expression" (Butler 1999, xiii).  This ontological field of 
value is socially constructed around claims of the “real,” but Butler’s point is that these 
claims to realness are themselves socially constructed in terms of power.   
  
158
 
As stated, drag is the example Butler (and Baudrillard) gives of a subversive 
move against the normative since it plays on the distinction between the anatomy of the 
performer and the gender being performed.  Says Butler, "In imitating gender, drag 
implicitly reveals the imitative structure of gender itself—as well as its contingency" 
(Butler 1993a,175).   This is why Butler calls all gender “drag,” as gender for the drag 
queen, and all other’s claiming a gender identity, is conceived of in terms of parody of 
the normalizing categories (power-simulacra) of gender themselves.    
For Baudrillard, the drag queens exemplify the absurdity of sexed bodies coupled 
with gender because in his example both “masculine” and “feminine” are shown as 
existing simultaneously together, thereby leading to a contradiction.  Baudrillard shows 
gender to be simulacra because no firm referent or origin exists for signification, and only 
stolen signifiers of a socially constructed master schema of referents exists.  In this sense, 
I argue that Baudrillard’s project can be understood in part as parallel to Butlers, as the 
culmination of both results in the destroying of a power system of gender, and thus 
results in gender implosion. 
 Perhaps this is why the image of Harman, a female and lesbian in the heterosexist 
and masculinist military, directly speaks to this point.  The power system that Butler is 
theorizing understands Harman’s identity in terms of heterosexuality and masculinity, yet 
this power system is challenged by Harman’s membership to the military group as a 
sexed female and given her various minority statuses.  However, Baudrillard’s point 
would be that Harman has seduced the “code” itself with her ability to produce multiple 
and contested identities in her attempts to locate identity, albeit a hyperreal one, within a 
postmodern culture. 
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What is important to know is that I read Butler as a radical feminist who is not 
only concerned with showing how power legitimates gender conceptions, but whose 
project is ultimately aimed at the nullification of gender categories as a means for 
conceptualization.   Through this nullification, her aspirations of rendering all gender 
performances as possible are fully realized.  Hence, for Butler, it is necessary to split sex 
from gender and sexuality, as in splitting the map from the territory, in order to 
understand how the coupling of sex, gender, and sexuality have informed what she argues 
are limiting accounts of gender.  For Baudrillard, all gender categories are simulacra—a 
hyperreal and self-reifying normalizing, socially constructed category that is at its 
foundation a hyperreal system of gender signification based on the cultural hailing of 
certain power-simulacra as “real.”  This understanding of gender is thus a simulacrum of 
the “real” since the system of gender and its social value becomes the “real” of gender 
itself.   
 Both England and Harman seemingly offended the masculinist military collective 
through their actions depicted in the media of the photographs of abuse, and this was 
pointed out in both courts-martial cases’ closing arguments.  The prosecution in both 
cases was quick to point out that the actions observed in the photographs was offensive to 
the military, and this point became gendered when at the England trial the prosecuting 
attorney looked at the all male panel and stated “she has tainted our army.  Her actions 
have made us look badly, has harmed the image of the army, and it is she who is 
responsible for more violence done against American soldiers in Iraq because of these 
photographs” (paraphrased).  This seems to be a clear delineation of boundaries in terms 
of gender such that an us/them rhetoric is used to distinguish between good and bad, 
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masculine and feminine.  Obviously England was not in the good-old-boys club of the 
military and did not count as a fellow soldier anymore.  She was now evidence of the 
feminine irrational symbolic code.  Nonetheless, this interpretation is in favor of the 
hyperreal rhetoric of gender simulation, as both England (in most accounts) and Harman 
were shown not to have participated in abuse of detainees, and thus this is an example of 
Baudrillard’s implosion of reality itself. 
5.4 The Simulacra of Gender at Abu Ghraib and the Courts-Martial 
 
 If all gender is power-simulacra, in that it is a self-perpetuating and reifying 
category of the “real,” then Baudrillard and Butler would agree that gender performances 
are understood with regard to their socially constructed system or “code” for reference.  
For postmodern identities, it is the model of reality that is more real then the reality it is 
supposed to represent.  In this case, I consider gender as a simulacra identity in that it is 
real only as a “consequence” of its performance within contexts that have created a 
narrative of gender “realness.”    
For Butler, unlike Baudrillard, gender performances have direct consequences for 
bodies, where gender is realized through power and the policing/surveillance of norms.  
On the other hand, Baudrillard would critique these norms in terms of simulacra norms, 
as gender for Baudrillard is only a game of seduction, and not about the production of 
identity in terms of power.  Nonetheless, both Baudrillard and Butler show that systems 
of “realness” are themselves constructed, and then reified such that “realness” is obtained 
through mimicry of the normalizing system itself, or what I call “power-simulacra” and 
the “rule by simulacra of reality.”   
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For Baudrillard, gender identity is about cultural signs, where identity culminates 
in the grabbing and identifying with the many available free-floating simulacra.  He does 
not view gender as something “real,” and instead sees gender as hyperreal—that which 
has no referential origin or reality apart from a self-legitimating system (self-referentially 
valid), where the imaginary is implicated as the “real.”  In a hyperreality, “reality” itself 
has collapsed, and only image, illustration, or simulation is left—the model of “reality” is 
more real than the reality it supposedly represents.  It is this hyperreality that comes to 
function as the “real,” or a simulacrum of reality, as signs have been substituted for the 
“real” itself.  Considering identity in a postmodern culture, it follows that realness is 
about signification, with gender understood as hyperreal simulacra categories for identity.  
When individuals conform and contort their identities to the hyperreal categories of 
gender, or when identities are understood in terms of some gender “code,” these identities 
can be understood as succumbing to rule by simulacra of reality.  Consequently, although 
Baudrillard claims that “realness” is dominated by a simulacrum of reality, he provides 
the means necessary for discussing the hyperreality of gender category simulations. 
For Butler, gender is understood similarly to that of Baudrillard, however Butler 
allows for an analysis of power, where the policing of self-presentation is in terms of 
social norms.  She argues that surveillance itself constrains our behavior and appearance 
formations, and that gender is a performative identity that can be conceptualized in terms 
of value with regards to its legitimating practices.  Thus for Butler, there is no gender 
identity behind the expression of gender, as that identity is performatively and 
ritualistically constituted by the juridical system that informs gender categories.  Gender 
for Butler is thus an act of “doing” that is understood with regard to a socially constructed 
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standard, which is at base level a simulacra of reality.  Hence, gender is simulacra for 
Butler, as for Baudrillard, in that it is neither a representation of reality, nor a description 
of reality, as “reality” can only be found in the representation itself. 
This account of gender culminates in an understanding of power as in terms of 
some specific understanding of “reality,” where value is socially constructed around 
claims of the “real.”  Both Baudrillard and Butler independently argue for a 
deconstructed understanding of gender, and one that culminates in simulacra of gender 
reality.  I argue that it is possible that Baudrillard’s notion of simulacra can come to 
function as a kind of postmodern policing technique, where what are being enforced are 
power-simulacra within a specific context.  These power-simulacra are what the 
collective conscience has come to regard as “real,” albeit this notion of “reality” is 
unstable and could change at any time.  Hence, this notion of “power-simulacra” is a 
concept that I find helpful in understanding power associated with Baudrillard’s 
theorizing, where “power” is understood as the legitimation of certain, yet unstable, 
significations within a specific cultural context.  In addition, and applying Butler, it is 
possible to show how power-simulacra can be attached to the body in terms of 
signification and value, where the power-simulacra function as the policing mechanism 
for gender itself. 
Consider the gender narrative of the American military, where gender is 
understood in terms of power-simulacra based on the code of constructed masculinity.  
This text informs a conception of gender, where the text itself is what is deemed the 
standard from which to measure, thereby functioning as a decoder, translator, and 
informer of the “code” itself.  In this way, the code becomes the gender standard, albeit 
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fleeting, for “rule by simulacra of reality.”  This code lies in the symbols that represent, 
legitimate, and celebrate the order of the code itself.   
 I argue that the military symbolic narrative can be understood as “masculine” 
because what is ideally valued in the military are those traits that are stereotypically 
associated with masculinity, even though these characterizations are themselves socially 
constructed simulacra.  The flip side of this is that what is deemed stereotypically 
feminine is not valued in the same way within the military as that which is masculine.  
This division of gender in the military is itself rigid, leaving both men and women stuck 
in their characterizations prior to their associations with the code itself.   
One way that gender is performed in the military is through the use of uniforms, 
where bodies are given military legitimacy.  Only certain dress is appropriate for certain 
events in the military, and options exist for women with regard to military uniforms that 
“feminize” them using the drag of military uniform.   Not only do these uniforms control 
the body in terms of identity, but they actually literally control the body in their binding 
fit.  These uniforms seem to function as drag in that they allow for a gendered 
understanding of identity that is in terms of a normalizing ritual and code for dress.  
Additionally, uniforms are worn in accordance with the “law” or rules for dress.  Hence, 
both identity and gender are constructed and performed through the use of uniform as 
well as repetition and the ritualized style of the body itself.   
Nonetheless, at Abu Ghraib, soldiers did not consistently wear uniforms, salute, 
or follow other military protocol, thereby providing evidence that this “code” is at its 
base conceptualization simulacra.  Additionally, testimony at the courts-martial showed 
that uniforms did not always function to police bodies, as prisoners were kept naked, and 
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without any bounded identity markings.  Additionally, American soldiers removed their 
nametags so that they could not be identified, thereby testifying to their actual lack of 
identity.  As a matter of fact, because of a shortage of supplies, it was stated in numerous 
testimonies that Iraqi women’s panties were purchased for “clothing.”  What is 
interesting is that a simulacra understanding of “clothing” appears in the images of 
detainee humiliation, as male prisoners were shown being shamed through the act of 
putting women’s panties on their heads for punishment.   
Using this text that couples the military and masculinity as a frame for 
conceptualization, an analysis of gender and power within the Ft. Hood courtroom 
emerges.  Interestingly, during the England trial, an expert witness for the defense makes 
this point about gender identity and military uniform clear.  This expert was a female who 
testified as an expert witness in child and adolescent psychology for the prosecution.    
Her name was Lang, and she argued that England was not suffering from depression, 
even though England had been on Zoloft (and anti-depressant) for 10 months now.  It 
immediately seemed logical to me that England was not suffering depression or anxiety 
at the moment because of this medication, as the purpose of the medication is to alleviate 
these symptoms.  Lang gave England a mental status exam and claimed that England 
displayed below average intelligence, and labeled England a “follower.”  What is 
interesting is that Lang did not give England any objective tests for measurement of 
either intelligence or depression and anxiety, and argued that England had adjustment 
disorder with mixed anxiety and depression.   Additionally, Lang did not consider any 
family history or context for England’s previous diagnosis of anxiety and depression.   
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Although her testimony was interesting, her gender was made clear in the 
courtroom and in terms of an oppositional relationship to the masculinist economy of the 
military symbolic.  Lang was the only female (other than the defense attorney during the 
Harman trial) who wore a skirt version of the army uniform, in a room filled with men 
and women of the military wearing pants.  This was noticed as the expert walked to the 
stand, in front of the filled room, and took her oath.  Additionally, as Lang explained her 
findings as an expert, she repeatedly referenced her male mentor that she worked with as 
a legitimating tool for her findings.  Lang stated that she had just graduated two years 
prior with a psychology degree and was new to Ft. Hood.   In this way, she was 
evidencing (feminine) weakness as an expert (her role at the trials) by referring to another 
male expert in the field to justify her professional position and psychological findings.  
Possibly the greatest evidencing of femininity made by this expert was her act of knitting 
a long yarn project in the middle of the courtroom, and in full view of the panel (jury) 
and other military peers.  This is an important, if not genius move, by the defense because 
it served to legitimate and reify the masculinist code of the military through an 
oppositional subordinate relationship of femininity.  Additionally, it was an all out 
statement that this expert knew her place and would happily occupy the subordinate 
feminine role through her actions, or use of craft as a feminine symbolic narrative.  In this 
way, the defense expert was succumbing to rule by simulacra of reality. 
These actions can be read as making the following claim: “The military accepts 
femininity so long as it is subordinate to masculinity.”  After all, this was the courts-
martial of a female soldier, and the gender message here is that this “rotten apple” was 
“rotten” because of her lack of ability to interpret and reify the code of military 
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constructed masculinity correctly.  After all, this is the hyperreal code that England was 
being judged in terms of, and even though this code of gender simulacra was itself 
constructed, it indeed functioned as power-simulacra in that it was considered to be “real” 
with regards to understanding gender within the military. 
This interpretation reifies without critical questioning the separate spheres 
doctrine of gender division, namely the association of masculinity and the public sphere 
and femininity and the private sphere.  As one can imagine it to be difficult to be a female 
expert witness in a room of alpha military males, the performance of femininity that this 
expert gave served to comfort masculinist positions in the room by bowing to the law of 
the father or phallus.  Specifically, to be heard in a room full of masculine subjectivities, 
it might have been the best legal strategy to legitimize the phallus so that the phallic order 
was not questioned.  Consequently, this interpretation is about the authority of the power-
simulacra of masculinity within the military, functioning as the policing mechanism for 
gender itself and the hyperreality of gender category simulations. 
Another example of gender performance (at the Harman trial this time) that can 
be understood in terms of the masculinist code of the military was that of Captain 
Takemura.  Consider the female and soft-spoken Takemura versus the tough, rational, 
and hard edged civilian attorney Frank Spinner.  Repeatedly, when Harman was 
described as a maternal caregiver it was by Takemura in a soft voice and through the use 
of photographs showing Harman doing service activities and making friends with Iraqi 
families and children.  During closing arguments it was again Takemura who pled with 
the panel in her soft voice, sometimes so soft one could not be sure what she said, as she 
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motioned to maternal-Sabrina and the pictures from Iraq that showed Sabrina performing 
stereotypical feminine roles.   
In the courtroom, it was a telling site that the only female attorney in the Harman 
trial was the one who elicited confessions of being afraid out of the male soldiers.  In this 
way, Takemura wore the persona of the motherly caregiver who could empathize with 
fear, and who could make it a safe place to address this fear, even in the courtroom which 
was itself doused plentifully with the military’s simulacra code of masculinity.  I argue 
that she could elicit these confessions because she understood the military code, and 
inserted herself as a role acceptable with regards to this masculine symbolic narrative.  
According to the code itself, the expression of fear is stereotypically understood as 
unmasculine.  Interestingly, Takemura elicited these confessions while wearing the 
masculine uniform of the military.  What is telling here is that none of the male soldiers 
made these confessions to any of the male attorneys or the judge, and only to the mother 
figure in the courtroom.  Thus, the policing technique associated with gender and power 
is evidenced in the form of a code that sets up power-simulacra as the self-reifying 
standard of the code itself, and namely masculinity.  Interestingly, with regards to 
gendering Takemura, she is both feminine and masculine in this example, thereby 
showing gender constructions to be simulacra identities because of their constructed and 
fleeting nature of identification.  Regarding the male soldiers who testified that they 
experienced fear, their claims do not match up with masculinity, and this is Baudrillard’s 
point about the simulacra nature of postmodern identity categories—they cannot signify 
themselves in any stable and meaningful way.  Hence, masculinity as a category for 
identification is fleeting with regards to coherence.   
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Consider the above example in terms of Baudrillard’s seduction.  Male soldiers 
admitted under oath that they were scared to stop the abusiveness of other American 
soldiers towards the Iraqi detainees because they were in fear of retaliation.  The male 
soldiers admitting to being scared in a military court shows the seduction of gender 
identity in that these males are shown to evidence both military masculinity and feminine 
fear.  This was an important point in the courts-martial with regard to gender identity, as 
these admissions of fear were being made to the only female attorney associated with the 
trial, and to one who embodied femininity as she was wearing the skirt-version of the 
military uniform, or exhibiting the feminine persona-fascia while in military “drag.”  As 
a further testimony of Takemura’s performance of femininity, everyday in court, 
Takemura showed up in full make-up and with her hair immaculately styled.  She even 
was concerned with re-applying make-up throughout the day, and visibly during court 
recesses.  Takemura’s gender performance was thus the seduction of gender signs, as 
Takemura displayed the signs of both masculine power and femininity in the courtroom 
as well as within the masculinist military.  Likewise, the male soldiers who displayed fear 
in their testimonies evidenced both the masculinity associated with the military by virtue 
of being a soldier, but also the vulnerability of femininity in their claims of fear.  
Takemura thus both displays the powerful masculine perspective while wearing her 
feminine persona identity, and the soldiers display femininity while also maintaining their 
roles as soldiers within the masculinist military. 
 This same use of gender simulacra was evident in the Harman trials, where 
Harman was sold to the panel as a maternal caregiver.  The archetype of “maternal 
Sabrina” was vivid in the life sized photographs of Harman at Al Hilla, another military 
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compound in Iraq.  Again, Harman was not seen as a soldier in the courtroom or in Iraq, 
and instead was repeatedly described as a caregiver, motherly individual, and even a 
social worker who cared about the experiences of Iraqi children.5  Instead of being an 
equal soldier in the courtroom to other male soldiers, Harman was cast into the role of the 
female symbolic narrative that defines women as caregivers and nurturers, even though 
she was a member of the masculinist military itself.  Unlike Takemura, however, Harman 
was not inserted into the code of masculinity because she did not evidence the simulacra 
gender of masculinity.   Instead, her identity as a soldier was stripped from her, and 
possibly given her characterizations as a feminine soldier, which subverted masculinist 
military ideals.   
Perhaps this is why she, and other soldiers who faced courts-martial, obtained the 
tattoo below depicting a rotten apple and their trial number.  (Most of the “seven rotten-
apples” had tattoos of rotten apples on their bodies with their courts-martial number.)   In 
an attempt to claim an identity in a postmodern culture, where identity is fleeting, and in 
a situation aimed at stripping important distinctions such as rank, job, and sense of worth, 
these soldiers forever solidified not only their bonds to each other, but also their bond to 
the military.  Nonetheless, and per Baudrillard’s account of postmodern culture, these 
identities are fleeting and ungrounded.  However, given the permanence of a tattoo, I 
argue that Harman embodied in a lasting way her identity as part of the masculinist 
military, and despite her gendered descriptions in her courts-martial as a “feminine” and 
“care giving” soldier.  In this way, Harmon subverts her gendered characterizations in the 
                                                 
5 Interestingly, the job of social worker can be understood as a caregiver occupation and thus symbolic of 
femininity itself and allowable instances of femininity in the public sphere. 
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courts-martial, and reifies her allegiance to the masculinist and heterosexist “code” of the 
military as both a female and lesbian. 
 
 
  
Figure 10, Harman Tattoo, “Rotten Apple # 6”  
 
 
 
In conclusion, I have shown that what is considered theoretically “real” instructs 
the formation of conceptual and organizational paradigms with regard to sex and gender 
categories.  I use the theories of both Baudrillard and Butler to discuss gender “realness,” 
and argue that gender is a simulacra category for identity.  Although the categories of 
gender are simulacrum in their construction, there are real consequences for offending the 
“code” of gender with regards to conceptualization.  I analyze notions of gender 
“realness” and postmodern identity with an analysis of the “metrosexual soldier,” and 
apply Baudrillard’s notion of seduction to an analysis of Sabrina Harman and drag.     
 One way that Baudrillard and Butler are different is that Baudrillard thrives on 
chaos, hyperreality, and simulacra, and sees a “sea” of circulating fictions as existing in 
“reality.”  For Baudrillard, this gendering of reality serves as reality itself—a hyperreality 
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indeed— as there is nothing apart from the simulations and free floating imaginary 
associated with this phantasm.  It is this hyperreality that comes to function as the “real,” 
or a simulacrum of reality, as signs have been substituted for the real itself and gender 
identity in this case.  Although for Baudrillard, there is no reality apart from the signs, he 
provides a way to discuss gender as hyperreal simulations that are self-referentially 
reified within their very definitions. 
Additionally, Butler points out that gender is under surveillance and can only be 
understood with regard to its very own policing practices based in power itself.  In this 
way, the performance of gender within the military can be understood with the concept of 
gender power-simulacra, where masculinity becomes the regulatory frame and policing 
technique for understanding legitimate citations of gender and value.  Says Butler, gender 
is thus an act of “doing,” where the socially constructed standard is neither a 
representation of reality, nor a description of reality, as “reality” can only be found in its 
simulation, or the code for surveillance itself.  This means that “realness” is constructed 
in the military through the conformity and surveillance of norms, such that the actual 
space of the military is characterized in terms of this code.  Apart from this code there is 
no understanding of “realness,” and only the rule by simulacra of reality.   Through the 
performance of gender within the military, the “doing” of gender becomes a means to 
naturalize the self in terms of the conformity to and surveillance of “masculinity.”  Thus, 
the performance of masculinity becomes a means for military cultural citation, value, and 
signification.   
Throughout this section, I have been concerned with gender and what was “real” 
at Abu Ghraib and the associated courts-martial.  At a private dinner, one soldier told me, 
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with tears in his eyes, that he pleaded with his wife to leave him and to take their 
children.  This pleading was in an attempt to “protect” his family from his continued 
experiences of the “realities” of Abu Ghraib, which still violently run through his mind 
and dreams, manifesting themselves in physical outbursts and emotional distress.  
Although this tearful confession was made by a male soldier who was still clearly feeling 
vulnerable given his experiences of Abu Ghraib, and was thus a violation of the code of 
military masculinity showing the ultimate simulacra nature of gender constructions, this 
confession evidences both the trauma and symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder that 
were the “realities” of Abu Ghraib.  Daily destruction, followed by post-traumatic stress 
disorder, is how soldiers described in interview and in testimony their experiences at Abu 
Ghraib, as well as their current state of existence.  There was chaos at Abu Ghraib, and 
this was real.   
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6. REPRESENTATIONS OF ABU GHRAIB AND IMAGES OF POWER IN 
RELATION TO GENDER 
 
In accord with a position taken in the social sciences, I am in favor of a reflexive 
sociology, where individuals in the social world are able to interpret their experiences as 
their own and as within a context, rather than a scientist interpreting experience for them, 
and in the name of objectivity.  In this way, I am interested in an understanding of the 
individual as effective in their existence—a theory of the individual as existing within 
objective social structures, but also retaining some agency with regards to interaction 
upon and within these structures themselves.   
 This theoretical position becomes important with regards to understanding 
cultural images and as commenting and critiquing the existing order of things.  This 
approach to understanding society and culture yields an individual with agency who can 
critique existing social structures and depict unfairness within contexts.  This active 
individual can thus recognize and critique oppressive power structures in an attempt to 
highlight cruelty and wrongdoings. 
With regard to aesthetics, this is different from approaches that understand art in 
terms of only considerations of form, position, and structure, and from an “expert’s” 
point of view.  According to a recent theory of culture, such as Pierre Bourdieu’s notion 
of cultural capital (using Kant’s ([1790]1988) approach to judging aesthetics), an 
individual is postulated who is not fully reflexive such that she can neither critique the 
deterministic manner of the social structures themselves, nor overcome these structures, 
resulting in a theory that does not account fully for the interaction of the individual within 
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social structures (Bourdieu 1979, Bourdieu 1980).  The outcome of this kind of 
theorizing is that power structures are neither easily uncovered nor questioned.  What is 
needed is a means for critique, exposure, and a way to comment on humanity itself. 
Approaching society, culture, and art in a critical manner allows for the 
questioning of power, value, and authority—allowing for a critique of some contextual 
reality.  Critical art allows for an evaluation of existing power structures, and an 
opportunity to change the world through its interpreted and exposed messages.  Critical 
art is also a means for further informing the public about situations that are unfair, illegal, 
or unethical—it can give a voice to those who have been marginalized.   In this section, I 
analyze power in relation to gender, homoerotic torture, and the depiction of women by 
interpreting representations associated with the abuse at Abu Ghraib prison, from 
aesthetics to advertising.   
6.1 Botero’s Abu Ghraib 
 
Colombian artist Fernando Botero’s latest works depicts the prisoner abuse at 
Abu Ghraib, where what some argue is experienced are the ties and implications of art 
and politics jointly.  His “Abu Ghraib,” each piece simply numbered “Abu Ghraib” and 
marked 1-50, is a series of drawings and paintings (50 oils and sketches—170 paintings 
total) that depict pain, degradation, and torture in the style of his more popular work 
(Ebony 2006)..  Consider Botero’s thematic question of his Abu Ghraib instillation, 
“What kind of society, what kind of country would visit such crimes against humanity?  
Ask yourself, what am I doing to allow this to continue?”  
This was not Botero’s first time painting controversial subjects, as he also has 
works that comment on Colombian death squads, massacres, car bombs, and 
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kidnappings, as well as the drug trade and drug wars in Colombia, and specifically 
pictures of Colombian drug lord Pablo Escobar being killed by police during a rooftop 
shootout.  In 2006, Botero displayed works in Bogotá about Colombia’s 40-year-old 
guerilla conflict (Molinski 2005).  Some of his works have been interpreted as critiques 
of bourgeois practices showing inflated egos through the use of inflated bodies.   
Consider his 1971 piece called “Official Portrait of the Military Junta,” which was a 
satire of military regimes that presided over U.S. domination in Latin America, where a 
bloated dictator and his followers (including a Catholic Bishop) stand at attention and in 
full uniform, while flies buzzed around their heads give the sense of a regime that was 
“polished on the outside, but rotten at the core” (Revolution Newspaper 2007).  That said, 
Botero’s works have a quality of biting social commentary that makes vivid and objective 
our most frightening subjective thoughts (Danto 2006).  Additional artists and pieces that 
can be helpful for understanding how to interpret critical art are the following:  the 
murals of Jose Clemente Orozco (see especially “Man of Fire” and its interpretation of 
social struggle), Diego Rivera’s “Man at the Crossroads” mural (which was removed 
from Rockefeller Center for its depiction of Lenin and communist overtones), Phillip 
Guston’s images portraying his contempt of Richard M. Nixon, Goya’s pieces 
chronicling French atrocities in Spain (see especially “The Sleep of Reason Produces 
Monsters: Plate 43 of The Caprices (Los Caprichos,” 1799), and Leon Golub’s 
“Mercenaries and Interrogations” series depicting the effects of individual and 
institutional power.  These pieces can all be read in a critical vein and as having a 
message.  But what is Botero’s message?
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Figure 11, Images from Botero’s “Abu Ghraib,” #43 (Botero 2005, #43) 
 
 
 
Naked, bound, blindfolded, bleeding, alone or in groups, the prisoners in Botero’s 
Abu Ghraib pieces are enduring abuse and humiliation at the hands of American soldiers 
at the Abu Ghraib prison in 2003, initially depicted in the images leaked to the public in 
2004.  Botero’s images are not copies of the leaked photographs, but are interpretations 
of the abuse through given descriptions.  “Paintings can make visible what is invisible,” 
says Botero, and he wanted to “recreate the atmosphere in the prison with scenes that 
were not scenes in the photos, to make some idea of the feeling, so that I could 
communicate some idea of the horrors that were going on…In a painting there is this 
concentration of emotion through time, leaving out everything that doesn’t concern the 
subject, and this makes the images in painting have special meaning” (Revolution 
Newspaper 2007).  For Botero, paintings restore the prisoners’ dignity and humanity 
without diminishing their experiences—their agony or the injustice of their situation.  
Botero does these paintings through the manipulation of scale, color and form—things 
that are judged important in terms of the Kantian “pure aesthetic.”  But he also makes a 
comment on these events through his art. 
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Figure 12, Images from Botero’s “Abu Ghraib” #56, (Botero 2005, #56)   
 
 
 
Figure 13, Images from Botero’s “Abu Ghraib”, 56b, (Botero 2005, #56b) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
178
 
 
 
Figure 14, Images from Botero’s “Abu Ghraib”, #43b, (Botero 2005, #43b) 
 
 
 
In Botero’s series, there is a picture of the naked human stacked pyramid, bound 
and hooded Iraqis behind prison bars, prisoners wearing women’s panties on their heads, 
forced into sexual and homoerotic positions (“Not far away, a blue-gloved hand yanks the 
hair of a terrified prisoner pushing him under a naked cellmate” (Kennicott 2006)), 
sodomy (broomsticks protrude from bleeding anuses), hooded men lie in their feces, 
bound by heavy ropes and blindfolded, suspended by body parts, tethered by all four 
limbs, mouths twisted into expressions of pain or agony, prodded into painful couplings, 
soiled by streams of urine from an unseen guard, threatened by guard dogs and tied to 
bars in  painful positions. 
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Figure 15, Images from Botero’s “Abu Ghraib,” “bra and panties,” (Botero 2005)
 
 
 
Many of these poses are of supreme humiliation to Iraqi masculinity and cultural 
beliefs as well.  Consider how Botero shows the juxtaposition of masculinity and 
femininity in the above picture:  the male body is hyper-muscular, and wearing a 
complete red bra and panty set.  This image is highly disturbing image that offends the 
cultural sensibilities of Iraqi men.  This could be Botero’s point about the torture of Iraqi 
detainees at Abu Ghraib—humiliation was used as a weapon.  There is the added 
humiliation for Muslim religious beliefs that forbids nudity and males dressing as 
females—the separating of feminine and masculine practices.   Botero also depicts the 
homoerotic torture that was used at Abu Ghraib against detainees, where detainees were 
forced to simulate fellatio and roll around on the floor together naked, yet another means 
for the devaluation of Iraqi cultural practices used as a weapon and for punishment.  
Additionally, consider the use of dogs in detainee abuse as a means for setting up power 
relations between the guards and the prisoners, where dogs are used to intimidate Iraqi 
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detainees through the fear of attack, and also through the exploitation of Iraqi cultural 
beliefs that dogs are unclean, filthy dirty creatures.  These are all examples of using 
culture as a torture instrument against the detainees at Abu Ghraib.  
The very use of the term ‘humiliated’ has a direct link to men being treated as 
women, and thereby offends the socially constructed ideals of masculinity, both Iraqi and 
American.  If we understand masculinity as opposed to femininity, these detainees were 
“humiliated” because they were treated as women, and specifically because they were 
raped, sexually dominated, and degraded.  Men who experience this sexual humiliation 
are thus treated as women because they experience the vulnerability that is usually 
associated with being a woman (Eisenstein 2004).   Eisenstein (2004) states “The women 
I met with during the Bosnian war whom had been forced into the rape camps there were 
not described as humiliated, but rather, as raped.”  In this way, the detainees are socially 
constructed as effeminate, a subtext associated with narratives of homosexuality.  One 
“code” of masculinity reads that maleness is associated with masculinity, which is also 
associated with heterosexuality.  Thus, the torture can also be read as homoerotic, where 
subjugation is identified through the narrative of homosexuality.  In this way, power can 
be interpreted in terms of a gender stratified, misogynistic, and heterosexist system of 
power aimed specifically at punishing.   
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Figure 16, Images from Botero’s “Abu Ghraib,” “sodomy,” (Botero 2005) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17, Images from Botero’s “Abu Ghraib,” #6, (Botero 2004, #6) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18, Images from Botero’s “Abu Ghraib,” #45, (Botero 2005, #45) 
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Sometimes in Botero’s work you can see the boot or fist of a tormentor jutting 
into the picture.  However, there are no overt signs of American flags or uniforms, and 
many times the guards are represented offstage and by a boot kicking an inmate, a club 
beating an unprotected head, a guard urinating on a prisoner, or a hand urging on an 
attack dog.  Because of this, it seems that Botero is focused on the abuse that the 
detainees experienced, and not specifically a narrative of American soldiers.  Says one 
interpreter of the art “The soldiers are part of the system—unseen jailers following 
commands” (Kennicott 2006).   The use of the word “unseen” implies that soldiers can be 
understood as cogs in a machine, where the jailers become nondescript and fade into the 
background.  However, what is important is that actual soldiers committed these abuses, 
and that these actions were not their unique conceptions, as they were following orders 
and responding to other parts of the machine itself.  
 Interestingly, Sontag (2004) claims that it is rare indeed to see photographs of 
abuse where the abusers are pictured alongside the abused.  She links the photographs of 
abuse at Abu Ghraib with the photographs of black victims who had been lynched taken 
between the 1880’s and 1930’s, where white men are shown grinning beneath the 
mutilated body of a black male or female victim.  It is possible that Botero is using the 
historical approach of narration, where abusers are not shown, and where the image 
concentrates on the abused solely.  However, these are all only speculations and 
interpretations about Botero’s intended meanings.       
Consider Botero’s use of “neutral” sensual bodies in his work as an argument that 
his Abu Ghraib is not about critique.  The curvy and puffy features of the individuals in 
Botero’s Abu Ghraib series are reminiscent of his other works where his figures are 
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described as “folk-inspired” (Kennicott 2006).  He uses these “tubby individuals” as 
essentially neutral objects that can be fit into multiple purposes and situations, and 
seemingly create the buffer zone sometimes necessary for understanding this (and other) 
terrifying situations.  It can be argued that since all individuals depicted in Botero’s Abu 
Ghraib have similar physical attributes, the soldiers and prisoner bodies can be read as 
“interchangeable,” and perhaps this is his point about war and anguish—suffering 
happens to all who are involved.   Botero comments on these “puffy” figures by saying 
that “ these puffed-up personalities are being puffed to give them sensuality…In art, as 
long as you have ideas and think, you are bound to deform nature.  Art is deformation.  
There are no works of art that are truly realistic” (Revolution Newspaper 2007).  In this 
way, Botero can be interpreted as depicting emotionality and not any one person’s reality, 
as corporeal signification is not the identification of specific individuals, but of the 
anthropomorphic expressiveness associated with a location itself.  Using this 
interpretation of Botero’s Abu Ghraib, it seems that Botero’s work is not about critique, 
but about giving the prisoners sensuality for his own artistic motives.  The reality of Abu 
Ghraib is that most of the prisoners were emaciated and hungry, and there wasn’t enough 
food for anyone there, including the American soldiers.   
6.2 Botero and the Suffering of Women 
Botero claims that since the prison is slated for demolition, his paintings and 
drawings will be a reminder of what happened there, “a catalog of dark memories, a 
compendium of outrages captured in a long-established people’s vernacular, as a hedge 
against obfuscation and oblivion” (Revolution Newspaper 2007).  In this way, I see him 
again as making appropriate artistic and humanistic statements.  
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Botero adamantly denies that his art is exactly like Diego Rivera’s and other 
Marxist artists who were trying to change society.  For Botero, the message is this: “The 
force of art is the length of time it speaks to people.  Art is permanent accusation” 
(Freedberg 2007), and in this case Botero can be interpreted as providing an “accusation” 
and representation of mistreatment of prisoners at the hands of American soldiers.  This 
can be interpreted as an intentional humanistic statement in that it is true that Botero is 
making a timeless accusation of torture.  Botero was even quoted in an interview as 
saying “I am increasingly sensitive to injustice, which makes my blood boil, and these 
paintings were born by the anger provoked by this horror” (Klein 2006).   
Maybe, as Botero claims, these pictures are a testimony to the events that took 
place at Abu Ghraib.  Yet, I am reminded of the report made by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) that estimated that from some military officers that 
“between 70 and 80 percent of the persons deprived of their liberty in Iraq had been 
arrested by mistake.”  What is more, the notion of “prisoner” might suggest that these 
incarcerated individuals had rights in accordance with international law and were covered 
by these laws in regard to their treatment.  Botero’s art forces us to remember these 
events of injustice.  Says Botero, “Because I thought this was an enormous violation of 
human rights and the United States has been a model of compassion and a model of 
human rights and they are doing something like this violation, It was the biggest damage 
ever to this country’s image….I gave testimony of what happened.  I could not stay 
silent” (Revolution Newspaper 2007).   Here Botero is being political.  Says Botero, 
“These paintings are anti-humanity…an artist expresses himself to communicate…To 
give a moment of reflection and stay in the mind of the people.  That is the function of art 
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I believe” (Revolution Newspaper 2007).  Says Danto in The Nation, “We knew that Abu 
Ghraib prisoners were suffering, but we did not feel that suffering as ours” (Danto 2006). 
Botero makes us feel this suffering, and thus does more than just testify to events, but 
forces the realization of human rights violations—thus possibly culminating in the 
rallying for political change itself. 
Nonetheless, I argue that Botero’s work leaves out a “testimony” of two specific 
kinds of suffering associated with the atrocities at Abu Ghraib prison.  First, Botero does 
not fully address the suffering of the women and children who were detained at Abu 
Ghraib, and specifically the women who were raped at the prison.  Although Botero does 
feature two drawings of women whose hands are bound and who are blindfolded, he does 
not testify to either the rape of women or the fact that children were held at Abu Ghraib.  
Interestingly, there are only two sketches of Botero’s that depict women, and these two 
sketches are only two among 170   
Second, Botero’s work does not depict the women charged and found guilty of 
detainee abuse, namely Lynndie England and Sabrina Harman, two of the “rotten 
apples.”  To not make these women central to his work seems to violate his stated aims of 
remembering what happened at Abu Ghraib.  
If “Art is permanent accusation” as Botero states, then one charge that Botero 
does not make central in his art is the charge of unfairness that women experienced at 
Abu Ghraib.  It was unfair, and also illegal under the Geneva Conventions and other legal 
agreements that the U.S. is signatory, to detain women and children as bargaining chips 
for their male family member’s surrender.  These women and children had not committed 
any crime, were not charged with any crime, and were not a threat to the U.S. occupation.  
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This fact was brought out in trial and seemingly overlooked as an important detail 
regarding the detention of women and children at the prison.  Some females were being 
forced to undress in front of male guards, an act that is seen as particularly demeaning in 
conservative Muslim culture.  This fact is made clear in Botero’s two sketches dealing 
with women, as both pieces show a naked female detainee, blindfolded and with her 
hands bound. (Again, however, these are two minor sketches compared to the 50 wall 
frescoes and 118 other sketches of abuse.)   
Other women have told human rights workers that they have been beaten, 
tortured, and isolated (Rosen 2006).   This behavior was reported by the Pentagon in the 
internal Army report by Army Major General Taguba, and specifically that soldiers had 
videotaped and photographed naked female detainees at Abu Ghraib, with at least one 
Iraqi woman assumedly forced at gunpoint to show her breast.  Again, this is torture that 
uses culture as a weapon, where actual people are not being valued for their humanity, 
and where their cultural beliefs and practices are being used against them as punishment 
and threat. 
Additionally, rape has been reported at Abu Ghraib, a power tactic that is unfair in 
every way, as it results in the raw using of force in taking something that belongs to 
another—namely dignity and body.  Says Rosen (2006) “If acts of ritual humiliation 
could be used to ‘soften up’ men, then the rape of female detainees is hardly 
unimaginable.”  I argue that this is a form of sexual terrorism and abuse.  Nonetheless, 
there is a long history of viewing women as the spoils of war.  Says Amal Kadham 
Swadi, an Iraqi attorney representing women detainees, she believes that sexualized 
violence and abuse committed by U.S. soldiers against female prisoners goes far beyond 
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a few isolated cases (Shumway 2004).  In some cases, as in the case with an Iraqi female 
prisoner named Noor, some of the females raped are getting pregnant (Shumway 2004).   
What is worse, few women in Muslim cultures will come forward with reports of 
being raped since they know that rape survivors are often treated with shame and are 
sometimes killed in an attempt to preserve family honor through a practice called “honor 
killing.”  A 2005 Amnesty International Report stated that there is a stigma attached to 
Iraqi women who are raped, thereby assumedly making the number of rapes far 
underreported.  In fact, the British Guardian (May 20, 2004) reported that one female 
prisoner urged the Iraqi resistance to bomb the jail at Abu Ghraib in order to spare the 
[pregnant] women further shame.   Nonetheless, Middle East Online has reported that 
three young rural women from the Sunni Muslim region of Al-Anbar, west of Baghdad, 
had been killed by their families after coming out of Abu Ghraib prison pregnant 
(Shumway 2004).  The Taguba report also sites a case of rape at Abu Ghraib prison, 
although the report describes the incident as a male prison guard “having sex” with a 
female detainee.  The military’s chief spokesperson, Brigadier Mark Kimmitt, when 
asked about rapes at Abu Ghraib, commented that the department running the prisons was 
“unaware of any such reports at Abu Ghraib” (Shumway 2004).  The military, as of yet, 
has not charged any soldiers for a specific case of sexual assault or sexual abuse 
involving a detainee.  Nonetheless, Botero provides few images of women in his 
collection on Abu Ghraib, and does not show the plethora of abuses that women faced at 
Abu Ghraib. 
  Lastly, the unfairness associated with England and Harman is that they were two 
of the low ranking soldiers who were found guilty of detainee abuse, and it was argued in 
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court that they acted in their own accord.  In fact, Eisenstein (2004) calls these women 
“gender decoys,” as through their participation in detainee abuse they create confusion 
with regard to gender in that it is usually the female who is abused.  This is a horrendous 
injustice to characterize these reservist soldiers as acting apart from the orders of those 
higher up, and one that is especially unfair since it came out in their courts-martial that 
neither of these women actually physically abused any of the detainees. (There was, 
however, one testimony that stated that England stepped on detainee’s fingers and toes, 
but many others that negated it.)   Instead, these women are being vilified because they 
have transgressed the roles still often expressed of women—they have betrayed their 
sex/gender role of caregiver, passive, and concerned with well-being.   
Accordingly, Eisenstein (2004) is correct about the following: a masculinist and 
racialized gender politics does exist within the military and can be understood in terms of 
a rhetoric associated with the misogyny of building empire.  This is a neocolonial 
interpretation that can shed light on the power structures operating at Abu Ghraib, and 
those especially concerning women who wear the masculinist uniform of the military.  
Consider the 112 reports of sexual misconduct filed by U.S. women soldiers in Iraq, 
Kuwait, and Afghanistan, for the years between 2002-2004 (Schmitt 2004).  Indeed, 30% 
of female veterans report experiences rape or attempted rape during their service (Hoppen 
2007).  These are examples of how masculinist power operates within the military 
through the use of power, or sexual terrorism itself, and against our own soldiers as well 
as against detainees in our care (Schmitt 2004). 
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Figure 19, Lynndie England Leash Photo, (www.salon.com) 
 
 
 
       In a discussion at UC Berkeley, where Botero’s work was exhibited in the spring 
of 2007, there was a difference of opinion about the interpretation of Botero’s work.  
History professor Thomas Laqueur highlighted that Botero does not depict any gendered 
messages about the abuse that were evident in the leaked photographs, where troubles 
might arise at imagining a woman as a violent torturer.  Here Laqueur is referring to the 
image of Lynndie England with a belt tied around a prisoner’s neck after Graner had 
dragged the detainee out of a cell, as this is the photograph that is projected on the screen 
behind him.  Instead, masculinist images showed brutality and sexual humiliation of 
prisoners in a “fresco-like smoothness” that allows the viewers the ability to ethically 
engage with Botero’s work (Moody 2007).   
Consider again Botero’s thematic question of his 2007 Abu Ghraib instillation, 
“What kind of society, what kind of country would visit such crimes against humanity?  
Ask yourself, what am I doing to allow this to continue?” The individual is invited to 
reflect about their ability to affect world events and attitudes, or their connections to 
overarching social structures that allow for these events and ideologies.  The social 
subject is thus postulated as an active member of the social structure, both in terms of the 
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social structure and as able to reflect upon this structure in order to critique. This 
interpretation is about society in general, and humanity specifically. 
  I, like Laqueur at the Berkeley 2007 conference on Botero, question why there are 
no women visible in Botero’s paintings. After all, real actual women were harmed at Abu 
Ghraib, including Iraqi women and children who were detained, as well as Iraqi women 
who were sexually abused and even raped.  American military women, such as Harman, 
England, and Karpinski, were harmed in terms of their image and “front-stage” personas.  
Additionally, England’s and Harman’s “harm” of serving jail sentences for crimes 
ordered by those higher-up the chain of command effected not only their own lives, but 
also the lives of those who cared for them, and especially England’s newborn son Carter. 
 But what about restoring the dignity of women who were prisoners at Abu 
Ghraib?  If this is Botero’s intent, why are there no women in Botero’s Abu Ghraib art?  
What does this say about the women of Abu Ghraib?  What does this say about the image 
of women in war and associated with the military?  Are they non-existent given the 
masculinist military system in that they are like a set of mathematical undefineds?  Why 
are women’s voices and perspectives not imagined and realized in Botero’s art?  Maybe 
Botero is not including women in his depictions of Abu Ghraib as a protest of sorts, 
meaning Botero is objecting to the vilification of England, Harman, and Karpinski in the 
media and around the world.  But the larger question still remains:  How can Botero’s 
exclusion of women from this series of his art be understood? 
In the feminist publication, Off Our Backs (Tarrant 2004), they ask the question 
“Who is accountable for the abuse at Abu Ghraib?”  The story points out that the more 
that we focus on England and the photo of the leash, the less likely we are to dig deeper 
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to find out the answers to questions such as: Who was in charge?  Where are they now?  
Will they ever be held accountable?   I agree with that.  To some extent it’s also true of 
Botero’s paintings.   
The only way to get at these questions regarding detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib is 
to examine everything that was said at the trials, and the media did not cover all of it.  
This is what I mean by unfair.  England initially faced 19 charges of detainee abuse and 
indecent acts, with a maximum of 28 years in military prison as a sentence.  But 
England’s actions, as well as the prisoner abuse, did not happen in a vacuum.  Off Our 
Backs (Tarrant 2004) printed the following:  “The prisoner abuse is part and parcel of 
gender politics run amok.  And, the prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib is an extreme 
manifestation of everyday pornography.” 
Now, Botero did not paint pornographic images such as those that are used for 
sexual arousal; however, taken out of context, his images do have a certain sadistic and 
masochistic sentiment about them.  But, the point about Botero’s images is that they can 
be read as a text of “pornography” in that objectification and mistreatment of people who 
we believe have less value than we do takes place in some pornography.  This is the point 
that is made in an article in the feminist journal Off Our Backs, where it is argued that 
pornography usually subjugates women, yet in this case it is happening to men and 
women of a different culture—“those with brown-skin” (Tarrant 2004).  This makes clear 
that in addition to gender, there is a race politic that can be used to understand some of 
the abuse during this war—an us/them, in-group/out-group rhetoric.  Says Eisenstein 
(2004) “War almost always destroys the very sense of humanity that allows you to see 
yourself in another, to see your connection with another instead of their difference from 
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you.  Brutality reflects this process of seeing and then not seeing another’s humanity” 
(Eisenstein 2004).  In addition, Jane Caputi, reminds us that “pornography is an everyday 
narrative underlying not only sexism, but also militarism” (Tarrant 2004).  This, in part, 
can explain the unfairness regarding the rapes at Abu Ghraib.  It might thus be possible 
that the historical cultural narrative of sexism and racism migrated from our American 
culture, all of the way to Iraq, where men, women, and children have become objects of 
pornographic and objectifying treatment.6   The Off Our Backs (Tarrant 2004) article 
even goes so far as to claim that “Lynndie England is being punished for taking part in 
exactly what the culture of militarism fosters”—namely racism and sexism (Tarrant 
2004).   Although during the England courts-martial there was no agreed upon account of 
her physically abusing prisoners, the photographs do show humiliations and perceived 
abuse, thereby vilifying England on the world’s stage.  In this way, England exhibits 
racism and subjugation through the images that depict her smiling and pointing to a 
naked Iraqi male’s genitals and laughing, a clear example of power over the “other.”   
Consequently, the addition of the following—Iraqi women in contexts they 
experienced at Abu Ghraib, American women’s experiences at Abu Ghraib, and Iraqi 
children— to Botero’s collection might have served to show the suffering of these groups 
of individuals in terms of humiliation, rape, racism, and sexism.   
However, there is no certain way to predict an artist’s, photograph’s, or any other 
representation’s impact in a society based on media spin and simulacra. 
 
                                                 
6 Interestingly, and using this same reading of abuse as “pornography,” REM lead singer Michael 
Stipe and director Josh Fox are producing a film entitled “Memorial Day” that provides an analysis of the 
abuses at Abu Ghraib prison read through the lens of pornography, where what is being provided in the 
film is a commentary on our culture’s relationship to pornography and violence (Channing 2006).   
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 6.3 Interpretations of Abu Ghraib Images 
 
Botero’s work shows a similarity between the photographic images of shackled 
prisoners in poses of the cross that can be compared to images of Christian martyrs.  
Imagine the resemblance between Botero’s shackled and brutalized prisoners and a naked 
Jesus hanging on a cross.  What is more, some of the soldiers seem to have intended this.  
Likewise, the cage-like iron grids of the prison bars and cells evoke images of the 
Spanish Inquisition.  Additionally, snarling dogs that are positioned inches away from 
prisoner faces can be read as illustrating Dante’s Inferno.  These are just a few ways that 
Botero’s work can be read as deferring to a narrative. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20, 11:01 p.m., Nov. 4, 2003. Detainee with bag over head, standing on box with 
wires attached, (www.salon.com) 
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Figure 21, 12:38 a.m., Oct. 18, 2003. Detainee cuffed to the entrance of the wing. Photo 
taken from the second tier, Abu Ghraib. (www.salon.com)  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 22, Image from Botero’s “Abu Ghraib,” second analysis of “bra and panties”, 
(Botero 2005)  
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Additionally, the following images were taken by photographer Antonin 
Kratochvil, a Czech refugee who fled to the United States and whose father was tortured 
and humiliated in a Stalinist labor camp.  Following in the footsteps of Botero, 
Kratochvil has recreated the humiliation suffered by naked, bound and hooded Iraqis in 
his project called “Homage to Abu Ghraib.”  Although the below images can be read as 
similar to those interpreted under the narrative of martyr, not all of his images have 
cross-like poses.  Like Botero, Kratochvil says his intent is to emblazon the images upon 
the consciousness of the world.  This project is critical in that it provides a message 
about the experiences of detainees at Abu Ghraib. 
First, the images are blurry, possibly mimicking the feeling confusion associated 
with the uncertainty of being hooded, as well as the perplexity of simply being a prisoner 
at Abu Ghraib, and especially since most of the detainees were either completely 
innocent or common criminals, yet were being treated as terrorists.  An additional 
explanation for the blurry images is that prisoners are not identified by name or face at 
Abu Ghraib, and exist only in terms of the gendered and homoerotic abuse they 
experiences as objects.  Hence, there is no need give names or faces to those who we 
objectify, and in this way the image speaks to the power Americans hold over their 
prisoner-objects.  Second, the image illustrates the loneliness and isolation that one must 
have felt at being a prisoner or guard at Abu Ghraib, as one witness stated in the Harmon 
case regarding his experiences at Abu Ghraib—“we felt forgotten at Abu Ghraib.”  
Lastly, the images testify to the abuse and humiliation that detainees experienced while 
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in the custody of the United States.  The bodies are naked, there is a large dog in the 
background, and the rope looks like a noose.  These are all images of a horror film set; 
however, these are simulacra images of Abu Ghraib, yet they speak directly to the reality 
of Abu Ghraib experiences. 
 
 
 
Figure 23, Photograph #1 by Antonin Kratochvil in his collection entitled “A Homage to 
Abu Ghraib,” (http://www.viiphoto.com/detail-story3.php?news_id=529) 
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Figure 24, Photograph #2 by Antonin Kratochvil in his collection entitled “A Homage to 
Abu Ghraib,” (http://www.viiphoto.com/detail-story3.php?news_id=529) 
 
 
 
 Sontag (2004) claims that “Shock and awe were what our military promised the 
Iraqis.  And shock and the awful are what these photographs announce to the world that 
the Americans have delivered: a pattern of criminal behavior in open contempt of 
international humanitarian conventions.”  The pieces considered in this section point out 
the reality of how detainees were treated under the American occupation of Iraq, and 
specifically at Abu Ghraib prison.  These images bear witness to the stories of the 
detainees specifically and show their horrendous existence at Abu Ghraib and their 
sometimes-illegal treatment by U.S. soldiers.  This was Botero’s stated goal, that of 
telling the story and providing the actuality that the detainee at Abu Ghraib was faced 
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with daily.  These artists provide for us alternative explanations and insights into the 
reality of Abu Ghraib. 
 
 6.4 Fashionable Torture and the “Use-Value” of Women 
 
 For decades, women have been the targets of advertising and marketing ploys 
that state the same and continual message, namely that women are not good enough the 
way they are.  Instead, women should want to be thinner, have larger breasts, look 
younger, be sexual virgins, etc.  It is not surprising, thus, when cultural images become a 
part of the fashion industry, as this is an industry that seemingly depends on women for 
its very existence.  Sometimes, messages are commodified such that they are used to sell 
products.   Some of these commodified messages tell women about their specific gender 
roles: how to be good mothers, what their children want, what to clean with, what beauty 
products they should use, what they should look like, what they should drive, what to 
serve their family to eat, etc.  These messages have typically been encoded in advertising 
schema, and have been critically addressed by feminists and media studies alike.   
 However, the images of Abu Ghraib have been used recently as a means to sell 
consumer products.  In Steven Meisel’s 2006 fashion photographs and advertising 
campaign, women were used as objects to “take the pornography of terror to another 
extreme” (Bourke 2006).  Consider the below photograph.   
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Figure 25, The photo-essay "State of Emergency" (#1) by Steven Meisel, September '06 
issue of Vogue Italia, (http://www.style.it/cont/home-style/home-style.asp) 
 
 
 
In this “photo-essay” on fashion, a woman is being detained by two security 
guards who provide the illustration of violence in the photo.  The woman has her legs 
seductively spread and is no doubt wearing a designer haut-couture dress.  She looks like 
a mannequin that has been put into a painful pose, and is a representation of the idealized 
feminine symbolic.  Her body is perfect, her hair styled flawelessly, her shoes pristinely 
shine—all while being forced to the ground, and despite her grimace.  This image can be 
understood in terms of the phallic economy of masculinity, where violence, humiliation, 
force, and power can be read as erotic possibility (Bourke 2006).  Specifically, however, 
this image is based on the terror narrative of Abu Ghraib, the appropriation of fear and 
the panic imaginary associated with the detainee abuse in Iraq, and larger narratives of 
war and security—and all used to sell products.  The use of women here however tells a 
story as to their submission as (sometimes literally) beneath men. 
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Figure 26, The photo-essay "State of Emergency" (#2) by Steven Meisel, September '06 
issue of Vogue Italia, (http://www.style.it/cont/home-style/home-style.asp) 
 
 
 
Consider the above image.  In this image, a female is being held captive by a 
guard dog and two gloved guards with billy clubs.  The female’s knees are apart, and her 
shirt unbuttoned almost to her waist.  Strangely, she is not terrified of the barking and 
spitting dog that angrily makes clear that she is supposed to remain perfectly still.  She 
looks upwards with large dark eyes and charcoaled circled features.  She looks almost 
alluring at best, and more like a scared little girl about to confess to stealing candy 
instead of the “criminal” she seemingly intends to represent, and who she is also made 
out to be given the situation.  Maybe she is not scared of the snarling dog because she 
knows that she is valuable in terms of her image, as her use-value is directly attached to 
this image itself.  Maybe she knows that the dog is there, like the phallus, to keep her in 
line with traditional power narratives of masculinity, where she, the woman, is shown as 
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subordinate.  If this is the translation, one might assume that she is compliant and 
complacent with her characterization. 
 Again, this image can be read and interpreted according to the code associated 
with the detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib, and its associated narrative of military 
masculinity.  Says Bourke (2006) “The photographs endorse the very taboos they 
violate.”  In this way, both advertisements normalize the abuse at Abu Ghraib, as these 
images take their inspiration from these abuses themselves, where images of torture have 
been translated into consumable products.  Thus, our cultural images of war provides the 
latest fashionista with a raison d'être to indulge in the season’s style—that of phallic 
power, humiliation, and torture.  Additionally, the image further solidifies the long-
standing relationship between the sexes in our patriarchal culture, where what is valued 
is the masculine symbolic, and especially within military power narratives.  In these 
power narratives, as I have argued elsewhere, the military is equated with the macho 
soldier who has authority, control, and supreme rule with regards to politics of the armed 
services economy of value inscription. 
Even so, it can be argued that these photographs, and many other advertising 
images, provide a statement as to the value of women in society, where  women 
themselves are the latest “style” for expenditure, and where what is being utilized are 
actual women.  Lately, I have been thinking about the two different kinds of value 
women have associated with the abuses at Abu Ghraib.  With regards to the 
advertisements, women have a “use-value” as objects to be tortured; With regard to the 
actual events at Abu Ghraib, women have a “use-value” as objects for torture.  In both 
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cases, they also have the use-value of being witnesses to torture, and thereby adding to 
the humiliation and degraded sexuality of the scene 
This argument comes directly in theory from feminist theorist’s Luce Irigaray’s 
claims in “Women on the Market,” namely that women can be understood as 
exchangeable commodities (used, consumed, and circulated) within patriarchal societies 
(Irigaray 1985b; Irigaray 1985c).  In the advertising images discussed above, women are 
the token prisoner commodity par excellence, and thus have value as a subordinate and 
in terms of her identity as “other” in reference to the metaphysical position of the male 
as subject (Irigaray 1985; Irigaray 1985b).  When referring to “the exchange of women,” 
I establish women as bartering objects, and stripped of power within society.  Men 
occupy the role of the producer-subjects and agents of exchange, while women are the 
exploited image-commodities being sold.  It is in this way that Irigaray argues that our 
society continually “refers back to men” as the givers and deciders of women’s value, 
both in the way that women value themselves and in the way that women are valuable in 
terms of exchange (Irigaray 1985).  In these advertisements, male power is exemplified 
directly through force, and female power through compliance, with women’s images 
functioning as the exchangeable value/good, where supplemental value is added to the 
initial item advertised.   
Considering again both advertisements, women are used to sell an actual product, 
and are shown in situations of abuse, thereby providing further support for the claim that 
they are exchanged for the actual commodity-image itself.  Women are thus used as the 
means to convey the message of the advertiser, albeit through the use of a culturally 
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recent and relevant torture narrative.  “Torture has not only become normalized, it has 
been integrated into one of the most glamorous forms of consumer culture—high 
fashion.  In our current moral state of emergency, torture imagery has become 
fashionable” (Bourke 2006).  In addition, this juxtaposition of women as submissive and 
controlled by men, the cultural narrative of gender oppression is realized in image and 
print.  At Abu Ghraib, women were used to “sell” the product of torture, in order to 
please Graner in England’s case, and to please the other male soldiers in Harman’s case. 
This discussion of the value of women becomes additionally important when 
considering the “use-value” of woman as functioning as objects for torture, or as actual 
“interrogation techniques” at Abu Ghraib, in both thing and strategy.  Women have use-
value in that their presence during detainee interrogation violates the Iraqi cultural 
standards of acceptable Muslim male/female social distancing, where what is 
problematic is that women are watching and are present witnesses of the torture of Iraqis 
(nakedness, homosexual torture tactics, as well as Iraqi masculine power as dominated 
by American masculine power).  Women’s gaze upon these events, which show men in a 
powerless, helpless, and incapacitated state, functions as a testament to weakness and as 
a cultural affront to understandings of Iraqi masculinity.  In this way, women are used as 
actual torture techniques themselves.  Another example of the use-value of women at 
Abu Ghraib exploits Iraqi women as useful “bait” for their already-presumed-guilty male 
family members or husbands, and as an evocation for these men to turn themselves over 
to American authorities.  In this way, the women in the advertisements, the American 
female soldiers, and the Iraqi female detainees at Abu Ghraib have all similarly been 
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inscribed with a use-value by men, where all categories of women are commensurately 
marked with a value tag as “woman prisoner.”  The women in the advertisements show 
their value as subordinate as a means to sell a commodity-image, and thus a product 
itself.    For the American female soldiers, their value is that of a prisoner object of war 
in that their worth is in their objectification for torture purposes among and for the 
benefit of their male military counterparts.  Considering the Iraqi women who were 
detained at Abu Ghraib, their value lies in their ability to lure in their male family 
members for detention. In this way, a cultural text is constructed that defines woman as 
having the status of subordinate “prisoner” in a relation to men and the military 
constructions of masculine soldier.    
Hence, value, recognition, and reward are understood in patriarchal societies 
based upon the society’s male-centered ordering, which in turn represents the needs, 
wants and desires of men.  Consequently, women have value in that they serve as objects 
in relations among men.  For these reasons, women’s exchange value is a socially 
constructed representation of masculine needs, wants, and desires.  This illustrates 
Irigaray’s claim that women “mirror” masculine values in themselves, and between each 
other, as a result of the value inscription process.  That is, the male designated “plus 
value,” or supplemental value, is mirrored in women in that it becomes a standard of 
value between women and as a result of man’s labor, thus making the commodities 
(women) commensurate.  Women in this system of value are equal commodities in that 
they, as commodities, equally “mirror” male desire.  This, I argue, is yet another reason 
that the few women at Abu Ghraib (England, Harman, and Karpinsky) have themselves 
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specifically been targeted and vilified with regard to prisoner abuse—they are 
commensurate in their “scapegoat” status.  
It cannot be stressed enough that women’s social roles have been constructed in 
accordance with male desire and to justify a masculine position of power.   That said, it 
is frequently argued that women’s prescribed social roles reflect a system based in 
masculine essentialism – a system constructed with the masculine perspective as its 
norm and aimed at benefiting and representing the desires of the binary half that enjoy 
the position of power, namely men.   
Considering the homoerotic torture of men at Abu Ghraib, women (both Iraqi 
and American soldiers) had a further “use-value” in their status as “women” in that the 
detainee abuse orchestrated and executed by men was carried out in the full view of the 
female detainees located in Tier 1B (as this tier looked down on the first floor common 
area where the abuse took place), and also in front of female soldiers.  In this way, the 
abuse itself can be interpreted as a means of garnering respect and esteem from other 
males at the prison (a flexing of the masculine-military-muscle of sorts), especially since 
the abuse was done in full view of women.  Additionally, however, this abuse can be 
interpreted as attempts at obtaining approval from other men by impressing them with 
power—a metaphoric “gay cruising” ritual.  The homoerotic torture can thus be read as a 
practice of impressing other men through actual homosexual acts.  Other abuse that was 
not sexual in nature can be interpreted as acts aimed at achieving higher status in other 
men’s significations, as this interpretation is about cultural masculinity and the 
significance of relations between and among men.  This can be also applied to Veblen’s 
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([1899]1994; Veblen 2003) notion of conspicuousness as a means to garner social status 
and esteem, and possibly the conspicuous consumption of masculinity through torture-
bonding rituals themselves.7   
In his book, The Rebel (1951), Albert Camus asked the question of how it is 
possible to live in a world in which we know that women and children are being 
tortured.  Camus neither asked this question in order to take sides, nor was he concerned 
with which military regime was better or more moral than the other.  Instead Camus was 
asking how we can face the human condition in our everyday lives knowing that such 
atrocities exist.   
One answer to Camus’ question is through an understanding of the individual as 
effective in their existence—a theory of the individual as existing within objective social 
structures, but also retaining some of the existential sensibilities of “effectiveness” upon 
these social structures.  I am arguing for a position that sees the individual as effectively 
able to interact with these social structures.  Thus, what is needed for a fully reflexive 
sociology is a way for the active social agent to critique the existing social structures in 
an attempt to recognize power differentials in order to rectify these oppressions.   
                                                 
7 This behavior has described as a socio-cultural practice by Irigaray (1985) with her term hom(m)osexual, 
as she provides a Marxist characterization of male social interaction based on male desire as the paradigm 
for understanding value.  Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick (1985) claims this desire between men is based on 
“homosocial” desire.  Sedgwick understands the term ‘homosocial’ to denote social bonds between 
persons of the same sex or men’s relations with other men, and understands the term ‘homosexual’ to be a 
more specific term within men’s social relations that denotes genital desire between same sex individuals.  
The notion of “homosocial” can be used to describe masculinist attitudes that are aimed at domination, and 
especially of women.  In this manner, the abuse of detainees by men can also signify male dominance over 
women in a patriarchal society through a consideration of actual physical power and threat.  The prisoner 
abuse took place in full view of women and by men, where masculine physical power can be made sense 
of in terms of both male status over women, and also male physical power over women.   
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Specifically, this is what my attempt in this section concerning image 
interpretation is about—showing that images can be critical about social phenomena, 
where the artist and their aesthetic representations critically address and challenge 
existing power structures through their work and interpretations of their projects by 
others.  Art that is critical in nature is important in that it provides a testimony and 
judicious comment regarding the existing order of things.  Additionally, art that is 
interpreted as having a message about humanity is important to consider as it is a 
testimony about compassion and civilization.  These approaches to understanding 
society, culture, and aesthetics yields an active individual who can critique existing 
social structures and depict unfairness within contexts.  This active individual can thus 
recognize and critique oppressive power structures in an attempt to highlight, inform, 
and possibly rectify malice and brutality—thereby making the significance endless. 
Nonetheless, not all of the images discussed here are critical.  Instead, advertising 
has appropriated cultural images of abuse to sell products, and this has a consequence for 
women in terms of value.  In the advertising images, power is seen in relation to gender 
such that women are shown to have a secondary status within patriarchal culture—their 
use-value is that of objects for torture, objects to be tortured, commodified objects, and 
objects of male desire. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
I am concerned with the detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib, and I am driven to find 
explanations for this abuse.  Through the use of a social and cultural theoretical analysis 
of the empirical data regarding the prison abuse that occurred at Abu Ghraib prison in 
Iraq by American forces, I have provided an examination of many issues surrounding 
this abuse using gender as a lens for analysis.  I analyze the photographs of this abuse, an 
analysis of the courts-martial surrounding the “rotten apples” punished for this abuse, a 
discussion of the body associated with punishment and torture, and also as marked in 
ways of identification, and an assessment of the varied representations regarding Abu 
Ghraib prison.  My “inside dopester” status at the trials provides a particularly important 
position from which to analyze these events.   In addition, and through the use of 
participant-observation of two trials, interaction with soldiers and officers, and analysis 
of both documents pertaining to the trial as well as analysis of the photographs of abuse 
themselves, using gender as a foci I have been able to weave an account of explanation 
itself. 
Gender as a focus of analysis has become increasingly important in the social 
sciences and has been used to make sense of many different social phenomena.  Gender 
as a social construction has a cultural context, where definitions of “masculinity” and 
“femininity” emerge with regards to this context.  Critical analysis of gender categories 
evidence that sex, gender, and sexuality are distinct categories themselves; yet, 
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frequently, stereotypical understandings of gender link these categories and dictate a 
“code” for gender.  Within this “code,” what it means to be male is tied conceptually to 
both masculinity and heterosexuality.  In this way, the social construction of gender thus 
delineates the boundaries for both “masculinity” and “femininity,” where gender 
categories are understood with regard to power or a “code” in their constructions.  One 
consequence of this “code” is that socially constructed systems of gender “reality” come 
to be understood in terms of power, where those who have power are able to dictate the 
standards of gender “realness” and value.  Social control is established in terms of this 
kind of inequitable socially constructed reality, thereby allowing the generated norms, 
taboos, expectations, social roles, etc., to be understood in terms of this privileged 
viewpoint.   
One example of masculine bias in our culture is social theory’s masculine 
universal voice.  In this project, I have argued that one way American society has been 
“gendered” is through the study of men in social experiments to the exclusion of women 
in these situations.  This is evident in Zimbardo’s prison study and its non-application to 
the realities of Abu Ghraib and the surrounding courts-martial.  Using gender as a tool 
for analysis, it is possible to provide a richer understanding of the abuse at Abu Ghraib. 
Additionally, I have provided an analysis of the chaos associated with Abu 
Ghraib prison and how this chaos does not fit into modernist narratives of rationality and 
order, where I equate order and rationality with the masculine symbolic code.  In this 
way, I described the illusory order and actual chaos at Abu Ghraib as gendered.  I have 
also discussed how Foucault’s identification of the body as the principal target of power 
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actually provides a kind of social control over the prisoners’ bodies and souls/minds at 
Abu Ghraib, and especially given the gendered and associated sexualized nature of this 
torture, and the associated violation of Iraqi cultural constructions of masculinity.   
Moreover, gender as a tool for analysis shows that the Parsonian distinction 
between instrumental and expressive roles served a multitude of functions 
simultaneously, and especially given the masculinist code of the military.  Applying 
Parsons’ notion of gender roles to an analysis of the following, I am able to provide a 
gendered analysis of these social phenomena:  my experiences in defense council 
meetings and in the courtroom, the treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison, an 
analysis of Sabrina Harman as a “maternal caregiver,” and an analysis of Instrumental 
and Expressive torture.  However, I move beyond Parsons, and argue that given the 
complex social situations at Abu Ghraib, Parsons’ notions of “instrumental” and 
“expressive” are limited with regard to their explanatory power in the following 
situations:  when expressive means were linked to instrumental ends; expressiveness 
towards superiors as a means to an ends; and expressive fear in male soldiers.  In 
general, Parsons accounts for the rigid stereotypes of the military with regard to male 
and female roles.  But Parsons does not account for the fact that males can be expressive, 
females can be instrumental, and above all, that expressive functions can themselves be 
“instrumental” in terms of power relationships.   
Also using gender as a tool for analysis, I have analyzed what was “real” and 
what was “simulacra” about gender at Abu Ghraib prison and at the trials.  I provide a 
discussion of how what is considered theoretically "real" instructs the formation of 
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conceptual and organizational paradigms, and especially categories for thinking about 
sex and gender.  Both Baudrillard and Butler have theories of gender “realness,” and I 
consider both theories when describing the categories of gender as simulacrum in their 
construction, but real in their consequences.  I have shown that roles within the military 
have been gendered in their constructions in terms of the code of normative gender 
realness, and show how individuals and actions both reify and subvert these gendered 
constructions, thereby questioning the “realness” of these constructions.  I have provided 
an analysis of the gendered construction of the military as a simulacra of masculinity, 
how military uniforms give bodies legitimate expression while also policing gender 
according to the code of gender, evidences of “femininity” within the masculinist 
military through the ritualized style of the body in terms of military gender politics, the 
association of the doctrine of separate spheres within the military itself vis-à-vis gender 
roles and gender expressions, performances of gender in the courtroom, the idea of 
“drag” as applying to military uniforms, and the perceived consequences of offending 
the masculinist and heterosexist symbolic military code.  Finally, I have provided an 
analysis of non-normative gender practices that call into question the validity of this 
entire system of gender and show its “real” nature to be simulacra, or a “code” based on 
the “rule by simulacra of reality.” 
Finally, I have analyzed different representations of Abu Ghraib and discuss 
images of gender as power.  These representations range from leaked photographs of 
abuse at Abu Ghraib, to Botero’s art, to images used by the advertising industry to 
promote a sort of Abu Ghraib, sado-masochistic fashion.  Within this discussion I have 
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shown that women have multiple use-values with regard to torture, and as “tortured” 
themselves. 
 This project is significant with regards to the discipline of sociology and also to 
women’s studies because I distinctively analyze these events in terms of gender, 
sexuality, and power.  I like to think of this work as a continuation of my life-long 
passion of questioning power structures, finding out how they work, and learning how to 
dismantle them when they seem unfair and subjugating.  This work highlights many 
power structures and shows how they function to reify cultural ideology and social 
practices. 
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